Research
Job market paper: "Ramsey Taxation and Fear of Misspecification"
(Anastasios Karantounias with Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent)
Abstract: A Ramsey planner knows that a representative agent distrusts a probability model for exogenous sequences of government expenditures. The representative agent expresses ambiguity aversion by using multiplier preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006) to order consumption, leisure plans. Because equilibrium prices embed the representative agent's worst case model, the planner has an incentive to manipulate them. We provide a recursive representation of the planner's problem and show how the representative agent's ambiguity aversion puts history dependence into taxes, allocations, and government debt. We use expansions in a single robustness parameter to illustrate the impacts of ambiguity aversion on the Ramsey plan.
Work in progress
"Ramsey Taxation and Fear of Misspecification: The General Case" (Anastasios Karantounias with Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent)
Other Work
"Overconfidence, Subjective Perception and Pricing Behavior"
(joint with Pierpaolo Benigno), NBER Working Paper No. 11922, January 2006.