Guillaume Fréchette
Fall 2006
Course Number: V31.0360
Time: Tuesdays and Thursdays from
Location:
Office Hours: Tuesdays
and Thursdays from
Course webpage: http://homepages.nyu.edu/~gf35/html/courses.htm
Introduction:
This is a course in experimental economics. The purpose of the course is to introduce students to the idea that economics, like all of the natural sciences, can be a laboratory science. The focus of the course will be on performing and engaging in experiments. As such, I will expect that students design their own experiment and be prepared to discuss the designs of others.
You will be graded in this course on the basis of several factors. First, there will be two to three surprise quizzes which will constitute 33.3% of your grade. These will test concepts you should have learned from the assigned readings and the lectures.
In addition, you will be responsible for writing a survey paper, which will survey at least five papers in a field of your choice. The paper should be both descriptive of the papers you read and evaluative of them. This paper will count for 33.3% of your grade.
You will also be grouped into teams who collaboratively will be responsible for designing an experiment, writing the instructions for it, and presenting the design and instructions in class at the end of the term. One grade will be given to each team and the grade your team gets will count as 33.3% of your grade.
To summarize:
Quizzes 33.3%
Survey Paper 33.3%
Team Experimental Design and Presentation 33.3%
A useful resource to
do your survey paper is the online bibliography of Charlie Holt at http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/y2k.htm
Required book
Charles Holt,
“Markets, Games, & Strategic Behavior,” Pearson / Addison-Wesley. (MGSB)
Additional resources
J. Kagel and A. Roth, “The Handbook of Experimental
Economics,”
D. Davis and C. Holt, “Experimental Economics,”
D. Friedman and S. Sunder, “Experimental Methods: A primer
for Economists,”
C. F. Camerer, “Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in
Strategic Interaction,”
Tentative Schedule
1.
Roth,
2.
Holt,
Charles, Chap. 2 “A Pit Market,” in MGSB.
3.
Smith,
Introduction to game theory experiments
1. Holt, Charles, Chap. 3 “Some Simple Games,” in MGSB.
2. R. Cooper, D. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. Ross, “Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 12, 1996, 187-218. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-45V7FNN-2-1&_cdi=6805&_user=10&_orig=browse&_coverDate=02%2F29%2F1996&_sk=999879997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkzS&md5=82e70c076f7740e992d103bca2aff017&ie=/sdarticle.pdf
3. Nagel, Bosch-Domènech , García-Montalvo , and Satorra “One, Two, (Three), Infinity…: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments,” American Economic Review December 2002, Vol. 92 No.5, pp. 1687-1701. http://lysander.ingentaselect.com/vl=1918769/cl=40/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/cw/aea/00028282/v92n5/s24/p1687
1. Holt, Charles, Chap. 4 “Risk and Decision Making,” in MGSB.
2. Holt,
C., and
3. Holt, Charles, Chap. 28 “Lottery Choice Anomalies,” in MGSB.
1. Holt, Charles, Chap. 5 “Randomized Strategies,” in MGSB.
2. Holt, Charles, Chapt. 24 “Generalized Matching Pennies,” in MGSB.
3. Ochs, Jack (1995) “Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 202-217. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6WFW-45NJFPR-17-1&_cdi=6805&_user=30681&_orig=browse&_coverDate=07%2F31%2F1995&_sk=999899998&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkWW&md5=6d84049a62440ada65b6c4887e00546d&ie=/sdarticle.pdf
4. Cooper,
Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1989) “Communication
in the
§ Design
§ Statistics
1. Kagel, John (1987) “Economics According to the Rats (and Pigeons Too),” in Laboratory Experimentation in Economics.
2. Smith,
§ Statistics Continued
1. Schotter,
Andrew (1985) “Experiments in Economics: Common Practices and Issues”, Mimeo,
Week 7 (Oct. 17, 19)
1. Holt, Charles, Chap. 23 “Multi-Stage Games,” in MGSB.
2. Beard, Randolph T. and Richard O. Beil, Jr. (1994) “Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test,” Management Science, 40 (2), 252-262. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0025-1909%28199402%2940%3A2%3C252%3ADPROTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
3. McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992) “An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game,” Econometrica, 60 (4), 803-836. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199207%2960%3A4%3C803%3AAESOTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 25 “The Traveler’s Dilemma,”
in MGSB.
Midterm grades are
due.
1.
Holt, Charles,Chap. 26 “Coordination Games,” in MGSB.
2. John B. Van Huyck;
Raymond C. Battalio; Richard O. Beil (1990) “Tacit Coordination Games,
Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure,” The American Economic
Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 234-248. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199003%2980%3A1%3C234%3ATCGSUA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 12 “Ultimatum Bargaining,”
in MGSB
Week 11 (Nov. 14, 16)
Voting and
Multilateral Bargaining
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 18 “Voting and Politics
Experiments,” in MGSB
Week 12 (Nov. 21)
Trust and Reciprocity
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 13 “Trust, Reciprocity, and
Principal-Agent Games,” in MGSB
Thanksgiving.
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 19 “Private Value
Auctions,” in MGSB.
2.
J. Cox, B. Roberson, and V. Smith, “Theory
and Behavior of Single Object Auctions,” pp. 1- 43 in V. Smith (ed.), Research
in Experimental Economics, vol. 2.
3.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 20 “The Takeover Game,” in MGSB.
§
Student Presentations
1.
Holt, Charles, Chap. 21 “Common Value Auctions
and The Winner’s Curse,” in MGSB.
Week 15 (Dec. 12)
Student Presentations