“Non-Homotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative Explanation”,
job market paper, 2007


 “Quality Differentiation in International Trade: Evidence from the Demand and Supply Sides”, working paper, 2007


“Models of Repeated Partnership with Limited Information”, mimeo, 2004

Abstract.  The paper studies a model of random matching in which a matched pair plays the prisoners dilemma repeatedly until partners separate and rematch. Existing literature uses this type of model to explain complex behavior in long-term social and economic relationships. In particular, it is shown that long periods of gradual cooperation building and asymmetries in conduct based on payoff-irrelevant marks (such as skin color) Pareto dominate simpler symmetric strategies.  By enriching the strategy space of the stage game from a discrete to a continuous action space, I prove that all payoffs in the set of symmetric subgame perfect equilibria can be attained with very simple symmetric strategy profiles employing at most three actions.  I also show that some of these strategies are efficient, even when efficiency is defined with respect to all correlated equilibria. Thus, with a rich enough action space, social efficiency cannot explain complex behavior.


“Mapping the Match between UK Exports and Demand in Emerging Markets: Final Report for the Asia Task Force”, joint with Jonathan Eaton and Ana Maria Santacreu, a report prepared for the United Kingdom Trade & Investment ( UK government organization)


Areas of interest: Trade, Development Economics, Microeconomic Theory