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“Don’t knows” and public opinion towards economic reform: Evidence from Russia

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Abstract

As market reform has spread throughout the globe, both scholars and policy makers have become increasingly interested in measuring public opinion towards economic changes. However, recent research from American politics suggests that special care must be paid to how surveys treat non-respondents to these types of questions. We extend this line of inquiry to a well-known case of large-scale economic reform, Russia in the mid-1990s. Our major finding is that Russians who fail to answer survey questions tend to be consistently less “liberal” than their counterparts who are able to answer such questions. This finding has implications both for our understanding of Russian public opinion in the 1990s, as well as for measuring attitudes towards economic reform more generally.

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Introduction¹

As market reform has spread throughout the globe, both scholars and policy makers have become increasingly interested in measuring public opinion towards economic changes (Chhibber and Eldersveld, 2000; DeBardeleben, 1999; Kaufman and Zuckerman, 1998; Powers and Cox, 1997; Buendia, 1996; Przeworski, 1996; Stokes, 1996a; Duch, 1993; Frentzel-Zagórska and Zagorski, 1993).² From a politician's perspective, economic reform offers a series of tradeoffs of short-term costs for potential long-term benefits. If these costs prove unpopular with the mass public, sustained public opposition could sabotage reform (Przeworski, 1991, Chapter 1). As a result, social scientists have been very interested in measuring the degree to which economic reform generates political backlash among the mass public, as well as in identifying the types of individuals that are more or less likely to support such reforms. Measuring public opinion towards reform is therefore a crucial task, and one often accomplished by means of surveys.

Opinion polls, however, are not perfect. As with any measurement strategy, the use of survey data comes with its own collection of potential problems. One particularly germane concern involves the treatment of “don't know” respondents. Recent research in American politics has focused on the problem of systematic biases in survey data that occur when the same factors that make respondents more likely to answer survey questions also make them more likely to answer in a particular way (Berinsky, 2004). One of the most likely culprits for this “exclusion” bias is disparity in access to resources. Thus, the problem has the potential to be particularly acute in the case of economic reform, where it is often the more vulnerable members of society who are more likely to oppose reforms (Kaufman and Zuckerman, 1998; Powers and Cox, 1997; Buendia, 1996; Przeworski, 1996).³

In this paper, we explore the interaction of non-response bias and attitudes towards economic policies in a country in the midst of massive economic transformation: Russia in the mid-1990s. We focus our empirical analysis on this case for a number of reasons. First, Russia is a classic and often studied example of a country that underwent a massive restructuring of its economic system. By the mid-1990s, the consequences of these changes were clearly being felt throughout society, but important questions still remained about the future direction of reform. Second, the surveys we analyze were in the field during the 1995–1996 election cycle, which only served to heighten questions of economic reform and policy in the eyes of the public. Indeed, the elections served to a large extent as a referendum on the job the government had done in managing the economic transformation. Finally, while there are

¹ All statistical analysis was conducted using Stata 7.0.

² See as well Stokes (1996b) for a nice summary of some of the questions raised by the literature.

³ Chhibber and Eldersveld (2000) present a slightly more complicated story, arguing that myopic economic self-interest in terms of evaluation of recent economic changes does not affect attitudes towards economic reform in China and India, but they still find greater support for market reforms among wealthier respondents in China and more support from more forward caste members in India (Chhibber and Eldersveld, 2000, p. 368 and Tables 2 and 3).

a small number of previous articles that have attempted to assess the nature of Russian “don’t know” respondents, they have focused on other substantive topics, including evaluations of the government and democratic governance generally (Carnaghan, 1996) and anti-Semitism (Gibson, 1994; Brym and Degtyarev, 1993).

The results should be of interest both to scholars studying economic reform and those concerned with issues of survey analysis more generally. Our major finding is that Russians who fail to answer survey questions tend to be less “liberal” than their counterparts who are able to answer survey questions. We use liberal here in the classical sense of the word as it has been applied to post-communist politics: pro-market reform and opposed to redistributive policies. Thus, the political “voice” of individuals who abstain from the reform questions is different from those citizens who respond to such items. Moreover, both the direction and magnitude of this bias is similar to those reported in attitudes towards social welfare policy in the United States (Berinsky, 2004), thus suggesting that the tendency for holders of certain types of economic opinions to be in part “silenced” by public opinion research may be a global phenomenon.

In the next section, we summarize the existing research on the topic of non-response bias from work on American politics and present our a priori expectations for the Russian case. We then detail our methodological approach, describing the data used and the issues examined in our analysis. Empirical results are then presented in three parts. First, we determine whether there are common factors that can predict opinion direction and opinion holding. Next, we compare imputed opinions between question answerers and question abstainers to determine the nature of Russia’s “silent voices”. Finally, we compare measurements of opinions on related questions for respondents and non-respondents on a question-by-question basis. In the final section, we synthesize these findings and discuss the implications of our results for our understanding of popular support for economic reform in the Russian context specifically, as well as for survey research more generally.

Potential for bias in established and new democracies

The study of “don’t know” responses has a long history in survey research (for a review, see Krosnick, 2002). While some researchers consider no-opinion responses to be simple expressions of “non-attitudes” (Converse, 1964, 1970), more recently scholars have paid close attention to the meaning of the don’t know response. In this view, the failure to answer particular survey questions is not simply evidence of a lack of reasoned political judgment. As Krosnick argues, “the vast majority of [no opinion] responses are *not* due to completely lacking an attitude and instead result from a decision not to do the cognitive work necessary to report it, a decision not to reveal a potentially embarrassing attitude, ambivalence, or question ambiguity” (Krosnick, 2002, p. 99). Taking a similar perspective, in a recent study of American public opinion, Berinsky (2004) has shown that important information can be lost by ignoring respondents who say they “don’t know” where they stand on a particular issue. If the same factors that enable respondents to answer an opinion question also lead them to take a particular stand on that question, certain types of political interests will be systematically excluded from measures of public opinion.

These biases may arise through processes of opinion expression or opinion formation. Bias arises in opinion expression when respondents abstain from particular questions for fear of social or physical sanction (Berinsky, 2004, chapters 1 and 2). By contrast, bias arises in the case of opinion formation when respondents are unable to express a summary judgment on a particular political matter, even though they have politically relevant interests that could bear upon that controversy. In this current paper, we focus on the latter of these two topics, bias in the process of opinion formation.⁴ Even in developed democracies with long traditions of mass political participation, certain types of politically relevant resources—such as education—better enable individuals to link their personal concerns with the world of politics. Thus, when asked their stands on particular issues, the resource-rich are more likely to state an opinion. If such politically relevant resources also lead these individuals to take particular policy stands, measures of public opinion collected through polls could exclude the voices of the less fortunate.

How might we expect the situation to differ in a newly competitive party system? Consider first difficulties arising in opinion formation owing to resource inequalities. New democracies differ from established democracies because citizens lack experience with freely expressing their opinions on complex political issues, such as economic policies. For instance, citizens might have insufficient experience with new economic structures to form coherent views on public policies. If research from long standing liberal democracies shows that respondents who benefit from redistributive economic policies have trouble understanding the implications of those policies, it seems likely that this problem would be even more severe in countries that have recently embarked upon radical transformations of their economies. Not only are citizens suddenly presented with an overwhelming number of economic concerns to consider, but these concerns are all related to an economic system with which citizens have little familiarity. Moreover, it is not merely the question of economic policy that is new to voters, but also the means by which such policies flow out of democratic (or even quasi-democratic) politics.

If the key to opinion formation in newly competitive party systems remains access to resources, then we might expect such uncertainty over the political process and market

⁴ There are of course also reasons to be concerned with bias in opinion expression in countries undergoing economic reform, especially in more authoritarian countries. However, as opposed to places such as Pinochet's Chile, economic reform in Russia followed on the heels of Gorbachev's glasnost, which removed many of the prior incentives for self-censorship. Consistent with this view, Carnaghan (1996) finds little evidence that Russians self-censored their views in surveys conducted as early as 1989 and 1992. Gibson (1994) concurs, noting in regard to a 1990 survey carried out throughout the Soviet Union that "the consensus of those working the field nowadays is that Soviet people are extraordinarily frank and open.... [and it] is doubtful that the Soviet respondents are trying to disguise their true views by claiming no opinion" (p. 107). We also tested for such bias using techniques described by Berinsky (2004) and found no consistent evidence of such bias across the issues we examined. For this reason, we have relegated discussion of this type of bias to this footnote in order to focus the text of the paper on the more interesting occurrences of bias in opinion formation that we do observe. However, this is not to say that such bias might not exist across other issue areas not considered here, nor that it is not reasserting itself today in Putin's Russia.

reforms to result in similar biases to those found in more established democracies: economic “winners” would be both more likely to offer opinions and to hold “classically liberal” opinions: pro-market reform and anti-redistributive economic policies.⁵ Such a pattern is especially likely in the Russian case. One of the most notable features of post-communist transitions has been the creation of economic winners and losers (Tucker et al., 2002; Bell and Smeltz, 2000; White, 2000, chapter 6). If, as we expect, the same factors—namely socio-economic resources—both influence the ability to form opinions and lead people to take pro-reform positions, there is a strong likelihood that non-respondents will be less supportive of economic reform.⁶ Another important demographic distinction that could lead to bias in opinion polls is the urban-rural split, with the expectation that, in general, urban respondents will have more access to resources than their rural counterparts (Whitefield, 2002; Clem and Craumer, 1997).⁷

Russian public opinion

The data employed in this paper come from a national survey of Russians during the period of the 1995 (parliamentary)—1996 (presidential) election cycle. The survey includes 2841 respondents and was conducted under the direction of Timothy Colton and William Zimmerman. The survey has a three-wave panel design: respondents were interviewed three to four weeks before the 1995 parliamentary election, interviewed again shortly following that election, and interviewed a third time shortly after the 1996 presidential election.⁸

⁵ A priori, however, one could postulate two additional hypotheses. Perhaps it is not resources that drive opinion formation, but rather the familiarity of issues. From this theoretical perspective, support for the non-market practices of the Soviet era would be cognitively “easy” to express. If this hypothesis is correct, we might expect that those unable to answer survey questions might be more liberal than those who gave voice to their political wants, needs, and desires. A third hypothesis—the absence of the exclusion bias—might also be warranted. Here we consider the potential effects of the framing of elite rhetoric. Nascent political party systems are often characterized by a much larger number of political parties than established democracies. Indeed, Russian parliamentary elections have been contested by as many as 30 parties (Wyman, 1997; Clark, 1999; McFaul, 2000). This chorus of elite voices offers frames for a wide range of political views. Combined with pervasive levels of uncertainty in the mass public (Bunce and Csánádi, 1993), it could be that all citizens are equally disadvantaged in formulating opinions. Under such circumstances, there may be no systematic link between opinion formation and opinion direction and exclusion bias might be absent. As we demonstrate below, however, these hypotheses are not supported by our analysis.

⁶ In addition to straight socio-economic status, older citizens have also often generally been considered to have been hurt more by the transition than younger citizens.

⁷ We also consider the possibility that greater religious affiliation might have a similar effect, given the generally conservative nature of the Russian Orthodox Church.

⁸ A multistage area-probability sample was drawn from the voting-age population, and selection of respondents within households followed the Kish procedure. Interviewers made three attempts to reach potential respondents and the response rate for the initial wave was 79.8%. The retention rate over the three waves of the survey was excellent with 2776 (97.7%) respondents completing the second wave and 2456 (86.4%) completing the third wave. Half of those not interviewed were refusals. All interviews were conducted in person. For a complete description of the data and survey procedures, see Colton (2000).

At the time the surveys were carried out, Russia was in the midst of a dramatic political and economic transformation. In the first two years of an independent Russia's existence, a democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin, struggled for political control with a Soviet holdover parliament. The conflict was eventually resolved violently, with army units loyal to the president shelling the parliament. This was followed within three months by Russia's first free parliamentary election in December of 1993, where pro-reform forces suffered an unexpected rejection at the ballot box (White et al., 1997; Colton and Hough, 1998). Over the next two years, Yeltsin and the parliament co-existed in a manner that was largely dictated by the super-presidential nature of Yeltsin's powers (McFaul, 2001, chapter 7). Despite an adversarial relationship with the president, the parliament was busy during this period, enacting over 400 laws "to consolidate the post-communist state system" (White, 2000, p. 66). During this period of time, the dramatic overhaul of the Russian economy that had begun at the end of the *perestroika* period continued and was intensified, unleashing a host of economic ills upon society as policy makers struggled to move to a more market oriented system.⁹ Since Yeltsin had come to power in 1991, GDP had declined every single year,¹⁰ unemployment had increased every year and was approaching 10%, inflation had been in the triple digits from 1993 to 1995 and still remained high at 48% in 1996, and workers were suffering from chronic non-payment of wages. Thus this time period is ripe for a study of attitudes towards economic reform and economic policy.

In order to test our hypotheses concerning the nature of exclusion bias, we divide a series of question related to economic development into two general issue areas: the future direction of economic reform and redistributive economic policies. While it would have been possible to group all of the economic questions together in a single issue area, we felt this approach allowed us to maximize the number of questions in the analysis while at the same time minimizing the degree of conceptual stretching necessary to insure a coherent issue dimension. At the same time, including both economic issue areas as opposed to one or the other allowed us to tap into different dimensions of the economic reform process. The search for coherent groupings of issues here is especially important. To the extent that issues cluster around similar concerns, we can better identify and characterize the sentiment of those respondents who fail to answer particular questions. After all, as survey researchers have long counseled, it is better to use several items to gauge underlying concepts, as opposed to single measures (Converse and Presser, 1986). Our first step, therefore, was to determine whether the survey items followed the expected groupings.

⁹ The economic changes in Russia in the 1990s have been the subject of a rich literature in comparative politics; see for example Reddaway and Gliński (2001), Frye (2000), Woodruff (1999), Gustafson (1999), Aslund (1995).

¹⁰ Although the rate of decline was slowing at the time of the election, down from a low of -12.6% growth in 1994 to -4.1% growth in 1995 and -3.6% growth in 1996 (Tucker, 2006, Table 1.2).

The direction of reform was perhaps the most important public policy question facing Russian citizens at this period of time. The central controversy was whether Russia should continue the process of reforming its economy in an effort to arrive at a market economy, or revert to a more centrally planned and state centered economy. We therefore included questions that asked respondents their opinion on the suitability of capitalism for Russia, whether Russia should proceed to a full market economy, the degree to which state owned property should be privatized, whether land should be privately owned, and whether heavy industry should be kept in the hands of the state.¹¹ We also included two questions that assessed respondents' attitudes towards the consequences of market reform: whether it is "normal" for a business owner to become richer than other people and whether business competition benefits society. We rescaled the questions on a zero to one scale, where "liberal" answers favor market reforms and one equals the most liberal response. An empirical analysis of these items confirmed our expectations that these questions tapped a common latent construct. The seven items (two of which are repeated across different waves of the survey) all correlated at reasonably high levels and an exploratory factor analysis indicated that the items loaded well on a single dimension. Thus, it is accurate to speak of a "direction of reform" issue area.¹²

While the degree of market liberalization is an issue area distinctive to transition countries, the extent to which the government should embrace redistributive economic policies is common to both established market economies and transition countries. In this category, we include questions about whether respondents believe that the government should guarantee jobs for citizens, set food prices, limit the income of the rich, and reduce public spending even if it entails cutting government services. In addition, we also examine whether respondents believe that if some are poor, no one should be rich, and whether or not individuals or the state are ultimately responsible for their providing for themselves. Because a number of these redistributive policies are closely related to policies pursued by the communist Soviet Union—and especially the questions regarding guaranteeing jobs and setting food prices—we code these questions in terms of the classical sense of "liberal" economic policies, whereby opposition to redistributive policies is coded as the more liberal answer. The six items (three of which were carried on multiple waves) correlate together well, with the exception of the item that asked if "it is necessary for the state for the time being to reduce its expenditures, even if this leads to a reduction in the funds allocated to health care and pensions." However, the removal of that item from the analyses that follow does not change

¹¹ All of these questions allowed respondents the opportunity to place their answer on a continuum, which in most cases was a five-point scale. Full question wording is found in [Appendix B](#).

¹² Specifically, the first factor had an Eigenvalue of 2.8, while no other dimension had an Eigenvalue greater than 0.5. The factor loading of the items were in the range of 0.35 to 0.62. In addition, the alpha of a scale formed from these items is 0.76. These results indicate that while there may be some noise in the individual items, the "direction of reform" questions do seem to tap—to varying degrees of success—a single underlying dimension. The full results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request.

our results. As with the direction of reform battery, the items scale onto a single factor.¹³

Empirical analysis

Given the appearance of a coherent underlying dimension in both issue areas, it is appropriate to ask whether the underlying sentiment of the non-respondents differed from the expressed positions of the respondents.¹⁴ As Table 1 demonstrates, the proportion of respondents who fail to answer the survey questions varies both within and across issue areas. The non-response rate is somewhat small on the redistribution questions—ranging from one percent to 12 percent, with an average rate of 5 percent—but the abstention rate is rather high on the direction of reform items—ranging from eight percent to 16 percent, with a mean of 12 percent.¹⁵

To assess our hypothesis on the nature of exclusion bias, we need to measure the opinions of those individuals who answer survey questions and those who abstain from the questions. Measuring the opinions of the first group is straightforward. We simply look at the answer they give to the interviewer. But for the later group, we must impute interests and opinions to those individuals who choose to remain silent. This task is difficult, but not impossible. We can use what we know about the opinions of the question-answerers and the differences in the characteristics of the question answers and the question abstainers to give our best guess of what the non-respondents would have said had they given voice to their underlying wants, needs, and desires (Berinsky, 2004).

To ascertain the nature of these “silent voices” we must first take a close look at the determinants of individual opinion and see how the factors that affect the direction of response are related to the factors that determine whether respondents will form an opinion. Insofar as these two sets of factors are closely related, the potential

¹³ The first factor had an Eigenvalue of 2.3, while no other dimension had an Eigenvalue greater than 0.3. With the exception of one item noted in the text, the factor loading of the items ranged from 0.41 to 0.65. The alpha of a scale formed from these items is 0.72. Some readers might object to our separation of the “direction of reform” items from the “redistribution” items. As might be expected, additive scales created from the items in the issue areas correlate highly ($r = 0.60$). However, we believe that these concepts are conceptually distinct. In any event, separating the items for the purposes of the analyses that follow do not change the nature of our analyses. In both issue areas, the “liberal” direction is the same. For example, opposition to the state setting food prices would be coded as “liberal” regardless of whether or not we included it in the direction of reform category or the redistributive category. Readers who find the distinction less convincing can therefore consider these two categories together.

¹⁴ Non-respondents are those respondents who refused to answer particular items or responded that it was “hard to say” their position on a given item. These choices were not offered to the respondent, but they were accepted. Thus respondents were given survey questions without “don’t know” filters (Schuman and Presser, 1981). These responses are distinct from the “waver” or “koleblius” response used as the mid-point of the five-point scale on several of the items.

¹⁵ It is interesting to note that these non-response rates, while clearly substantial, are significantly lower than the greater than 30% non-response rates from the early 1990s cited by Carnaghan (1996). Rates this high had “led some to question whether such a thing as ‘public opinion’ exists in Russia” (Carnaghan, 1996, p. 327).

Table 1
Mean issue opinions and opinion holding

Variable name	Mean opinion	Proportion with opinion
<i>Direction of reform</i>		
View of market economy—Wave 1	0.41	0.84
View of market economy—Wave 3	0.44	0.84
Privatization of state property—Wave 1	0.35	0.88
Privatization of state property—Wave 3	0.37	0.92
Favor private property in land	0.59	0.91
Capitalism not suitable for Russia	0.34	0.87
Business competition is good	0.70	0.84
Prosperous owners should be rich	0.50	0.88
Heavy industry belongs to state	0.22	0.90
<i>Redistribution</i>		
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 1	0.11	0.99
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 3	0.14	0.98
State should set food prices—Wave 1	0.22	0.97
State should set food prices—Wave 3	0.28	0.97
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 1	0.34	0.93
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 3	0.37	0.94
Reduce spending despite service cuts	0.27	0.91
If some are poor, none should be rich	0.48	0.88
State or themselves? Responsible for people	0.43	0.97

Note: The entries in the second column represent the sample mean opinion on a given survey question. The responses to these questions have been rescaled so that “1” represents the most liberal response and “0” represents the least liberal response (where “liberal” indicates pro-market reform and opposed to redistributive policies). The entries in the third column are the proportion of respondents to the survey who answered a given question item.

for exclusion bias is great. In the Russian case, we assess the degree to which opinion direction (the extent to which the respondent gives a “liberal” answer) is connected to opinion holding (whether or not a respondent answers a given question) through systematic empirical analysis of the survey data.¹⁶

We employ a common model across all of the opinion measures. At the core of the model are the demographic variables discussed in the previous section (education, income level, unemployment status, age, urban/rural characterization of

¹⁶ It is almost certainly the case that individuals come to the “don’t know” response through a variety of paths. Some individuals may be uncertain—they may not have formed opinions on some issues. Other individuals might be ambivalent—they might be unable to express their views because they subscribe to competing political principles. In other words, individuals may have difficulty linking their personal situation to the world of politics because of uncertainty, ambivalence, or both. In an interesting and promising line of research, Alvarez and Brehm (2002) have attempted to peel uncertainty apart from ambivalence in opinion responses. While the inferential approach adopted by these authors is useful for their purposes, it is difficult to adopt their method to question abstention and to distinguish among confusion, uncertainty, and ambivalence. In any event, for the purposes of this paper, such a distinction is not critical. It is enough to note that if question abstainers are similar in the types of wants, needs, and desires they bring to the survey interview, the end result—their removal from the opinion signal through a “don’t know” response—will have the same political implications for the creation of bias in public opinion.

residence, and religious attendance). We also include reported membership in the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the expectation that those who are more closely connected to the previous communist regime, are, on average, less likely to hold liberal views. In the models to predict direction of reforms, we also include an index in the belief of the efficacy of political activity with the expectation that this positive association with the democratic transitions would lead to more pro-liberal views generally.¹⁷ In the model to predict whether or not voters held opinions, we also include a measure of engagement with politics (how much they follow politics, and how much they talk about politics), which we had a strong expectation would lead to a greater likelihood of the respondent offering an opinion (Zimmerman, 2002, p. 115).¹⁸

We find the significant predictors of opinion giving and opinion direction share some commonalities across the different items. The full set of empirical results across all of the items can be found in the [Appendix A](#) by issue area. In [Table 2](#), we present the results from one item from the direction of reform issue area—view of the market economy—for illustrative purposes. Although we include this particular item because it is representative of the general pattern for the direction of reform issue area, we invite readers to examine the tables in the [Appendix A](#) as well. In [Table 3](#), we summarize the substantive effect of each variable included in both

¹⁷ The components of the index were whether the respondent believed that voting can change things, if party competition makes the system stronger, and if he or she personally was prepared to participate in politics.

¹⁸ All variables in the analysis (with the exception of Age and Age-squared) are recoded along a 0–1 continuum for ease in interpretation with 1 representing the most “liberal” response. We include also a measure of how much the respondents socialized in general to control for general socialability. One issue remains, however. Simply modeling the decision to answer a question and the particular placement on a question independently is not always a wise strategy. We must also attend to issues of selection bias. Berinsky (1999) has demonstrated that accounting for item non-response on questions measuring support for policies designed to ensure racial equality alters our understanding of the structure of opinion on those policies in the US. It is important to ensure that the data is not contaminated by selection bias that could arise from unmeasured factors relating to non-response (conditioning, of course, on the characteristics of the respondents we include in our model). Selection bias, after all, will arise in any situation where the sample of observed cases differs in systematic ways from the sample of unobserved cases, in ways that we cannot directly measure. In the questions we analyze here, we believe that we can adequately capture the differences between the question-answerers and the question-abstainers. We therefore expect to find no selection bias here—only opinion ingredient bias. Indeed this is the case; given the measures of values and politically relevant resources included in the model, the opinion direction and opinion giving processes are independent and can be considered separately. Specifically, we used a Heckman selection bias model (Greene, 1997) and estimated: (1) the determinants of item response, (2) the determinants of expressed issue position, and (3) the link between unmeasured factors affecting the two processes. In most cases, we could not reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias. In other cases the Heckman model failed to converge, providing no conclusive evidence of selection bias. The finding of no selection bias may, at first glance, seem somewhat puzzling. The analyses, after all, show that non-response and the direction of response share common predictors. But selection bias occurs only when the unobserved factors predicting selection are correlated with the unobserved factors predicting opinion direction. In the analyses presented here, we observe many of the factors that predict both opinion direction and selection. So the lack of selection bias should be expected. We can therefore proceed to examining the direct links between the measured variables in the two processes.

Table 2
View of the market economy

	Opinion direction Coefficient (SE)	Opinion holding Coefficient (SE)
Constant	0.30 (0.05)**	-0.09 (0.29)
Education: University	0.11 (0.02)**	0.51 (0.11)**
Education: Secondary school	0.06 (0.01)**	0.14 (0.08)*
Income: 1st quartile	-0.06 (0.02)**	-0.17 (0.10)*
Income: 2nd quartile	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.10)
Income: 4th quartile	0.07 (0.02)**	0.11 (0.11)
Income: NA	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.44 (0.11)**
Unemployed	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.08)
Age/100	0.03 (0.20)	4.09 (1.06)**
Age/100 ²	-0.28 (0.22)	-4.96 (1.08)**
Big urban area	0.04 (0.01)**	0.08 (0.08)
Small urban area	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.08)
Moscow/St. Pete	0.07 (0.02)**	-0.06 (0.12)
Religious attendance	-0.00 (0.02)	0.20 (0.10)*
Former CPSU	-0.03 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.10)
Efficacy	0.18 (0.03)**	
Follow politics		0.62 (0.11)**
Political discussion		-0.15 (0.12)
Socialize		0.03 (0.17)

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

sets of analyses.¹⁹ The entries in this table represent the average effect of the different opinion ingredients—or variables—across the questions in a given issue area. The first column of the table lists the various variables used to predict both the direction of opinion and the decision to give an opinion. The second column indicates the effect of the different variables on the probability of offering an answer to a question in a given issue area. These values are calculated to represent the effect of moving from the minimum value of a given opinion ingredient to the maximum value of that ingredient.²⁰ For example, the effect of raising a respondent’s education from no secondary diploma to a college education on the probability of

¹⁹ While Table 3 only includes variables common to both models, these tables were generated from the analyses in Appendix A that includes variables specific to the selection and outcome models as well.

²⁰ The estimates are derived by calculating, for each of the items, the difference in the predicted probability of item response between the minimum and maximum value of a particular variable, while holding all other variables at their mean value. While the procedure of holding the other variables at their means is standard, it calculates effects based on non-existent persons (someone cannot, for example, be 1/4 of a Moscow resident). We therefore recalculated the effects holding the model respondent at the median values. The results were largely unchanged. These estimates are derived separately for each question from the coefficient estimates in Appendix A, and then averaged to generate the entries in Table 3. The pooling of the coefficients to present the average effect is appropriate because in most cases the coefficients are similarly signed and of similar magnitude. This procedure generates conservative estimates of the predicted effect of the variables on opinion holding because the average response rate to the questions is fairly high. Therefore, the probit effects are calculated in the upper tail of the cumulative normal, far from the point of maximal effect.

Table 3
Roots of opinion giving

Variable	Issue area			
	Direction of reform		Redistribution	
	Holding	Direction	Holding	Direction
Education				
University	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.09
Secondary school	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01
Region of residence				
Big urban area	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.03
Small urban area	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01
Moscow/St. Pete	0.00	0.07	0.01	0.04
Income				
1st quartile	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
2nd quartile	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
4th quartile	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.03
Not reported	-0.09	0.01	-0.06	0.02
Unemployed	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Age/100	0.26	-0.43	0.13	-0.29
Age/100 ²	-0.66	0.14	-0.43	0.04
Religious attendance	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
Former CPSU member	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01

Note: The entries in this table represent the average effect of the different variables across all the questions in a given issue area. The first column of the table lists the various variables used to predict both the direction of opinion and the decision to give an opinion. The second column indicates the average effect of the different variables on the probability of offering an answer to the nine items in the direction of reform issue area. The third column presents the average effect of the different opinion ingredients on the respondent’s issue position on the nine items in the direction of reform issue area. Columns four and five repeat this analysis for the redistribution items.

answering the direction of reform questions is an increase of about 5 percentage points. The third column presents the average effect of the different opinion ingredients on the respondent’s issue position.²¹ Again, this value is calculated to represent the effect of moving from the minimum to the maximum value of that ingredient. For instance, increasing a respondent’s educational level from no secondary diploma to a college education moves the respondent’s opinion 0.07 points in the liberal direction (on the recoded 0–1 scale).²² This pattern of presentation is repeated for both of the issue areas.

As Table 3 demonstrates, there are common predictors of opinion giving and position taking. On direction of reform, there is a significant overlap between these two

²¹ This entry is the average regression coefficient from Appendix A.

²² To account for possible curvilinear effects, we included both age and age squared. To determine the effect of age on the processes of opinion holding and direction, age and age-squared must be considered together.

processes through education and income.²³ Specifically, the resource-rich are more likely to offer opinions to the questions and, when they do answer questions, tend towards the liberal side of the opinion spectrum (that is, the pro-reform side of the spectrum). A similar pattern can be found on the redistribution items. In sum, many of the same factors determine: (1) the decision to give an opinion; and (2) the direction of opinion on those questions. Thus, there is reason to believe that the populations of respondents who abstain from the issue placement questions differ from the population of respondents in their political preferences.

The next step, then, is to determine the shape of these “silent voices.” We do so by computing the degree of bias in Russian attitudes towards economic reform. Because the bias works through the factors that we can measure, we can use what we know about the opinions of the question-answerers to characterize the opinions of those individuals who declined to answer the question. In effect, we can estimate what the non-answerers would have said if they were able to give voice to their politically relevant wants, needs, and desires.²⁴ We can then compare this sentiment to the collective judgment of those individuals who place themselves on the issue scales to gauge the extent—not simply the presence—of compositional bias in public opinion.²⁵

Before we continue, a word about the meaning of this analysis is in order. Given that we are, in effect, imputing attitudes to individuals who—given the opportunity—declined to answer a given question on a survey—does our procedure produce meaningful results? The skeptical reader might argue that by imputing attitudes to non-respondents we are overstepping the bounds of proper analysis. Admittedly, generating attitudes for individuals who decline to answer particular questions—no matter how technically sophisticated the method used—is a controversial undertaking. In effect, we ask “what would these individuals have said if they answered

²³ These results—in particular with regard to education—are consistent with the findings of previous studies of the determinants of non-response in the Russian context in 1989 and 1992 (Carnaghan, 1996). It should also be noted that the basic character of these results hold when we include measures of the respondents’ ideological identification. These results are available from the authors upon request.

²⁴ Specifically, we use the coefficients presented in Appendix A to predict the issue positions of the non-respondents. This approach is valid because, as noted above, there was no selection bias in the data. The betas for the sample under analysis (the sample which excludes people who do not choose a position on the questions) are therefore the full sample betas. Thus, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is not different for the people who answer the questions compared to those who are unable to form coherent opinions on those issues. We can therefore use the betas and the measured variables to predict issue positions for the non-respondents through a regression imputation. We also replicated these analyses using both models of opinion direction that included more variables, and those that included fewer variables. In all cases, the predicted differences between the “scale placer” group and the non-respondents remained stable. Some readers have criticized the imputation analysis because the R^2 on the models predicting opinion direction are somewhat low, achieving a value below .10 for six of the items. This concern is unfounded. Berinsky (2004) finds that in the US case that models with many variables predict the same differences between respondents and non-respondents as more limited models. What matters here is not the overall predictive power of the model, but rather the inclusion of factors that predict both opinion holding and opinion direction.

²⁵ It should also be noted that because these are imputed positions being compared to actual issue positions, T -tests of statistical significance are inappropriate.

questions that they chose not to answer?” It might be reasonable to argue that these imputed interests are not valid measures of popular sentiment. Even if we take Converse’s (1970) non-attitude hypothesis as too extreme, we do know that people vary in how stable or firm their positions are, with some responses appearing to vary almost randomly over time. This continuum of stability almost certainly varies across issue areas. It is, therefore, easy to imagine that there are some fairly complex issues on which many people would reasonably and appropriately give a “don’t know” response. And even if one accepts that the line between responses and non-responses is somewhat fluid, we must acknowledge that, on balance, the respondents who fail to answer particular survey questions fail to do so because they are too far to the “unstable” side of the opinion firmness to do so. The question, therefore, is whether the procedure by which we impute attitudes to non-respondents produces meaningful results.

We argue that the answer to this question is yes. The failure to give a response on a survey question does not indicate that a given respondent lacks politically relevant interests. Some individuals might find it difficult to answer survey questions, even if they have politically relevant needs. As Berinsky notes, “Simply because respondents are unable to easily translate their thoughts and feelings into a summary judgment does not mean that those concerns are irrelevant” (Berinsky, 2004, p. 49). In essence, through our analysis, we ask what would happen if we did not draw the firm line between question answerers and question abstainers—what would happen if we assumed that everyone, no matter how muddled their political voice, should be heard as part of the democratic process. How would our view of the political world change? How would our measure of the popular will change? Ultimately, we might choose to ignore those people who decline to answer survey questions, but without answering questions such as these, we cannot know what types of sentiment we miss in opinion polls by excluding non-respondents. Understandably, not all scholars will accept our position on faith. Thus, in the analysis that follows we undertake additional steps to address potential criticisms of our analytic strategy by looking at the answers that non-respondents give to other survey questions on similar topics (see below).

The differences found in the power of the opinion ingredients play out in the predicted opinions, as shown in Table 4. Turning first to the direction of reform questions (Table 4A), in all ten cases, we predict the non-respondents to be less supportive of reform than the respondents. The degree of this differences ranges from 0.01 to 0.06, with an average difference of 0.04. The redistribution items (Table 4B) are less clear. On six out of eight of those questions, non-respondents are projected to be less liberal, and across all eight items the average difference is 0.02 in the less liberal direction. One interesting observation is that in general opinions on guaranteed jobs and state control over food prices behave differently from the other items, despite the fact that they scale together well with those items. We suspect that this result may have something to do with the association of these two particular items directly with the command economy of the Soviet period. The other four questions could, for the most part, be asked of respondents in any market based social-welfare state, whereas the food and jobs questions have a direct connection to

Table 4
Projected issue positions

Variable name	Item abstainers (<i>N</i>)	Item answerers (<i>N</i>)	Difference
<i>(A) Direction of reform</i>			
View of market economy—Wave 1	0.35 (386)	0.41 (2315)	–0.06
View of market economy—Wave 3	0.39 (342)	0.44 (1979)	–0.05
Privatization of state property—Wave 1	0.30 (303)	0.35 (2400)	–0.05
Privatization of state property—Wave 3	0.35 (178)	0.38 (2154)	–0.02
Favor private property in land	0.57 (203)	0.59 (2490)	–0.02
Capitalism not suitable for Russia	0.32 (305)	0.34 (2390)	–0.03
Business competition is good	0.67 (393)	0.70 (2308)	–0.03
Prosperous owner should be rich	0.44 (290)	0.50 (2406)	–0.05
Heavy industry belongs to state	0.20 (228)	0.22 (2470)	–0.01
<i>(B) Redistribution</i>			
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 1	0.10 (22)	0.10 (2681)	0.00
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 3	0.15 (32)	0.14 (2308)	0.00
State should set food prices—Wave 1	0.18 (56)	0.22 (2647)	–0.04
State should set food prices—Wave 3	0.29 (56)	0.28 (2283)	0.01
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 1	0.32 (160)	0.35 (2536)	–0.03
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 3	0.36 (124)	0.37 (2208)	–0.01
Reduce spending despite service cuts	0.27 (209)	0.28 (2491)	0.00
If some are poor, none should be rich	0.43 (291)	0.48 (2410)	–0.05
State or themselves: Responsible for people?	0.39 (56)	0.43 (2273)	–0.04

communism. This result suggests that there may be something peculiar about the mechanism of response to questions that directly invoke policies of the communist period.

Taken as a whole, the findings lend fairly convincing support to our original hypothesis: non-respondents do indeed appear to be less liberal than their opinion-offering counterparts. Indeed, across the 18 different survey questions we examine, in only two cases do we impute more liberal views for the non-respondents; moreover, in neither of these cases is the substantive effect greater than 0.01 on a 0–1 scale.²⁶

Above, we argued that our imputation procedure produces meaningful results. Given that we assess the differences between scale placers and non-placers using opinion placements constructed, in part, by imputing interests to individuals who opted out of answering survey questions, a healthy degree of skepticism is understandable. We do, however, have some recourse. While some respondents declined to answer all of the items in a given issue area, other respondents who abstained from one of the items answered at least one of the other items. For example, of the 16 percent of respondents who failed to give an answer to the

²⁶ These results, it should be noted, are consistent with the findings of Carnaghan, who found that non-respondents to a 1989 survey of Moscow residents tended to be “regime supporters with non-democratic leanings” (Carnaghan, 1996, p. 363), although she notes that this trend was diminishing in 1992.

question, “what is your view of the transition to a market economy in Russia?”, over 99 percent answered at least one of the other direction of reform items across the three waves of the survey. We therefore have a measure of policy sentiments for some respondents who declined to answer particular items. In effect these measures allow us to assess the policy views of non-respondents based on attitudes they actually expressed to the survey interviewer. We can use the answers they give to other questions to see if, as suggested, when they do speak, they speak with a different voice.

Table 5 presents this analysis by comparing for each individual question the average score of answered questions across the entire issue area between respondents and non-respondents. Again, the results are fairly clear. On the redistribution question (Table 5B), the expected differences are found in just over half the cases (five out of eight) with an average difference of 0.01. Even stronger evidence can be found in the direction of reform category (Table 5A). In all eight cases, we find the expected differences, with an average item difference of 0.06 toward the less liberal direction. Thus we have additional evidence that those who choose to abstain from answering questions regarding the direction of reform are less enthusiastic about reform than those who do answer such questions.

Taking all of the tests together, it seems clear that Russia’s “don’t knows” are on average less economically liberal than their fellow citizens. From a behavioral standpoint, this is an important finding and one that has the potential to travel far beyond Russia’s borders. It does indeed appear to be the case that those who are likely to oppose market reform are also less likely to answer survey questions about their opinions concerning economic change.

From a public opinion perspective, this then raises the equally important question of the extent to which our aggregate level measures of Russian public opinion towards economic reform suffer from non-response bias. In this regard, fortunately, we have more reason to be optimistic. It is possible to calculate the aggregate effect of excluding the non-respondents on the shape of public opinion by multiplying the non-response rate by the difference between the question-answerers and the question abstainers (Berinsky, 2004). The effect of the exclusion bias on the shape of aggregate opinion is somewhat small. On average, giving political voice to the non-respondents would move aggregate opinion about two-tenths of a point (on a 100 point scale) in the pro-redistribution direction and one-half a point in the anti-reform direction on the direction of reform question. Non-respondents therefore differ significantly from respondents in their policy preferences, but in the aggregate, this difference does not seem to change significantly our measures of collective opinion, and, indeed, is likely well within the margin of error of any attempt to measure aggregate level public opinion using survey data. Thus in this particular case, we can safely measure aggregate levels of public opinion based primarily on answers provided by those who chose to offer an opinion. However, the fact that non-respondents are so consistently distinguished from respondents in the *same* direction—here, opposed to economic reform—leaves open the very real possibility that at other times or in other places, the size of the bias produced by ignoring non-respondents may be significantly larger.

Table 5
Placement scale scores

Variable name	Mean on direction of reform scale among item abstainers (<i>N</i>)	Mean on Direction of Reform Scale among item answerers (<i>N</i>)	Difference
<i>(A) Direction of reform</i>			
View of market economy—Wave 1	0.39 (419)	0.44 (2393)	−0.04**
View of market economy—Wave 3	0.36 (362)	0.43 (2050)	−0.07**
Privatization of state property—Wave 1	0.41 (325)	0.43 (2489)	−0.02*
Privatization of state property—Wave 3	0.39 (184)	0.43 (2240)	−0.03**
Favor private property in land	0.34 (231)	0.44 (2573)	−0.10**
Capitalism not suitable for Russia	0.41 (344)	0.43 (2461)	−0.02*
Business competition is good	0.31 (434)	0.45 (2378)	−0.14**
Prosperous owner should be rich	0.35 (326)	0.44 (2481)	−0.08**
Heavy industry belongs to state	0.41 (256)	0.43 (2551)	−0.03**
<i>(B) Redistribution</i>			
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 1	0.35 (34)	0.29 (2800)	0.06**
Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 3	0.33 (38)	0.29 (2413)	0.05*
State should set food prices—Wave 1	0.28 (80)	0.29 (2754)	−0.01
State should set food prices—Wave 3	0.30 (66)	0.29 (2383)	0.01
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 1	0.27 (205)	0.29 (2622)	−0.02**
Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 3	0.25 (140)	0.29 (2303)	−0.03**
Reduce spending despite service cuts	0.26 (262)	0.29 (2569)	−0.03**
If some are poor, none should be rich	0.23 (344)	0.30 (2488)	−0.07**
State or themselves: Responsible for people?	0.23 (64)	0.29 (2376)	−0.06**

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed tests).

These results, it should be noted, are somewhat consistent both in terms of size and direction with Berinsky's (2004) findings in the US in the realm of social welfare policy. But regardless of the aggregate consequences of Russia's "silent voices," the fact remains that those who keep silent on questions of reform and redistribution

would—if they gave opinions—speak in a different manner, and apparently a remarkably consistent one, than those who answer these questions. Thus, in Russia as in America, ignoring these question abstainers subverts the representation of popular sentiment on critical issues through opinion polls.

Implications of findings

Overall, our analysis suggests that non-respondents in Russia are more anti-reform and pro-redistribution than those who make their voices heard in opinion polls. These “silent voices” are therefore more opposed to the changes in the Russian economy that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union than their counterparts who are willing to answer survey questions.

These findings have implications both within and beyond the Russian context. First, they provide evidence that survey data may have told too optimistic a story about the response of Russians to economic reform. Though surveys made clear that large numbers of Russians were opposed to particular market reforms, the depth of this opposition may have been even larger than appears from the survey aggregates. While the magnitude of the effects of exclusion bias on the shape of aggregate opinion is not particularly large, they are at least on order of the biases found in US public opinion. Moreover, the direction of this bias on the micro-level is remarkably constant. Across almost every question, non-respondents were more likely to oppose economic reform than those who chose to answer questions. Thus the effect of silencing some anti-reform voices appears to be a systematic feature of survey analysis. Regardless of the degree to which surveys distort our overall sentiment of the proportion of Russians opposed to reform, the very fact that opinion polls systematically silence certain types of opinions is worth continued attention.²⁷

In terms of Russian survey research, previous research on the topic of don't knows in Russia has tended to conclude that respondents who fail to answer opinion polls do so because they honestly do not have an opinion on the question. Carnaghan writes that “for most Russians, most of the time, if they did not answer questions it was because they had little interest and minimal information: they did not have an opinion” (Carnaghan, 1996, p. 109). Gibson makes a similar point, concluding that “in sum, it appears that many Soviets have no opinions about a variety of political issues, and that they faithfully report their lack of opinions to interviewers” (Gibson, 1994, p. 108). While we certainly agree with the conclusion of both studies that Russian respondents are not attempting to consciously deceive the interviewers by claiming not to have an opinion, our work in the economic

²⁷ This is particularly troublesome given more recent developments in terms of state control of media in Russia. If part of the reason certain voices were silenced in Russia in the 1990s is because they lacked access to adequate resources to form opinions, then one can only imagine this problem becoming more acute as media (and especially television) continually falls under the sway of the state and thus provides even less information about the pros and cons of various economic reforms and policies.

issue area suggests a slightly different conclusion. We suggest that certain resource poor respondents may have difficulty in articulating their position on economic reform in response to specific survey questions. Moreover, we find that had these respondents been able to articulate a position, it would most likely not have been a neutral opinion on the topic (as Brym and Degtyarev (1993) conclude in regard to anti-Semitism), but rather a consistently less liberal position than those who answered the question.

The findings here also suggest a note of caution for understanding the degree of public support for economic reform beyond the Russian context. While the magnitude of the pro-reform bias in the Russian case is not terribly large, its very existence suggests that researchers and policy makers attempting to measure support for economic reform in other areas of the world should be aware of and account for this possibility. While we cannot make any definitive conclusion beyond the data analyzed above, certainly the effects identified in Berinsky (2004) are not limited to established democracies with mature polling establishments. The fact that such similar results were found in the disparate contexts of Russia and the United States holds open the possibility of finding a similar pattern of bias in other countries undergoing economic transformations. Of particular note is the connection between the lack of politically relevant resources, opposition to economic reform, and the propensity to abstain from survey questions. One could imagine situations where disparities in resources are likely to be even more serious than in Russia. For instance, in Latin American countries indigenous citizens may face the additional barrier of being asked survey questions posed in their non-native languages while at the same time may be likely to have received less formal education than many of their Spanish speaking fellow citizens. Under such circumstances, the potential for bias in opinion polls may be large. Our results therefore suggest the possibility that the degree of support for economic reform may be systematically overstated worldwide.

Finally, in terms of public opinion analysis generally, these results demonstrate that findings identified in the American context regarding non-response bias do in fact travel abroad. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the same pattern identified for social welfare policy in the United States—resource rich respondents tend to be more likely to answer questions and to answer them in a particular direction—seems to hold nicely in the Russian context. Intriguingly, in both the Russian and American cases, the “silent voices” seem to want more state intervention in the economy than their more vocal counterparts, although the political ramifications of that desire (more liberal in the US, more conservative in Russia) are quite different.

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Appendix A

A.1. Key of variable abbreviations and descriptions

Variable abbreviation	Variable description
<i>Direction of reform</i>	
D_me1	View of market economy—Wave 1
D_me3	View of market economy—Wave 3
D_pr1	Privatization of state property—Wave 1
D_pr3	Privatization of state property—Wave 3
D_pl1	Favor private property in land
D_cnr1	Capitalism not suitable for Russia
D_cfel	Business competition is good
D_or1	Prosperous owner should be rich
D_his1	Heavy industry belongs to state
<i>Redistribution</i>	
R_jb1	Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 1
R_jb3	Government should guarantee jobs—Wave 3
R_fp1	State should set food prices—Wave 1
R_fp3	State should set food prices—Wave 3
R_li1	Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 1
R_li3	Limit incomes of the rich—Wave 3
R_re1	Reduce spending despite service cuts
R_lp1	If some are poor, none should be rich
R_sr1	State or themselves?: responsible for people

A.2. Individual level analysis used to generate Tables 3 and 4

Questions relating to direction of reform					
Variable	D_me1	D_me3	D_pr1	D_pr3	D_pl1
<i>Opinion direction</i>					
Constant	0.30 (0.05)**	0.47 (0.05)**	0.45 (0.05)**	0.49 (0.05)**	0.70 (0.05)**
Education: University	0.11 (0.02)**	0.06 (0.02)**	0.10 (0.02)**	0.07 (0.02)**	0.00 (0.02)
Education: Secondary school	0.06 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.02)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.02)
Income: 1st quartile	-0.06 (0.02)**	-0.07 (0.02)**	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income: 2nd quartile	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income: 4th quartile	0.07 (0.02)**	0.03 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)**
Income: not reported	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Unemployed	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)**
Age/100	0.03 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.75 (0.18)**	-0.62 (0.18)**	-0.40 (0.21)*
Age/100 ²	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.21 (0.22)	0.41 (0.19)**	0.35 (0.19)**	0.03 (0.21)
Big urban area	0.04 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.07 (0.01)**	0.06 (0.01)**	0.07 (0.01)**
Small urban area	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)*	0.07 (0.02)**
Moscow/St. Pete	0.07 (0.02)**	0.09 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.02)**	0.10 (0.02)**
Religious attendance	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)**
Former CPSU	-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)**
Efficacy	0.18 (0.03)**	0.10 (0.03)**	0.13 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.03)**	-0.01 (0.03)
<i>N/R</i> ²	2315/0.14	1979/0.13	2400/0.17	2154/0.11	2490/0.08

Appendix A.2. (continued)

Variable	D_me1	D_me3	D_pr1	D_pr3	D_pl1
<i>Opinion holding</i>					
Constant	-0.09 (0.29)	0.72 (0.32)**	0.13 (0.31)	0.29 (0.36)	1.08 (0.35)**
Education: University	0.51 (0.11)**	0.24 (0.11)**	0.33 (0.12)**	0.08 (0.14)	0.10 (0.13)
Education: Secondary school	0.14 (0.08)*	0.21 (0.09)**	0.22 (0.09)**	0.10 (0.11)	0.07 (0.10)
Income: 1st quartile	-0.17 (0.10)*	-0.29 (0.10)**	-0.25 (0.11)**	-0.22 (0.13)*	-0.07 (0.12)
Income: 2nd quartile	-0.05 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)
Income: 4th quartile	0.11 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	0.13 (0.12)**	0.03 (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)
Income: not reported	-0.44 (0.11)**	-0.31 (0.12)**	-0.31 (0.12)	-0.24 (0.14)*	-0.42 (0.13)**
Unemployed	0.04 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)**	0.06 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)
Age/100	4.09 (1.06)**	0.76 (1.17)	3.56 (1.12)**	3.59 (1.31)**	0.56 (1.26)
Age/100 ²	-4.96 (1.08)**	-1.66 (1.18)	-4.47 (1.14)	-4.25 (1.33)**	-2.03 (1.26)
Big urban area	0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.20 (0.10)**	0.02 (0.09)
Small urban area	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.22 (0.11)**	0.02 (0.10)
Moscow/St. Pete	-0.06 (0.12)	0.19 (0.14)	0.09 (0.13)	0.24 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.13)
Religious attendance	0.20 (0.10)*	0.03 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)	0.13 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.12)
Former CPSU	0.05 (0.10)	0.16 (0.11)	0.11 (0.12)	0.36 (0.16)**	0.08 (0.12)
Follow politics	0.62 (0.11)**	0.49 (0.11)**	0.79 (0.11)**	0.55 (0.13)**	0.84 (0.13)**
Political discussion	-0.15 (0.12)	0.11 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.07 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)
Socialize	0.03 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.18)	0.34 (0.21)	0.17 (0.20)
N/Log likelihood	2678/-1041.24	2326/-922.99	2680/-882.54	2337/-611.99	2670/-701.25

Variable	D_cnr1	D_cfel	D_or1	D_his1
<i>Opinion direction</i>				
Constant	0.55 (0.05)**	0.62 (0.05)**	0.53 (0.05)**	0.44 (0.43)**
Education: University	0.08 (0.02)**	0.06 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.02)**	0.06 (0.01)**
Education: Secondary school	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income: 1st quartile	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Income: 2nd quartile	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Income: 4th quartile	0.05 (0.02)**	-0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)**	0.01 (0.01)
Income: not reported	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)**	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age/100	-0.91 (0.21)**	0.07 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.22)	-0.96 (0.17)**
Age/100 ²	0.54 (0.22)**	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.23)	0.64 (0.18)**
Big urban area	0.03 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.08 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)
Small urban area	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.02)**	-0.02 (0.01)
Moscow/St. Pete	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)**	0.13 (0.02)**	0.04 (0.02)**
Religious attendance	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)**
Former CPSU	-0.04 (0.02)**	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Efficacy	0.12 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.03)*	0.08 (0.03)**
N/R ²	2390/0.12	2308/0.03	2406/0.12	2470/0.10

<i>Opinion holding</i>				
Constant	0.24 (0.31)	0.02 (0.31)	0.36 (0.33)	-0.20 (0.34)
Education: University	0.32 (0.12)**	0.83 (0.13)**	0.42 (0.13)	0.26 (0.12)**
Education: Secondary school	0.15 (0.09)*	0.25 (0.08)**	0.20 (0.09)	0.38 (0.10)**
Income: 1st quartile	-0.34 (0.11)**	-0.19 (0.11)*	-0.25 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.12)

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Appendix A.2. (continued)

Variable	D_cnr1	D_cfel	D_or1	D_his1
Income: 2nd quartile	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.19 (0.10)*	0.01 (0.12)	0.18 (0.13)
Income: 4th quartile	-0.10 (0.11)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.12)
Income: not reported	-0.50 (0.12)**	-0.59 (0.12)**	-0.70 (0.12)	-0.39 (0.13)**
Unemployed	0.13 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.15 (0.09)	0.16 (0.10)*
Age/100	2.27 (1.12)**	2.56 (1.12)**	1.01 (1.18)	2.88 (1.22)**
Age/100 ²	-2.81 (1.14)**	-3.90 (1.13)**	-1.97 (1.19)	-3.71 (1.24)**
Big urban area	0.20 (0.08)**	0.33 (0.08)**	0.25 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)*
Small urban area	0.03 (0.09)	0.19 (0.09)**	-0.00 (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)
Moscow/St. Pete	-0.16 (0.12)	0.15 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.13)	0.10 (0.14)
Religious attendance	0.00 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.12)
Former CPSU	0.15 (0.12)	0.43 (0.13)**	-0.04 (0.11)	0.23 (0.14)*
Follow politics	0.66 (0.11)**	0.80 (0.11)**	0.56 (0.11)	0.82 (0.12)**
Political discussion	0.26 (0.13)**	0.09 (0.12)	0.60 (0.13)	0.47 (0.14)**
Socialize	-0.03 (0.18)	0.00 (0.18)	0.21 (0.18)	0.16 (0.20)
N/Log likelihood	2672/-910.16	2678/-942.68	2673/-821.48	2675/-706.53

Questions relating to redistribution

Variable	R_jb1	R_jb3	R_fp1	R_fp3	R_li1	R_li3
<i>Opinion direction</i>						
Constant	0.12 (0.03)**	0.08 (0.03)**	0.26 (0.04)**	0.29 (0.05)**	0.53 (0.05)**	0.56 (0.05)**
Education:	0.06 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)**	0.11 (0.02)**	0.13 (0.02)**	0.11 (0.02)**	0.09 (0.02)**
University						
Education:	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*
Secondary school						
Income: 1st quartile	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income: 2nd quartile	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income: 4th quartile	0.03 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.02)**
Income: not reported	0.04 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)**
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age/100	-0.25 (0.12)**	0.17 (0.13)	-0.44 (0.17)**	-0.36 (0.19)*	-0.79 (0.19)**	-0.85 (0.20)**
Age/100 ²	0.15 (0.13)	-0.27 (0.14)*	0.18 (0.18)	0.14 (0.20)	0.36 (0.20)*	0.45 (0.21)**
Big urban area	0.02 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.01)**	0.09 (0.01)**	0.02 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)**
Small urban area	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Moscow/St. Pete	0.04 (0.01)**	0.04 (0.01)**	0.05 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.02)**	0.03 (0.02)
Religious attendance	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Former CPSU	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Efficacy	0.08 (0.02)**	0.02 (0.02)	0.18 (0.03)**	0.09 (0.03)**	0.15 (0.03)**	0.07 (0.03)**
N/R ²	2681/0.08	2308/0.06	2647/0.15	2283/0.13	2536/0.14	2208/0.13

Appendix A.2. (continued)

Variable	R_jb1	R_jb3	R_fp1	R_fp3	R_li1	R_li3
<i>Opinion holding</i>						
Constant	1.73 (0.72)**	0.44 (0.62)	0.84 (0.48)*	0.31 (0.48)	0.78 (0.37)**	0.73 (0.40)*
Education: University	-0.24 (0.28)	0.04 (0.24)	0.37 (0.21)*	0.11 (0.20)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.15)
Education: Secondary school	0.17 (0.23)	0.32 (0.20)	0.19 (0.15)	0.04 (0.16)	0.13 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)
Income: 1st quartile	-0.53 (0.36)	-0.26 (0.26)	-0.40 (0.20)*	-0.07 (0.19)	-0.46 (0.14)**	-0.05 (0.14)
Income: 2nd quartile	0.04 (0.42)	-0.14 (0.27)	-0.18 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.15)	0.10 (0.14)
Income: 4th quartile	-0.61 (0.38)	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.32 (0.14)**	-0.07 (0.14)
Income: not reported	-0.92 (0.36)**	-0.38 (0.28)	-0.55 (0.21)**	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.74 (0.15)**	-0.14 (0.16)
Unemployed	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.14)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.11)
Age/100	2.89 (2.32)	4.55 (2.24)**	3.37 (1.70)**	4.81 (1.78)**	1.75 (1.32)	1.45 (1.50)
Age/100 ²	-3.29 (2.26)	-3.90 (2.28)*	-3.27 (1.71)*	-4.49 (1.82)**	-2.39 (1.34)*	-1.73 (1.52)
Big urban area	0.15 (0.20)	0.11 (0.17)	0.17 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	0.04 (0.10)	0.23 (0.11)**
Small urban area	-0.20 (0.21)	0.30 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.15)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.11)	0.15 (0.11)
Moscow/St. Pete	0.06 (0.29)		-0.22 (0.20)	0.13 (0.23)	0.21 (0.16)	0.14 (0.17)
Religious attendance	-0.07 (0.24)	0.16 (0.25)	0.10 (0.18)	0.14 (0.19)	0.13 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.14)
Former CPSU	0.31 (0.40)	0.50 (0.38)	0.16 (0.24)	0.41 (0.27)	0.30 (0.15)**	0.18 (0.15)
Follow politics	0.83 (0.28)**	0.19 (0.24)	0.80 (0.19)**	0.36 (0.19)*	0.57 (0.13)**	0.35 (0.15)**
Political discussion	0.59 (0.33)*	0.08 (0.28)	0.29 (0.21)	0.14 (0.22)	0.14 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.17)
Socialize	0.03 (0.41)	0.75 (0.38)**	-0.15 (0.30)	0.42 (0.30)	0.49 (0.21)**	0.47 (0.23)**
N/Log likelihood	2680/-141.78	2150/-163.61	2680/-288.90	2344/-271.73	2673/-605.63	2337/-498.46

Variable	R_re1	R_lp1	R_sr1
<i>Opinion direction</i>			
Constant	0.28 (0.04)**	0.55 (0.06)**	0.46 (0.07)**
Education: University	-0.03 (0.02)*	0.13 (0.02)**	0.17 (0.02)**
Education: Secondary school	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.02)**
Income: 1st quartile	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Income: 2nd quartile	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)*
Income: 4th quartile	-0.02 (0.01)	0.05 (0.02)**	0.07 (0.02)**
Income: not reported	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)**
Unemployed	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Age/100	0.21 (0.17)	-0.58 (0.22)**	-0.26 (0.27)
Age/100 ²	-0.40 (0.18)**	0.23 (0.24)	-0.04 (0.28)
Big urban area	0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.02)

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Appendix A.2. (continued)

Variable	R_re1	R_lp1	R_sr1
Small urban area	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)**	-0.02 (0.02)
Moscow/St. Pete	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)**	0.03 (0.03)
Religious attendance	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Former CPSU	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Efficacy	0.03 (0.03)	0.14 (0.03)**	0.04 (0.04)
<i>N</i> / <i>R</i> ²	2491/0.01	2410/0.12	2273/0.08
<i>Opinion holding</i>			
Constant	0.69 (0.34)**	0.35 (0.32)	1.83 (0.54)**
Education: University	0.30 (0.13)**	0.40 (0.12)**	0.12 (0.21)
Education: Secondary school	0.19 (0.10)**	0.18 (0.09)**	0.14 (0.15)
Income: 1st quartile	-0.32 (0.12)**	-0.20 (0.11)*	-0.26 (0.20)
Income: 2nd quartile	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.21)
Income: 4th quartile	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.22)
Income: not reported	-0.71 (0.13)**	-0.57 (0.12)**	-0.68 (0.21)**
Unemployed	0.06 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.15)
Age/100	1.22 (1.23)	1.54 (1.16)	0.99 (1.88)
Age/100 ²	-1.56 (1.26)	-2.28 (1.18)*	-2.07 (1.86)
Big urban area	0.22 (0.09)**	0.14 (0.08)*	0.01 (0.15)
Small urban area	0.17 (0.10)*	0.05 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.15)
Moscow/St. Pete	0.10 (0.13)	0.25 (0.13)*	0.77 (0.40)*
Religious attendance	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.18)
Former CPSU	0.21 (0.13)	0.14 (0.12)	0.50 (0.28)*
Follow politics	0.45 (0.12)**	0.79 (0.11)**	0.51 (0.20)**
Political discussion	0.15 (0.14)	0.01 (0.13)	0.00 (0.23)
Socialize	0.05 (0.20)	0.27 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.31)
<i>N</i> /Log likelihood	2677/-731.01	2678/-860.43	2334/-265.60

p* < 0.10; *p* < 0.05 (two-tailed tests). Coefficient with standard error in parentheses.

Appendix B

B.1. Dependent variable question wording

Var	Question wording
D_me1	“What is your view of the transition to a market economy in Russia? Which of the opinions I shall now read is closest to your opinion? (1) You are for a market economy and believe that the transition to the market should be quick. (2) You are for a market economy and believe the transition to the market should be gradual. (3) You are against the transition to a market economy.
D_me3	“What is your view of the transition to a market economy in Russia? Which of the opinions I shall now read is closest to your opinion? (1) You are for a market economy and believe that the transition to the market should be quick. (2) You are for a market economy and believe the transition to the market should be gradual. (3) You are against the transition to a market economy.
D_pr1	“What do you think about the privatization of state property in Russia? Please look at the card and say which alternative best corresponds to your opinion. (1) All property in the economy should be in private hands. (2) Economic property should for the most part be in private hands. (3) The shares of private and state property in the economy should be equal. (4) Economic property should for the most part belong to the state. (5) All property in the economy should belong to the state.

Appendix B.1. (continued)

Var	Question wording
D_pr3	“What do you think about the privatization of state property in Russia? Please look at the card and say which alternative best corresponds to your opinion. (1) All property in the economy should be in private hands. (2) Economic property should for the most part be in private hands. (3) The shares of private and state property in the economy should be equal. (4) Economic property should for the most part belong to the state. (5) All property in the economy should belong to the state.
D_pl1	“Private property in land should exist in our country.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
D_cnr1	“The capitalist system is not suitable for Russia.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
D_cfel	“Competition among various enterprises, organizations and firms benefits our society.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
D_or1	“It is normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many other people.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
D_his1	“All heavy industry must belong to the state and should not be given over to private ownership.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.

Note: All questions were rescaled for the analysis contained in the paper on a 0–1 scale with “1” representing the more classically liberal view. People who refused to give an answer or were coded by the interviewer as saying that it was “hard to say” were coded as non-respondents, although it is important to note that these were not choices given by the interviewer. Respondents answering at the mid-point of the scale (e.g., waver) are *not* coded as non-respondents.

B.2. Redistribution

Var	Question wording
R_jb1	“The government ought to guarantee a job to everyone who needs one.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_jb3	“The government ought to guarantee a job to everyone who needs one.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_fp1	“The state should set food prices.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_fp3	“The state should set food prices.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_li1	“The state should limit the incomes of the rich.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_li3	“The state should limit the incomes of the rich.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_re1	“It is necessary for the state for the time being to reduce its expenditures, even if this leads to a reduction in the funds allocated to health care and pensions.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_lp1	“If some people live in poverty, the government should react and make it so that no one can become wealthy.” (1) Fully agree, (2) Agree, (3) Waver, (4) Disagree, (5) Completely disagree.
R_sr1	“Here in front of you is yet another scale. On this scale “1” denotes that people should take the main responsibility for providing for themselves and “5” denotes that the basic responsibility for providing for people should lie with the state. And what do you think?”

Note: All questions were rescaled for the analysis contained in the paper on a 0–1 scale with “1” representing the more classically liberal view. People who refused to give an answer or were coded by the interviewer as saying that it was “hard to say” were coded as non-respondents, although it is important to note that these were not choices given by the interviewer. Respondents answering at the mid-point of the scale (e.g., waver) are *not* coded as non-respondents.

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