

# Lecture Notes on Industry Dynamics II

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- Very ambitious framework: reconcile firm-level studies of R&D, productivity, patenting, and growth with endogenous growth theory.
- Two separately developed literature:
  - R&D, productivity, and patenting. (Griliches 1998). Not answered: sources of heterogeneity in innovative effort across firms; why some firms prosper while doing little or no R&D; what is a good measure of innovative output;
  - Firm growth, entry, exit, and size distribution. (Long literature: Lucas, Jovanovic, Hopenhayn, Sutton, etc.). Not answered: sources of heterogeneity among firms; what explains Gibrat's law as well as Zipf's law?

- An integrated treatment by KK:
  - poisson process for a firm's innovation: arrival rate depends on current R&D and knowledge stock. (Patent and R&D, i.e. Kortum 1997)
  - optimal R&D investment rule: growth rate independent of size. (Gibrat's Law)
  - stochastic process for innovation: size distribution of firms. (Zipf's Law)
- key ingredient: innovating and multiproduct firms (Penrose (1959))
- industry equilibrium:
  - firms' innovative successes come at the expense of competitors (Bertrand competition on quality, i.e. Aghion and Howitt (1992))
  - allows for simultaneous entry and exit, with a skewed firm size distribution (Hopenhayn (1992))

# Model: Innovating Firm

- profit flow of each good is  $0 < \bar{\pi} < 1$ , heterogeneity of  $\pi$  will be introduced later. Firm's state is summarized by a scalar, the number of goods  $n$  is products.
- firm's R&D determines the Poisson rate  $\lambda$  at which its next product innovation arrives. Most recently innovator of any good takes over the market for that good. KEY ASSUMPTION: not directed innovative effort-the good draws from  $U[0,1]$ .
- Firms don't innovate on a good it is currently producing. However, it faces the possibility that being overtaken by other firms for its current good. Poisson hazard:  $\mu$ .
- At the background: quality ladder model of Grossman and Helpman. (Check why incumbents never want to innovate!)

# Model: Innovation Technology

- $I = G(R, n)$ ,  $R$  is R&D input and  $n$  proxies knowledge capital.  $G(\cdot)$  strictly increasing and concave in  $R$  (decreasing returns), strictly increasing in  $n$ . Another important ASSUMPTION: homogenous of degree one in both inputs. (neutralizes the effect of firm size on innovation)
- Write in terms of cost function:  $R = C(I, n) = nc(I/n)$ , then firm's Bellman equation is:

$$rV(n) = \max_I \{ \bar{\pi}n - C(I, n) + I[V(n+1) - V(n)] - \mu n[V(n) - V(n-1)] \}$$

- Let  $\lambda = I(n)/n$  be firm's innovation intensity and  $v = V(n)/n$ . F.O.C implies  $c'(\lambda) = v$  or  $c'(0) > v$  and  $\lambda = 0$ . Further  $(r + \mu - \lambda)v = \bar{\pi} - c(\lambda)$ , which implies innovation intensity is increasing in  $\bar{\pi}$ , decreasing in  $\mu$ , and decreasing in an upward shift of  $c'$ . (Check notes for the F.O.C.!)

# Model: Firm's Life Cycle

- $p_n(t; n_0)$ : prob that a firm size  $n$  at date  $t$  given that it was size  $n_0$  at date 0. Then  $\dot{p}_n(t; n_0)$  follows that:

$$\dot{p}_n(t; n_0) = (n - 1)\lambda p_{n-1}(t; n_0) + (n + 1)\mu p_{n+1}(t; n_0) - n(\lambda + \mu)p_n(t; n_0), n \geq 1$$

- $\dot{p}_n(t; n_0) = \mu p_1(t; n_0)$  if  $n = 0$ , i.e. exit is an absorbing state.
- Solving the differential equation system using probability-generating function techniques could lead us to several nice implications about firm growth that links back to Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989).

# Model Implications: Firm Growth and Failure

- Simplify that  $n_0 = 1$ , the authors prove that  $p_0(t; 1) = \frac{\mu[1 - e^{-(\mu - \lambda)t}]}{\mu - \lambda e^{-(\mu - \lambda)t}}$ . (Not that  $\lim_t p_0(t; 1) = 1$ , so a firm always exit).
- $p_n(t; 1) = [1 - p_0(t; 1)][1 - \gamma(t)]\gamma_t^{n-1}$ , for  $n = 1, 2, 3, \dots$ , where  $\gamma(t) = \lambda p_0(t; 1) / \mu$ . Intuition: think about the evolution of an entire firm as summing the evolution of independent divisions, each as a firm starting with a single product, so  $p_n(t; 1) = p_{n-1}(t; 1)\gamma(t)$ ,  $n = 2, 3, \dots$ ,  $\gamma(t)$  captures the relative strength of creation and destruction.
- Thus, conditional on survival, the size of the firm at date  $t$  follows a simple geometric distribution  $\frac{p_n(t; 1)}{1 - p_0(t; 1)} = [1 - \gamma(t)]\gamma_t^{n-1}$ ,  $n = 1, 2, \dots$
- In addition, since  $\gamma(t)$  is growing overtime, the distribution grows stochastically larger overtime (More weight on larger  $n$ ).

- Another natural implication is that a firm of size  $n$  exits within  $t$  periods is  $p_0(t; 1)^n$ . (Think about it as  $n$  firms of 1 products). Larger firms have a lower hazard of exiting.
- Let  $G_t = ((N_t - N_0)/N_0)$ . Then  $E[G_t | N_0 = n_0] = e^{-(\mu-\lambda)t} - 1$ . So the Gibrat's Law holds in the sense that the expected growth is independent of size.
- Expected growth conditional on survival is  $E[G_t | N_t > 0, N_0 = n_0] = \frac{e^{-(\mu-\lambda)t}}{1 - [p_0(t; 1)]^{n_0}} - 1$ , i.e. it is a decreasing function of initial size.

# Generating Heterogeneous Research Intensity

- How to capture considerable cross-sectional variability in research intensity: size is NOT a good predictor.
- A quite mechanical way: introduce different profit types in  $\pi$ , i.e. some firm's ALL products are more profitable. Also, type  $\pi$  firm has a research cost function  $C_\pi(I, n) = (\pi/\bar{\pi})C(I, n)$ , i.e. it is more costly to develop larger innovations.
- This setting keeps  $\lambda$  the same across all types. But value per product  $v_\pi = (\pi/\bar{\pi})v$  and R&D intensity  $C_\pi(I, n)/n = (\pi/\bar{\pi})c(\lambda)$  carries the heterogeneity in  $\pi$ .

# Industry Behavior

- Denote the measure of firms with  $n$  products at date  $t$  by  $M_n(t)$ . Then total measure of firms is  $M(t) = \sum_n M_n(t)$ . Further  $\sum_n nM_n(t) = 1$ .
- Take as whole, industry incumbents innovate at rate  $\sum_n M_n(t)n\lambda = \lambda$ .
- Entry: a mass of potential entrants invest at rate  $F$  for a Poisson hazard 1 of entering with single product. Free entry condition  $F = E[v_\pi] = E[(\pi/\bar{\pi})v] = v$ , the rate of innovation by entrants is  $\eta$ . The rate of innovation by entrants are pinned down by  $\eta = (\bar{\pi} - c(\lambda))/F - r$ .
- Size distribution: with  $\mu = \eta + \lambda$ , for  $n \geq 2$

$$n \geq 2 : \dot{M}_n(t) = (n-1)\lambda M_{n-1}(t) + (n+1)\mu M_{n+1}(t) - n(\lambda + \mu)M_n(t)$$

$$n = 1 : \dot{M}_n(t) = \eta + 2\mu M_2(t) - (\lambda + \mu)M_1(t)$$

The authors prove that the resulting steady state distribution with entry/exit is logarithm.

- Estimate an equilibrium model of productivity growth through innovation
- Question: what is the role of resource reallocation in the growth process?
- Borrows heavily from Klette and Kortum (2004).
- Background: Bailey, Campbell, and Hulten (1992) Decomposition of aggregate productivity growth. Within firm growth v.s. reallocation (or entry/exit).

## Preference and technology

- $U_t = \int_t \ln C_s e^{-r(s-t)} ds$  and nominal household expenditure  $E_t = P_t C_t$ . We normalize  $E_t = E$  for all  $t$ , thus  $P_t$  declines at the rate that consumption grows.
- Aggregate CES production function:

$$C_t = \left[ \int_{j=0}^1 Z(j) (A_t(j) X_t(j))^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} dj \right]^{\sigma/(\sigma-1)}$$

$Z(j)$  represents the expenditure share.

- Each input  $j$ 's productivity is determined by  $A_t(j) = \prod_{i=1}^{J_t(j)} q_i(j)$ , where  $J_t(j)$  is the number of innovation steps made for  $j$  up to time  $t$ .

- Suppose the quality of other intermediate goods increase at an average rate  $g$ , for good  $j$  (whose latest innovation happens at  $t$ ), its demand at  $t + a$  is  $x_{t+a}(j) = z_{t+a}(j)/p_{t+a}(j)$ , where  $z_{t+a}(j) = zZ_t(j)^\sigma (P_t(j)/P_t)^{1-\sigma} e^{g(1-\sigma)a}$ . When a firm innovates, it doesn't know which  $j$  is directed, so demand shifter  $z_{t+a}(j)$  has random realization  $\tilde{z}$  and  $z = E(\tilde{z})$ .
- All quality-adjusted prices  $P_t(j) = p_t(j)/A_t(j)$

## Value of firm

- Pricing for good  $j$  follows "limit-pricing", i.e. markup  $m(q(j), \sigma) = \sigma/(\sigma - 1)$  if  $q > \sigma/(\sigma - 1)$  and  $m(q(j), \sigma) = q(j)$  otherwise.
- Thus the profit is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_{t+a}(j) &= (p(j) - w - \kappa)z_{t+a}(j)/p_j = \pi(q(j), \sigma)z_{t+a}(j) \\ &= (1 - m(q(j), \sigma)^{-1})z_{t+a}(j)\end{aligned}$$

- Following KK, total number of products supplied by a firm is  $k$ , new products are generated by R&D at an arrival rate  $\gamma k$ , with an cost  $wc(\gamma)k$ . Also there is a common destruction rate  $\delta$  that one product is replaced by a more productive version by another firm.
- Introduce additional heterogeneity: firms differ in their innovation steps  $q$  when born. A  $\tau$  type innovates at step  $q_\tau$ , which draws from  $F_\tau(\cdot)$ .

- A firm's state is characterized by  $(k, \tilde{q}^k, \tilde{z}^k)$ .
- A value of type  $\tau$  firm has a closed form solution, and define  $\nu_\tau$  as type  $\tau$  conditional expected value of a product. It is straightforward to show that  $w\hat{c}'(\gamma_\tau) = \nu_\tau$ , where  $\hat{c}(\gamma) = c(\gamma)/z$ .
- Firm entry: let there is a constant measure of  $m$  potential entrants, the aggregate entry rate is  $\eta = m\gamma_0$ . We will need free-entry condition that  $w\hat{c}'(\eta/m) = \sum_\tau \nu_\tau \phi_\tau$ .
- The  $\tau$  specific steady state distribution of  $k$  is again well-defined, the total number of products produced by each type  $\tau$  firm is defined as  $K_\tau$ .
- Finally, we have  $\delta = \eta + \sum_\tau K_\tau \gamma_\tau$ .

## Steady State Equilibrium:

- A triple  $(w, \delta, g)$  together with entry rate  $\eta = m\gamma_0$ , creation rate  $\gamma_\tau$ , and a steady state size  $K_\tau$  for each type that satisfy (1) optimal choice of creation rate for both entrants and incumbents (two equations) (2) balanced entry/exit of mass into different type  $\tau$  (3) destruction rate is the sum of entry rate and the aggregate create rates of incumbents (4) growth rate in consumption  $g = \delta E[\ln(q)]$  (5) labor market clearing.

## Steady State Equilibrium Solution given model parameters.

- $w$  is estimated from the data, so leave out (5) labor market clearing
- Look for a mapping  $(\Psi', \delta', g') = \Upsilon(\Psi, \delta, g)$ , where 
$$\nu_\tau = \frac{\bar{\pi}_\tau}{r + \delta - g(1 - \sigma)} + \Psi_\tau.$$
- Solve  $\gamma_\tau$  and  $\eta$  using (1), then 
$$\Psi'_\tau = \frac{\gamma_\tau \nu_\tau - w \hat{c}(\gamma_\tau)}{r + \delta'}$$
- Update  $K_\tau, \delta', g'$  using (2) (3) (4)
- Iterate until reaching a fixed point.

## Estimation and Simulation

- Parameters:

$$\omega = (r\&d(c_0, c_1), \text{capital}(\kappa), \text{demand}(\sigma, \beta_Z s), \text{innovation} - \text{step}(\beta_q, \xi_1, \xi_2, \xi_3), \text{type}(\phi_1, \phi_2), \text{measurement}(\sigma_Y, \sigma_W))$$

- Moments: Mean, Dispersion, and Correlation of  $Y$ ,  $W$ , and  $N$  of 4,9872 Danish firms in 1992 and 1997.
- Using Simulated Method of Moments technique to estimate model parameters. KEY: Identification with unobserved heterogeneity.(Which is quite hard to get from their writing).