
Anna Bassi

New York University, Department of Politics
19 West 4th Street, room 302
New York, NY 10012-1119
(718) 679-4775
Italian Citizenship (F1 Visa)

anna.bassi@nyu.edu
<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~ab142>

- EDUCATION**
- ◇ **New York University**, New York, NY.
Ph.D. in Politics, expected August 2009.
 - ◇ **Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies**, Pisa, Italy.
Ph.D. in Economics and Management, July 2006.
Thesis title: *Voting, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness. Essays in Experimental Economics.*
 - ◇ **New York University**, New York, NY.
Visiting Scholar: Spring 2003 - Summer 2005.
 - ◇ **Università commerciale L. Bocconi**, Milan, Italy.
M.A. in Economics, July 2001.
 - ◇ **Università degli Studi di Firenze**, Firenze, Italy.
B.A. in Political Science, December 1999.

- HONORS AND AWARDS**
- ◇ McCracken Fellowship, (September 2005–current).
 - ◇ Sant'Anna School Fellowship, (September 2001–August 2004).
 - ◇ Fondazione Invernizzi Fellowship, (September 2000–June 2001).
 - ◇ B.A. in Political Science summa cum laude.
 - ◇ Università degli Studi di Firenze Fellowship, (September 1995 – June 1999).

- RESEARCH INTERESTS**
- ◇ Formal Theory;
 - ◇ Comparative Politics;
 - ◇ Experimental Social Science.

- WORK EXPERIENCE**
- ◇ Research Assistant, New York University and Princeton
 - Summer 2006/2007/2008: RA for Rebecca Morton.
 - Spring 2006: RA for Thomas Palfrey.
 - Summer 2005: RA for Rebecca Morton, Marco Battaglini, and Thomas Palfrey.
 - ◇ Teaching Assistant, New York University
 - Fall 2007: Game Theory II, taught by Catherine Hafer.
 - Spring 2007: Game Theory II, taught by Catherine Hafer.
 - Fall 2006: Games, Strategy, and Politics, taught by Steven Brams.
 - Fall 2005: Power and Politics in America, taught by Anna Harvey.
 - Fall 2003: Intermediate Microeconomics, taught by Jonas Prager.

OTHER AFFILIATIONS

- ◇ **Center for Experimental Social Sciences**, New York University.
- ◇ **Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Sciences**, Princeton University.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- ◇ American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Boston. August, 2008.
- ◇ Political Methodology Summer Meeting, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. July, 2008 (Poster).
- ◇ American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Chicago. September, 2007.
- ◇ Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Chicago. April, 2007.
- ◇ First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Austin. October, 2006.
- ◇ Economic Science Association North American Annual Meeting, Tucson. September, 2006.
- ◇ American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Philadelphia. September, 2006.
- ◇ Political Methodology Summer Meeting, UC Davis. July, 2006 (Poster).
- ◇ Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Chicago. April, 2006.

INVITED SEMINARS

- ◇ Workshop on Distributive Politics, University of California San Diego. April, 2008.
- ◇ New York University, Department of Economics. March, 2007.

REFERENCES

- ◇ **Rebecca Morton** (Committee Co-Chair)
New York University rebecca.morton@nyu.edu
Department of Politics <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/RebeccaBMorton>
New York City, NY 10012-1119
(212) 998-3706
- ◇ **Michael Laver** (Committee Co-Chair)
New York University michael.laver@nyu.edu
Department of Politics <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/MichaelLaver>
New York City, NY 10012-1119
(212) 998-8534
- ◇ **Catherine Hafer**
New York University catherine.hafer@nyu.edu
Department of Politics <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/CatherineHafer>
New York City, NY 10012-1119
(212) 992-9679
- ◇ **Joshua Tucker**
New York University joshua.tucker@nyu.edu
Department of Politics <http://homepages.nyu.edu/~jat7/>
New York City, NY 10012-1119
(212) 998-7598
- ◇ **Guillaume Frechette**
New York University frechette@nyu.edu
Department of Economics <http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gjf35>
New York City, NY 10012-1119
(212) 992-8683

**WORKING
PAPERS**◇ **‘A Model of Endogenous Government Formation’, *Job Market Paper*.**

Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Non-cooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their nominal voting weight. This paper examines government formation as a process in which the role of formateur is determined endogenously, or within, a coalition and parties have different preferences over cabinet positions. In equilibrium, if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios, the share of seats they are allocated will be proportional to the parties’ sizes.

◇ **‘Trading Office for Policy. A Legislative Bargaining Model of Minority and Super-majority Governments.’**

In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. The non-cooperative theory of bargaining predicts the formation only of minimal winning coalitions. However, the empirical evidence suggests that half of all governments are either minority or super-majority. In this paper, we develop a multistage non-cooperative bargaining model of multi-party government formation where political parties care both about the allocation of cabinet positions and the expected policy implemented by the future government. For sufficiently high values of the “policy concern” parameter, parties may be willing to sacrifice the office benefits in their entirety in order to achieve a more desirable government policy. Minority government are predicted in equilibrium with the support of external parties with high policy concern. Furthermore, the introduction of uncertainty over implemented policy allows to explain why parties have an advantage to form super-majority governments.

◇ **‘Voting Systems and Strategic Manipulation: an Experimental Study’, July 2007.**

This paper presents experiments analyzing the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Strategic behavior is significantly different under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in a more sophisticated manner, but not necessarily insincerely, displaying the lowest levels of manipulation. The opposite holds for the Borda count games, where players are the least sophisticated but the most insincere. Approval voting shows intermediate levels of strategic behavior. In terms of social efficiency, plurality rule unexpectedly performs better than both approval voting and the Borda count. Yet, plurality rule is the weakest performer under Condorcet efficiency, whereas approval voting and the Borda count perform remarkably well even with a small electorate.

◇ **‘An Experimental Study of Fair Division’, July 2006.**

I consider the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible goods through two different mechanisms proposed by Crawford (1979, 1980). The “Equal Division Divide and Choose” is a bargaining game where the divider, selected randomly, proposes a division and the chooser can either accept it or reject it. If it is accepted, the proposal is implemented, otherwise each player gets the “equal division”. The other, called “Pareto Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocation”, introduces an extra stage in the game where the role of divider is auctioned off. I tested these two mechanisms in an experimental setting. The first mechanism gives results that are efficient and envy-free, but not equitable. Experimental data highlights interesting results about fairness when the two players enjoy asymmetric utilities. The second mechanism produces efficient, envy free, and equitable outcomes, even if players are not completely selfish and rational. This happens because of two reasons: the role of divider is not chosen by nature, but it is earned through a fair competition, and dividers pay the auction by transferring part of their payoffs to choosers.

- ◇ **‘The Effect of Identity, Incentives, and Information on Voting’**, with *R. Morton and K. Williams*.

We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities and the effect is stronger when voters have less information. Nevertheless, financial incentives reduce this influence. Our results suggest that identity may have an important effect on voter choices in elections where incentives and information are low.

- ◇ **‘Delegating Disenfranchisement Decisions’**, with *R. Morton and J. Trounstine*.

Most empirical analysis of voting rights laws focus on the implications of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes as if they are fully implemented. However, the administrative structure used by states varies as does the extent that the implementation is monitored and the competitiveness of the electoral environment. We formally model the process by which states choose voting rights measures such as felon disenfranchisement laws. We find that different administrative and monitoring structures as well as competitiveness of the electoral environment are likely to affect both the adoption and implementation of the laws. Even states with identical laws but different administrative and/or monitoring systems and different levels of electoral competition are predicted to have different degrees of implementation. We argue that empirical research that ignores these interactive effects may inaccurately estimate the effects of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes.

- ◇ **‘Reaping Political Benefits: Local Implementation of State and Federal Election Law’**, with *R. Morton and J. Trounstine*.

There is substantial agreement in political science literature that election laws shape electoral outcomes. The existing literature assumes that election laws are implemented as written, but there is extensive anecdotal evidence that this is not the case. States delegate the administration of elections to county and municipal officials. We argue that these administrators are frequently unaware of or misinformed about the laws, granted insufficient resources to properly determine who is eligible (or ineligible) to vote, and have incentives to purposefully act in opposition to state and federal law. In order to test these claims we collected original data on the partisanship of local registrars and turnout in state elections. In a cross-sectional analysis we find a positive correlation between the partisanship of a registrar and the turnout of their partisans in gubernatorial elections, but that this relationship can be mitigated by institutions set up to monitor the electoral process like bipartisan boards. This suggests that registrar partisanship does have a causal impact on voter turnout in state elections.