

Introduction to the Politics of Industrial Democracies

Professor Matt Golder

Course #: 030:040:AAA
Time: M, W 9:30-10:20
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Description

This course applies the basic concepts of *comparative political science* to the study of industrialized democracies. Its goal is to illustrate and explain some of the systematic relationships that exist between certain social, economic, and political variables in industrialized democracies and not to detail the political history of these countries. As a result, the course will NOT be an in-depth study of 3 or 4 countries (although you will get country-specific knowledge). Our universe of cases will be the industrialized democracies. These are countries in which liberal democracy and free-market capitalism are widely accepted as legitimate ways to structure the economy and society. Thus, the set of countries that we will study includes North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia since 1945.

We will ask questions such as (i) what is the relationship between economic development and democracy? (ii) what are the differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes? (iii) what are the different types of governments and how do they form? (iv) why do minority governments exist? (v) how do different countries elect their representatives and does it matter? (vi) why do some countries have many parties while others have few? (vii) why is policy change difficult and incremental in some countries but not in others? (viii) how do institutions affect government accountability, representation, and stability? (ix) does economics or policy best explain the way people vote? (x) has globalization affected the ability of parties on the left and right to implement different policies? (xi) do political business cycles exist? (xii) what is endogenous election timing and does it matter? The course will provide you with simple methodological tools for analyzing these questions. As a result, we will employ simple game-theoretic models and you will learn to interpret regression results.

Requirements

Attendance at lectures and in section is both recommended and required. In my previous classes, attendance at lectures and section has been a good predictor of a student's performance on exams. There will be three exams - two midterms and a final - and periodic homework assignments. In the interests of fairness, homework assignments that are handed in late will not be graded and exam makeups will only be possible in the most extenuating of circumstances (oversleeping, leaving early for Spring Break etc. are not suitable excuses).

Grades

Midterm I: 25%

Midterm II: 25%

Final: 30%

Participation: 20%

Note: Your participation grade will be based on (i) lecture attendance, (ii) participation, and (iii) homework assignments.

Required Texts:

Books have been ordered at Iowa Book and Supply. However, I also list the prices for buying them online at amazon.com or bn.com in case there are significant price differentials.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. (\$57.31 amazon.com; \$58.66 bn.com)

Course Packet: Available at Zephyr Copies, 124 E. Washington Street.

All readings not in the books listed above can be found in the course packet. This can be obtained at Zephyr Copies. All required books and the course packet have been placed on reserve at the library.

Schedule:

This schedule should be treated as tentative and flexible. It may be the case that it takes us more or less time for a particular topic than I have allotted here. We will adapt accordingly.

Week 1: January 19 – Introduction to course. What is comparative politics?

Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona Golder. 2004. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Ch. 1.

Week 2: January 24-26 – What is political science? What is science? Mill's Methods of Agreement and Difference. Induction versus deduction. Logical fallacies.

Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona Golder. 2004. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Ch. 2.

Week 3: January 31 - February 2 – What is politics? Why study industrialized democracies as a separate universe of cases – the relationship between wealth and democracy.

Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona Golder. 2004. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Ch. 3.

Przeworski, Adam & Fernando Limongi. 1997. 'Modernization: Theories and Facts.' *World Politics* 49: 155-183.

Bates, Robert. 1991. 'The Economics of Transitions to Democracy.' *PS: Political Science & Politics* 24: 24-27.

Week 4: February 7-9 – Parliamentary, presidential, mixed regimes. Unidimensional models of government formation. Minority, minimal winning, and surplus governments.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 41-95 (chapters 3-4).

Week 5: February 14-16 – Two-dimensional models of government formation. What explains why some countries have a lot of minority governments? Introduction to regression analysis.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 339-365 (part of chapter 12), 398-422 (chapter 14).

Laver, Michael & Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-78 (chapters 3-4).

1st Midterm Exam (Wednesday, February 16)

Week 6: February 21-23 – Government survival and political experience. Voting and turnout.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 365-372 (rest of chapter 12).

Huber, John, & Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2004. 'Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience in the Cabinet: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective.' *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 27-48.

Morton, Rebecca. 2004. *Analyzing Elections*. New York: W.W. Norton. pp. 13-28.

Week 7: February 28 - March 2 – Electoral rules - majoritarian, proportional, multi-tier and mixed. Mechanical effect of electoral systems.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 300-333.

Golder, Matt. 2005. 'Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000.' *Electoral Studies* 24: 103-121.

Week 8: March 7-9 – Duverger's theory and the strategic effect of electoral systems. Cleavages.

Clark, William & Matt Golder. 2004. 'Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory. Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws.' Paper presented at the 2003 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 234-244.

Week 9: March 14-18 – Spring Break

Week 10: March 28-30 – Federalism, bicameralism, judicial review, central bank independence. Veto players.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 17-37 (chapter 1).

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 14-40, 122-229 (chapters 2 and 6-9).

2nd Midterm Exam (Wednesday, March 30)

Week 11: April 4-6 – Majoritarian and proportional visions of democracy.

Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 3-43 (chapters 1-2).

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 1-47 (Chapters 1-3).

Week 12: April 11-13 – Economic voting in the US. Are American voters sociotropic voters or pocketbook voters? Are they retrospective or prospective? Is the economy more or less important than policy? Predicting the 2004 presidential election.

Lewis-Beck, Michael & Mary Stegmaier. 2000. 'Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes.' *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 183-219.

Alvarez, R. Michael & Jonathan Nagler. 1998. 'Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election.' *American Journal of Political Science* 42: 1349-1363.

Campbell, James. 2004. 'Symposium: The 2004 Presidential Election Forecasts.' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37. Contributions by James Campbell, Christopher Wlezien and Robert Erikson, Michael Lewis-Beck and Charles Tien.

Week 13: April 18-21 – Economic voting in other industrial democracies. Clarity of responsibility. Ecological inference problem.

King, Gary, Ori Rosen, Martin Tanner, Alexander Wagner. 2004. 'Ordinary Voting Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler.' Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University.

Powell, G. Bingham & Guy Whitten. 1993. 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.' *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 391-414.

Week 14: April 25-27 – Partisan macroeconomic policy and political business cycles.

Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona Nadenichek. 2002. 'Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union.' *European Union Politics* 3: 205-230.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, & Peter Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw Hill. pp. 375-397 (chapter 13).

Clark, William Roberts & Mark Hallerberg. 2000. 'Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy.' *American Political Science Review* 94: 323-346.

Week 15: May 2-4 – Endogenous election timing and its effects.

Smith, Alastair. 2004. *Election Timing*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-67.

Final Exam (Monday, May 9 at 7.30am)