Critical Engagement with “A Man’s Right to Choose” by Carole Joffe, Jennifer Reich, Danielle Bessett
, and Michael Armato (a small selection of the many engaging, critical
responses that I have received)
From Professor Carole
Joffe, UC Davis
Open Letter to
December 11, 2005
Dear
Most of the responses to your recent New York Times op-ed, “A Man’s Right to Choose, have been eloquently stated philosophical objections to your “bottom line” argument in the op-ed: “If a father is willing to legally commit to raising a child with no help from the mother he should be able to obtain an injunction against the abortion of the fetus he helped create.” My perspective is that of a sociologist who has studied the front lines of abortion provision for nearly 30 years. You start off by positioning yourself as a supporter of Roe v Wade, by suggesting that a valid reason to oppose Samuel Alito’s nomination to the Supreme Court is that he might “nibble away” at this decision. Do you realize that your proposal would do far more than “nibble away” at Roe? It would create havoc in this already overregulated and unnecessarily chaotic branch of the health care system! Your brief acknowledgment, in the op-ed, that implementing your proposal would be “problematic” hardly does justice to what in fact would occur.
Here are just some of the issues that would doubtless arise with the paternal veto right you propose. There were have to be machinery for a “judicial bypass” for those women who needed abortions to protect their lives and health. According to the Council of Scientific Affairs of the AMA, a first trimester abortion is more than ten times safer, in terms of maternal mortality, than carrying a pregnancy to term. For a small group of women, continuing with a pregnancy might be life threatening; for others, there might be considerable health risks. If we have learned anything from the experience of the judicial bypass system already in place for teenagers who feel they cannot notify their parents, or (in some states), obtain parental consent for an abortion, it is that this system can be difficult to access and often humiliating. As the New York Times recently reported, many juvenile court judges across the country (who are elected by voters) are recusing themselves from such assignments, to avoid engagement with the abortion issue. When it is harder to see a judge, earlier abortions are pushed into later ones and some are prevented from occurring at all.
Your proposal would also require doctors’ documentation of threats to the life or the health of a pregnant woman. This of course will add to the cost. And given the extreme politicization of abortion within medical circles, doctors in conservative settings (and it would most likely be the red states that would adopt your proposal, if legally permitted) would likely deny an abortion in all but the most unambiguous cases. As always in the abortion wars, it would be poor women, mainly those of color, who would have the most difficulties in accessing abortions, even those that are medically desirable; your proposal will only make a bad situation worse.
Twenty five years of surrogate mothering in this country shows us other things that could go very wrong in the situation of coerced pregnancy you propose. What happens when prenatal diagnosis in such a pregnancy reveals severe fetal anomalies? Does the father now have the right to change his mind about wanting the child that will result from this pregnancy? Even if he does relent, and frees the woman to choose an abortion, he is subjecting her to a later, and more complex (and considerably more expensive) procedure. And will the father have the right to monitor the pregnant woman’s behavior during her pregnancy? Will he obtain further court orders to forbid drug use and alcohol use? If the pregnancy becomes “high risk,” will he ask a court to mandate bed rest, and to forbid sexual intercourse with others during the pregnancy? These are issues that have come up --often explosively-- in the world of surrogate parenthood, but at least there, the two parties have entered into a contract. Do you really want to subject women who have not contracted to be surrogates to this kind of control from a man from whom they are now estranged?
Imagine another likely scenario. The father, in the course of a compelled pregnancy, starts a relationship with another woman, who is hardly enthusiastic about raising a child born in such circumstances. This “new” woman may convince the father to give up his claims to the ongoing pregnancy and have a child with her! What happens then? A child born under such sad circumstances--to a mother who did not want to be pregnant, to a father who has changed his mind because of a new relationship--will most likely end up in the child welfare system.
The main problem with your proposal, of course, is that it is so utterly unenforceable. How would abortion clinic staff necessarily know, when a woman presents herself for an abortion, that a man (who may or may not be the actual father of the fetus) is contesting the procedure? Would all women seeking abortions have to come to the clinic with notarized statements of approval from the alleged progenitor? Would all the men giving such consent be subject to DNA tests? The fact that this proposal would be unenforceable would not however prevent it from making life miserable for some pregnant women, as well as the abortion providing facilities themselves. Given the constant litigation that surrounds this field, there would doubtless be numerous lawsuits against abortion providers, for failing to comply with partner consent provisions.
Your op-ed
indicates that you are unaware of the considerable efforts to involve men, in
appropriate ways, in the abortion process which have
long been part of the culture of abortion provision.. In the
course of visiting scores of clinics and private offices, I have been struck by
the serious commitment to address the need of male partners. Many clinics
offer counseling to men, either with their partners, or, if
requested, without their partners. Some facilities allow men to
accompany women throughout the abortion procedure (assuming the woman
agrees), and take special care to inform men about such matters as
post-abortion care for their partners, and the possible emotional
reactions to the procedure that both parties may experience. One of the
national leaders in this effort is Claire Keyes, who has worked as an abortion
counselor since 1971 and is now both counselor and director at
Finally, I would like to comment on your op-ed as a example of “public sociology gone wrong.” Like you, I am a passionate believer in public sociology, and think its recent revitalization is one of the best things that has occurred in our discipline in years. I commend you for your many writings that are accessible to an audience beyond sociology. But in the case of this op-ed, I believe you have acted irresponsibly, and have done harm to a cause (legal abortion) in which you profess to believe. . Quite frankly, rather than seeing your op-ed as authentic public sociology, I view it as inappropriate “private sociology.” Based on your individual experience with a contested pregnancy, you are attempting to intervene in a policy arena that you seemingly know very little about.
I am
aware that since this op-ed originally appeared, you have backed off
somewhat. I saw your appearance on Fox last week, where you said you
“were only trying to be provocative” and I have seen your partial
“clarification” that was posted on the Huffington
site. But surely you realize, as a savvy sociologist, that an op-ed
published in the leading newspaper of record in the
Why do I think this matters? Do I think it likely that your ill-considered proposal actually will come to pass? Probably not-I am not sure even a Supreme Court with two George W. Bush appointees would go as far as you advocate. But, I do think-- in the classical fashion of radical ideas making somewhat less radical ones appear reasonablethat you have helped soften opposition to Alito, who “only” advocates spousal notification. You have also helped revive the possibilities of partner notification as an antiabortion strategy. With all due respect, I believe one reason your op-ed continues to generate so much buzz is not only because of what it saidbut who said it. Various antiabortion leaders and father’s rights spokesmen for years have said similar things about male prerogatives in abortion. But you, as a known progressive, in an elite East Coast university, in a field known for its liberalism, offer a kind of legitimacy (and publicity) to these arguments that longstanding partisans can’t bring. Again meaning no disrespect, why do you think that Fox, the most conservative station on cable TV, invited you to appear, two days after the op-ed was published?
Conversely, why
do you think that your op-ed is causing such anguish within the community
of abortion providers? This group knows the real world consequences
of ill thought out policy in the realm of reproductive services. When asked by
pollsters, most Americans favor spousal notification, as they do parental
notification for teens. But most teens already inform their parents of plans to
have an abortion, as most women tell their male partners. The
problem is with the minority of teens who cannot tell their parents, out of a fear of violence and of being thrown out of the
house. For many in this country, especially the young and the poor,
we are already in a “post-Roe” environment; abortion is so hard to access, and
culturally so stigmatized, that we are beginning to see tragedies similar to
the pre-Roe era. In two recent cases which both involved unwanted
pregnancies to teenage couples, the young men induced stillbirths in their
girlfriends, one by stomping on her stomach, the other by striking her belly
with a baseball bat. One of these teenagers, a Latino from
In closing, I would suggest to you that the luxury and privilege you and I have, as college professors, to try out provocative ideas and “thought experiments” in the classroom take on a quite different character when we venture into the print media, especially in an internet age. I hope you will use your many media contacts to disavow the idea that men should be able to compel a woman to carry a pregnancy to term.
I look forward to your response to this letter.
Sincerely,
Carole Joffe
Professor of Sociology,
From Jennifer Reich,
Assistant Professor of Sociology at the
I had not planned on writing, but decided that this last essay is too
frustrating not to comment on.
Since reading Conley's latest essay this morning, I have heard the Monty
Python tune "Every Sperm is Sacred" running through my head. This discussion
has been incredible, in part because Conley, who has as far as I know, has
not focused squarely on gender in his work, is providing what one colleague
of mine called "an articulate recitation of what my undergraduate men argue
in class...its not fair." Sadly, he doesn't engage the voluminous
scholarship or work of respected scholars who have traveled this very road.
Where I am willing to engage Conley--which is actually engaging Judith
Lorber's question from last week-- is around child support, which Conley
reduces to "voluntary fatherhood." What Conley alludes to in discussing that
"Alito didn't go far enough" on spousal notification is the expectations for
unmarried fathers (the rights and responsibilities of married fathers have
always been more clearly defined). In my own research on the child welfare
system, I found that whereas expectations of legal fatherhood (most
particularly financial support) once established are almost impossible to
shake for most men, men considered to be poor fathers whose children are in
the child protective services system find it difficult to claim fatherhood
and establish rights. In both cases, state policies on unwed fathers serve
state interests: to get kids off public support (be it welfare, education,
or foster care). The structural argument most grotesquely missing is a
consideration of how parenthood is privatized with little public support for
raising children. If children received what they needed from public support,
men should in fact be free to renounce their paternity post-conception
pre-birth. (This has all sorts of problems about people changing their mind
following a pre-sex or post-pregnancy contract, as people's feelings often
change in all directions.) I remain uncomfortable with the current child
support system as it--like Conley-- reduces parenthood to genetics. However,
I am more uncomfortable with children whose basic necessities are unmet. If
Conley really wants to argue for fairness in voluntary fatherhood, perhaps
he should start by advocating a public system of family support.
Conley dismisses biological essentialism and then employs it. A man might
want to fetus to be carried to term because it is his genetically. He is
incorrect as well in characterizing abortion as resulting in all cases to
avoid "unwanted children." Many are to avoid unwanted pregnancies which
carry physical, economic, and social sanctions. Some are for wanted children
but unwanted poverty. Some are chosen by women who want children but don't
want that potential father to remain in their lives. Again, engaging
scholarship beyond a Slate.com column could go a long way.
As a final point, I would have been more interested in hearing Conley's
ruminations on his actual areas of knowledge, namely siblings and resource
issues. Presumably, had he successfully persuaded his ex-girlfriend to
ignore not being ready or "minor medical concerns" to continue the
pregnancy, this would have presumably altered his current children's lives.
Is he really suggesting that his core argument about birth order and numbers
of children are irrelevant when one wants a fetus in a fledgling
relationship? I am sad that Conley strayed so far outside his knowledge-base
but glad it has given us an opportunity for such an exchange.
Best,
Jennifer
Jennifer A. Reich
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology and Criminology
(303) 871-2066
Some thoughts about
the science and social organization of pregnancy and “a man’s right to
choose”…
Danielle Bessett
Ph.D. Candidate,
Visiting Instructor,
December 10, 2005
With the gender group poised to discuss men's rights in pregnancy on Friday, I
thought I might share a few informational points about the science and social
organization of pregnancy and birth that raise questions related to the group's
topic of discussion.
Foremost is the question of presumed biological paternity. Most
challenges to paternity are typically handled through a post-natal DNA test.
This post-natal procedure is also used by state officials mandated to establish
paternity for women who seek welfare benefits (whether or not she would
“choose” for her sexual partner(s) to
be aware of the resulting pregnancy);
for collection of child support in cases where fathers have taken on, and then
abandoned, responsibility for a child; and for episodes of Jerry
Springer. Typically, children produced in legally-certified marriages
(which usually include “common law” marriages where they are recognized by
state law) are presumed to be the product of the legally-wed parties until the
proven otherwise, and we can imagine that they might be treated in such a way
in matters related to abortion. But, interestingly, none of the three
anecdotal accounts provided by
insemination, paternity would not be presumed, but would have to be
established. (Otherwise, couldn't women simply tell the abortion arbiter
that another man was likely to be the father?) What would be involved in
such an event?
Currently, the only way to establish paternity prenatally
is for a woman to undergo chorionic villus sampling (CVS) between 10-12 weeks or amniocentesis
(otherwise known to people as “the test with the big needle”) between 15-18
weeks. Pregnancy loss or injury to the fetus may result from either of
these tests in a small fraction of pregnancies, with CVS being slightly riskier
(between 1-2% higher chance of miscarriage than amnio,
depending on the CVS procedure and circumstances, and more likely to result in
missing fetal limbs/digits). However, the time frame for an amnio falls within a
few weeks of the window for a medically uncomplicated safe and legal
abortion. Complications of both tests
may also result in prescriptions of total or partial bedrest
for the woman. Hemorrhage from a perforation of the placenta or vessels
of umbilical cord
as a result of transabdominal CVS or amniocentesis is
also a very small possibility. While DNA testing is indeed “readily
available,” these prenatal tests are typically recommended only with medical
indications (which, though variably constructed, are nonetheless motivated by
forces other than the “property rights” paradigm) because of the
risks they pose. At present, women usually bear the legal right to accept
or refuse these tests during their pregnancies, despite the wishes of their
husbands or partners, healthcare providers, or insurers. While always
contested, the ethical ideal of a woman’s right to accept or refuse testing
emerges from a long tradition of misuse of mandated tests in a rather short
history of genetic testing.
However, a contested claim to paternity in a situation such as Dalton proposes
would likely require one of the two tests in order to establish that the male
party indeed had some “say” over the outcome of the pregnancy, representing a
fundamental break in the hard-won precedent of women’s ability to control the
tests which are performed on or quite literally through their bodies.
Wouldn't this open a dangerous door, for – once opened to mandated prenatal
testing to determine paternity – why should other parties with financial interests
in the fetus (including physicians, public health authorities, health insurance
companies, etc.) not seek testing to insure the “health” of all newborn babies
and make coverage contingent on such tests, thereby requiring women to assume
all financial risk for any so-called “defective” fetuses they may choose to
carry to term? Could not the same principle
In the event that prenatal tests are not required to establish paternity, would
fathers be required to raise the child they insisted be born were it found not
to be his biological child after birth? If not, what would be the fate of such
a child?
Assuming paternity and subsequent rights to the child are established, other
fundamental problems arise. Leaving aside the issue of how we might
assess men’s motives in insisting women maintain a pregnancy in the first
place, how does a “property rights” perspective influence how much control men
would be able to exert over “their” pregnancies? Though heavily debated in its specifics,
current science links some
maternal behaviors to some pregnancy outcomes, and, increasingly,
women are prosecuted for problems in the fetus they are thought to cause with
their behavior. Some might suggest that if men are to bear the burden of
raising a child alone, they should also have some say as to its
“quality.” Would fathers be able to control fetal exposure to the effects
of smoking, drugs, alcohol, mercury, environmental toxins, foods with high fat
and sugar content? How? Would they be able to
overrule a woman’s judgment about the method of birth that is right for her,
the frequency and extent of her exercise (up to and icluding
decisions about bedrest), and medical interventions
during the pregnancy (up to and including fetal surgery)? If they
do so, how does this complicate the “separateness” of women and fetuses that
underlies a father’s claim to the fetus itself?
Of course, bad things do happen to good people, and there is some etiological
uncertainty in many, if not the majority, of cases of fetal disability and
death. Sadly, an estimated third of all pregnancies end in
miscarriage. This is relevant not only because one can imagine how women
would be held under suspicion should a pregnancy end spontaneously under the
circumstances of an injunction (see above), but, equally importantly, because
it illustrates that pregnancies end for all kinds of reasons outside of the
control of either parent.
Finally, while I endorse the view that pregnancy and birth are natural and safe
processes for most women, a variety of factors – including the organization of
healthcare and obstetrics -- have resulted in a situation where close to 400
American women are known to die each year from pregnancy, birth, and post-natal
complications. The CDC has acknowledged that the number of actual
deaths are underreported and may exceed 1,000 women per year. (See:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Safe Motherhood: Preventing
Pregnancy-Related Illness and Death," CDC, Atlanta, 2001; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, "Safe Maternal Mortality -- United States,
1982-1996," CDC, Atlanta, 1998; M. McCarthy, "US Maternal Death Rates
Are on the Rise," Lancet 348 (1996); among many others.) In contrast
to those who would suggest or imply that the risk of abortion is equal to that
of carrying a pregnancy to term, I refer you to data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute (2005; see also, Rock & Jones,
2003; Paul et al., 1999), which places the current death rate from legal
abortion at all stages of gestation at 0.6 per 100,000 procedures, or
approximately ten to eleven times safer than carrying a pregnancy to
term.
An unknown percentage of women will suffer painful chronic conditions as a
result of pregnancy or birth, possible organ loss, loss of fertility due to
hysterectomy following problematic Cesarean section, limited subsequent parity
in the event of an "uncomplicated" Cesarean delivery (Declercq et al 2002).
[Cesarean births are documented at just under 30% in 2003 and are now
estimated at nearly 40% of all births in the U.S. (Hamilton et al 2005; NCHS
2005); parity will be limited in the future because fewer physicians are
willing to risk vaginal births after Cesarean and, while there is debate about
where to draw the line, most obstetricians acknowledge there is a limit to how
many Cesarean surgeries any given woman should have (ACOG 1999; Caughey 1999; Liberman
2004).] These are all conditions that
will affect them long after the 40 weeks of pregnancy are finished and cannot
necessarily be anticipated in advance. Taken together with the mortality
data above, it is safe to say that there is always some increased risk to the life and health of the
mother as a result of a pregnancy, though its extent is somewhat unquantifiable
as a result of very limited data on maternal morbidity. Now, even when
the vast majority of women may suffer no ill effects from carrying a pregnancy
to term, how and when do we insist that a woman take on these risks
involuntarily? If we reduce pregnancy to an exchange, how do we compensate
her for a loss of a kidney or of her future fertility?
(Without granting that surrogates are unexploited, this last point is a key
difference with paid surrogates, who typically consider their reproductive
activities in building their own families complete before becoming a
surrogate. And here we must acknowledge the work of NYU's own Kiley
Kraskouskas.)
Works Cited
Alan Guttmacher Institute. 2005. “Get ‘In the Know’: 20 Questions About Pregnancy, Contraception and Abortion.” http://www.agi-usa.org/in-the-know/index.html Accessed December 6, 2005.
Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. 2001. "Safe Motherhood: Preventing
Pregnancy-Related Illness and Death."
Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. 1998.
"Safe Maternal Mortality --
Declercq, E; C Sakala;
MP Corry;
Duster, T. 1990. Backdoor to Eugenics.
Gold, RB; SK Henshaw; and LD Lindberg. 1990. Abortion and
Women's Health: A Turning Point for
Kraskouskas, K. 2004. Personal Communication.
Liberman, E; EK Ernst; JP Rooks;
McCarthy, M. 1996. "
Paul, M; ES Lichtenberg; L Borgatta; DA Grimes; and PG Stubblefield. 1999. A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical
Abortion.
Rock, J, and HW Jones.
2003. TeLinde's Operative Gynecology, Ninth Edition.
Michael Armato, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, NYU:
Hello everyone. After reading
Choose,” from yesterday’s Times. I feel obligated to publicly disagree
with
woman be able to end a pregnancy that she knew was a possibility of
consensual sex? Why couldn’t I make the same claim—that I am going to
keep the baby regardless of whether she wants it or not?” My first
response is because pregnancy is not separate from her; it’s part of her
body. But beyond that, the logic of this argument seems to me to be in
line with the logic of those (typically men, but often enough women)
who, when a woman claims she’s been raped or sexually assaulted, cry
foul on the grounds that she shouldn’t have been alone with him in his
room/apartment at such and such a time of night. Forget it if she
actually had gone up to a man’s place with plans of having sex. The
logic is one in which once a woman gives any consent at all (and
oftentimes it’s not clear she gave it), she loses the ability to change
her mind, retract her consent, and, heaven forbid, actually keep control
of her body.
describes, once a woman consents to having sex with a man, all bets are
off. He wants her to forgo future claims to her body. What’s also
troubling is that he hints at his friend’s “parallel but reverse”
situation. I think this is a danger of the logic he’s employed. And by
citing this example, he comes just short of saying that perhaps men
should be able to force women to have an abortion if they don’t want to
be a father. If that is the case, then this is “procreative slavery,”
as Judith Lorber points out in her response in the Times.
really about a woman's control over her body. Hence my lack of rights
to have any say in whether my seed comes to fruition.” The seed
metaphor, though common, is inaccurate. Seeds need nutrients from the
soil, but they are complete in
terms of their DNA.
any other man’s) is not. But by using the metaphor of a seed, he
employs a rhetorical slight of hand that reduces women to a vessel,
merely something that helps the baby grow. Were this the case, I would
still support a woman’s right to choose to abort or keep a baby because
it is her body that has to go through the pregnancy process. But this
is not the case. Women provide half the genetic material (and all the
work) needed to produce a healthy newborn. Also, the seed metaphor,
especially when phrased as “my seed,” smuggles in not only the notion
that the fetus is separate from the woman, but another common notion:
the fetus as actually belonging to the man, despite the fact that it’s
“housed” in and intimately connected with a woman’s body. So,
biological language aside, it’s clear that the seed metaphor has very
real political significance.
Americans believe things that loosely relate to his position (fetus
isn’t entirely distinct, but it’s not entirely the mother either;
husbands, by law, should be notified of wives’ abortions). But just
because most Americans believe something doesn’t make it right. What
people believe in the aggregate is the outcome of complex historical
processes. If anything, especially given the history of women’s bodies
and the law and women’s relations with men in the private sphere, what
most people believe in the aggregate lags behind the more progressive
developments of recent decades. After all, I suspect that at various
points in American history the majority of Americans thought slavery was
just, women shouldn’t be allowed to own property or vote, husbands were
entitled to sex from their wives on demand, and the like. That’s why
activists have struggled so hard to fight for various rights.
Finally, on a personal note, I am sincerely sorry that
through what I can only imagine is a very difficult and painful
situation. But I suspect this was equally difficult for the woman
involved and perhaps more so as she was the one who had to go through
the abortion procedure. And I’m troubled because the tone of his piece
is at best dismissive of and is at times closer to being hostile toward
women: “Otherwise, don’t expect anything more of me than a few million
sperm.” Women as agents are absent, aside from the one who wouldn’t
listen to him and instead chose to abort. When he writes that his
desire for fatherhood was fulfilled, it was “by two wonderful children,”
not the woman who carried them to term and co-cares for them now. His
comment that “…those forty weeks of pregnancy—as intense as they may
be—are merely a small fraction of a lifetime commitment to that child”
seems to swipe away an entire array of potential short- and long-term
health issues for women. Perhaps this is an outcome of the NY Times
editorial process. But if not,
I would urge
rethink our personal sense of entitlement to women’s bodies. After all,
the personal is political for us as well.
regards,
Michael Armato