Research

Teaching

Personal

Contact

"A Structural Study of a Dynamic Auction Market" (Job Market Paper)

A dynamic model is developed that incorporates two key features of online auctions for standardized goods.  First, there is an infinite series of auctions for an identical item.  Second, those auctions are naturally ordered over time.  I model the buyers’ decision of what auctions to bid in and how much to bid.  The model is applied to a rich dataset of online auctions for a particular Apple iPod model.  I propose an identification and estimation strategy that allows me to evaluate the efficiency of the current mechanism versus a perfect competition benchmark.  The estimation reveals significant inefficiency present in the existing mechanism.  An alternative second best mechanism is proposed that would allow to reduce market inefficiency.

"An Experimental Study of Dynamic Incentives in Sequential Auctions"

A series of experiments have been conducted to test the central theoretical predictions regarding bidder behavior in sequential auctions.  These predictions are hard to test with field data because bidders’ valuations are unobservable. The results from the experiments indicate that the bidders’ behavior is not significantly different in a multiple auction environment and a single auction environment.  This result is inconsistent with the optimal risk-neutral behavior in a dynamic setting.  It might be explained by either risk-aversion or myopic behavior by the bidders.

Previous Research:

In a transition economy, many of employee/employer's contracts are informal, rather than formal. Even in cases when formal contracts concluded, external legal enforcement of a contract often appears to be imperfect and costly. Sometimes, this brings to the employer the opportunity to “deceive” the employee, paying her a lower salary than was had expected ex-ante. Underdevelopment of the judiciary system and weak enforcement of courts decisions make this problem more serious, and at the same time more difficult to resolve. The paper provides a positive model of “deception” at labor markets.