

# What's Left Behind When the Party's Over: Survey Experiments on the Effects of Partisan Cues in Putin's Russia

**TED A. BRADER**

*University of Michigan*

**JOSHUA A. TUCKER**

*New York University*

*We consider the question of whether Russia's greatly weakened political parties might continue to exert an influence on public opinion in twenty-first century Russia. To do so, we carried out a series of survey-based experiments in Moscow in the spring of 2006. We present evidence showing that partisan cues increase support for public policy proposals and make it more likely that respondents will adopt a position on an issue that mirrors their party's preferred position ("opinion taking"), as well as increase the likelihood that respondents will adopt a position on a given issue at all ("opinion giving"). We also present evidence that party cues can sway the opinions of nonpartisans, though such influence may be limited to cases when the position of a party constitutes an unusually informative or credible signal. The findings should be of interest to those concerned with Russia's post-communist political development, those interested more broadly in the effects of partisan cues on political behavior, as well as to scholars trying to characterize the nature of "competitive authoritarian" regimes.*

*Consideramos la cuestión de si partidos políticos fuertemente debilitados, como es el caso de los partidos rusos, podrían continuar influyendo la opinión pública en la Rusia del siglo XXI. Para responder esto llevamos a cabo una serie de investigaciones basadas en encuestas realizadas en Moscú en la primavera de 2006. Presentamos evidencia que demuestra que las pautas partidistas incrementan el apoyo del público a sus propuestas de políticas y hacen más probable que un encuestado conozca la preferencia del partido e incluso la llegue a asumir como suya ("tomando opinión"), así como que incremente la posibilidad de que ellos adopten una determinada posición sobre un determinado tópico ("dando opinión"). También presentamos evidencia que las pautas del partido pueden producir cambios de opinión, aunque dicha influencia puede estar limitada a casos donde la*

*posición del partido constituye una señal inusualmente informativa o creíble. Los resultados serán de interés para aquellos preocupados por el desarrollo político de Rusia post-comunista, aquellos interesados más ampliamente en los efectos de las pautas partidistas en el comportamiento político, así como para los académicos que buscan precisar las características de los regímenes “autoritarios competitivos.”*

The twentieth anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall presents a good impetus to consider some of the overarching themes of the post-communist experience. Undoubtedly, one of the most important has been the ebbs and flows of democracy in the region. While the advent of eight post-communist countries in 2004 to the European Union may have provided the most vivid illustration of democratization's success, the fate of Russia in recent years represents perhaps democratization's most disappointing failure. Unlike other post-communist countries—especially in Central Asia—where democracy never really got started in the first place, Russia in the 1990s had all the trappings of a newly emerging democracy: unpredictable elections, competitive political parties, a parliament capable of opposing the president and a vibrant (if at times biased) media (Brader and Tucker 2001, 2008b; Colton 2000; McFaul 2001; Mickiewicz 1999; Smith and Remington 2001; Tucker 2006; White, Rose, and McAllister 1997; Whitefield and Evans 1999). Today, not so much. Freedom House has downgraded Russia to its “Not Free” category,<sup>1</sup> and the outcome of the most recent round of elections was known long before the first ballot was cast (Holmberg 2008; Myagkov and Ordeshook 2008). The Russian *Duma* (parliament) is now “tamed” (Litvinovich 2003) and “toothless” (Ortung 2008). As Steven Fish (2005) has aptly put it, Russian democracy has clearly been derailed.

Reflecting back on Russia's move toward and away from the democracy, it is legitimate to ask whether there is anything left from the experience. Certainly one legacy is the presence of multiparty elections, which, despite the fact that they seem uncompetitive for now, do not appear to be going anywhere and have left at least the machinery of democracy in place for potential reactivation in the future (Hale 2005 and 2008). But beyond the elections themselves lies the question of the parties. For there are indeed political parties in Russia today. They contest elections, get their members elected to parliament, and appear in the mass media. They may have little direct effect on the implementation of policies that are controlled by the Kremlin, but they do still exist.

Moreover, we know from the literature on American politics that parties can do more than simply legislate and influence voting behavior: parties can also

<sup>1</sup> Available online at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7475> (accessed on April 24, 2009).

provide cues to voters who are attempting to form an opinion on issues of public policy (Bullock 2006; Coan *et al.* 2008; Druckman 2001; Kam 2005). This generally works in one of two ways. First, finding out that your preferred party supports a position (or, conversely, that the opposing party in a two party systems opposes a position) can lead you to be more likely to support that position as well. There is nothing inherently irrational about this, as the partisan cue can be a useful conduit of information about an issue on which one might not be particularly well informed. Second, partisan cues can make it easier for respondents to offer any opinion at all on an issue, as opposed to refusing to take a position (e.g., answering “don’t know”).

It seems eminently plausible that such effects for party cues exist in a long-standing democracy, such as the United States, where parties are both relevant to the political process and very stable (Aldrich 1995; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In contrast, it may come as somewhat of a surprise that we are able to identify similar effects for party cues deep in the heart of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in the remainder of the paper, we present evidence showing that partisan cues increase support for public policy proposals and make it more likely that respondents will adopt a position on an issue that mirrors their party’s preferred position (“opinion taking”), as well as increase the likelihood that respondents will adopt a position on a given issue at all (“opinion giving”).<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, we also present evidence of the impact of party cues on nonpartisans, which may suggest that party position taking can at times influence opinion by sending especially informative or credible signals.

In the following section, we lay out our experimental design for testing the effects of partisan cues on opinion giving and opinion taking by Russian citizens. We introduce two different types of survey experiments, single party cue (SPC) and multiple party cue (MPC) experiments. We then present our findings on opinion giving and taking, before concluding with a discussion of how this sort of research can contribute to the increasingly important task of understanding the role of political parties in “competitive authoritarian” regimes, such as Russia (Levitsky and Way 2002, Forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> Alternatively, we might expect relatively authoritarian political systems, where norms or pressures of compliance are strong, to produce larger party cuing effects than liberal democracies. However, it is not clear why citizens in an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian polity should be submissive toward political parties in general, or opposition parties in particular, especially if parties play a more modest role in governance. We might instead expect higher compliance with the “government,” the ruling party, or other primary authorities. Thus, this alternative logic would not lead us to expect extra-responsiveness to most party cues in Putin’s Russia, but it might offer a good reason to keep an eye on whether Kremlin-backed parties have greater cuing power than other parties.

<sup>3</sup> As we explain in detail later, the effects in terms of opinion giving are only found on issues for which a nontrivial minority (>10 percent of respondents) refuse to take a position; we find no effects for issues on which most respondents (>95 percent) are able to take a position (i.e., where there is little variance to explain).

## Data

Our evidence comes from a survey experiment carried out during the spring of 2006 by a preeminent Russian polling agency, the Levada Center.<sup>4</sup> The survey was conducted on probability samples of adult citizens in Moscow, and was completed by 376 valid respondents.<sup>5</sup> Interviews were conducted face-to-face in respondents' homes and took roughly 50 minutes on average. The survey contained numerous questions about policies, parties, and politics. The battery of policy questions making up the focal experiments in this paper appeared at the midway point of the interview. Questions soliciting party preference and party identification were asked earlier in the survey.

### Experimental Design and Measurement

Our goal in this paper is to assess the impact of partisan cues on policy opinions. More specifically, we want to know whether citizens are more likely to support a policy or stake out a position on an issue when they become aware that the policy or position in question is endorsed by (or otherwise associated with) their party.<sup>6</sup> For this purpose, we designed two types of experimental manipulations. Each uses a simple two-cell design where the presence of party cues is varied: in the *treatment* condition, party cues are embedded in the survey question; in the *control* condition, there are no party cues. For some questions, the manipulation involved inserting only an SPC. We manipulated other questions by inserting MPCs. In this section of the paper, we provide further details on both manipulations.

#### Design of SPC Experimental Tests

The SPC experiments contain the simpler of the two types of manipulations and comport fairly well to the format of party cuing studies in the United States. Respondents in both conditions are told about a policy proposal and asked whether they support it, oppose it, or neither (i.e., have no opinion). In the treatment group, this proposal is attributed to a specific political party. In contrast, no attribution is given for the proposal in the control group ("A

<sup>4</sup>More information about the Levada Center available online at <http://www.levada.ru/>; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VCIOM> (accessed on April 24, 2009).

<sup>5</sup>The survey was conducted by the Levada Center between April 20 and May 20, 2006 based on a multistage stratification scheme. Of the 2,052 addresses visited, contact was made at 1,590 residences. Of these contacts, 4.5 percent (73 respondents) were too ill to participate, 70 percent (1,110) declined to participate, and 25.5 percent (407) participated. Five interviews were rejected by the Levada Center during the control process, resulting in a total of 402 interviews. Further controls conducted by the authors resulted in the dropping of interviews conducted by one of the interviewers, for a final data set of 376 respondents.

<sup>6</sup>As described in greater detail below, we also consider the effects of exposure to partisan cues of other parties.

bill has been proposed . . .”). The specific party assigned for the treatment cue matched the respondent's party preference, which had been ascertained earlier in the survey by asking respondents which of the major parties they “liked the best.” As not all respondents were willing to provide such a party—even after repeated prompting<sup>7</sup>—the analyses of the SPC experiments that we report below include only those respondents who indicated some sort of explicit party preference.<sup>8</sup>

For the respondents who express no preference whatsoever, we assign a preselected party cue and assess its impact separately from the rest of the analyses. In the absence of assigning cues from all parties randomly across all respondents, this allows us to obtain at least a small glimpse at the impact of “other party” cues on opinion formation. Thus we assigned the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) as the cue for respondents who expressed no preference. We chose the KPRF because we thought it was likely to be well known to a large number of respondents, and, given Russia's historical legacy, likely to induce some sort of feeling among respondents (perhaps more likely negative, if they did not prefer it).

One challenge of the SPC experimental tests is that they require finding policy proposals that may be plausibly endorsed by any of Russia's major parties. Although this would be challenging even in two-party systems like the United States, multiparty systems, such as Russia's, increase the number of parties that must be matched to the position, unless one chose to exclude a significant plurality of the electorate from analysis (cf. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). After all, one of the presumed “advantages” of multiparty systems is their ability to represent a greater variety of issue cleavages and distinct positions along an ideological spectrum. This requirement essentially limits the SPC questions to relatively less salient policies.<sup>9</sup> According to prior research in the United States, party cues have stronger effects for issues that are less salient, more complex, or more remote from personal experience (Bullock 2006; Coan *et al.* 2008). For highly salient issues, it can be hard to discern party

<sup>7</sup> If respondents did not initially name one of the parties, interviewers were instructed to prompt them as to which party they would prefer if they “absolutely had to choose,” or, ultimately, to name the one they “disliked the least.”

<sup>8</sup> Although we do not need an explicit party preference in order to administer the survey question to the control group, we also omit control-group respondents who refused to provide a preferred party to ensure comparability between the treatment and control groups. This would avoid problems, for example, if there were factors (e.g., lower socioeconomic status) that might both predict whether Russians were less likely to answer survey questions generally, as well as their opinions on particular policy proposals (Berinsky and Tucker 2006).

<sup>9</sup> By the time an issue becomes highly salient, it usually causes or is caused by distinct position taking among political parties. Very few *salient* issues elicit universal agreement among parties, and, when they do, it likely signals near universal public support. Note, however, that low salience does not mean the policy is trivial or of little importance. As in our study, for example, they may involve important issues of foreign affairs, serious trade-offs between economic, health, and environmental considerations, or fees and services citizens encounter daily.

cue effects even with experiments *precisely because extensive party cuing has already taken place and shaped public opinion*. With this in mind, in our study, we asked respondents about proposals to raise the fare on the Moscow metro in return for an improvement in service, to make high-tech weapons available for sale to China, and to have Russia import spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing and storage.<sup>10</sup> In all three cases, we tried to identify proposals that would not excite unanimous approval, but rather that tipped toward opposition so that party cues would have some “work to do.”<sup>11</sup>

### **MPC Experimental Tests**

Voters may be largely on the look out for cues from reliable sources, such as their own party (Druckman 2001; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In many polities, however, voters will often be alerted to the rival positions of several parties, and, unlike the bipolar environment that prevails in two-party systems, voters cannot always assume that unmentioned parties will take an opposite stance.<sup>12</sup> We therefore designed the more complicated MPC questions to reflect a reality where multiple cues are competing for citizens’ attention from all over the “ideological map.” These questions present respondents with information about a particular policy proposal or debate, on which people have staked out a variety of positions and/or rationales for their stances. In the treatment condition, each position is attributed to one of Russia’s major political parties. In the control group, these positions are variously attributed to vague groups of people or experts (e.g., “Some experts espouse . . . , while some prefer . . . , and still others argue for . . .”). Our principal goal is to examine whether partisans are more likely to adopt the positions we associate with their party in the treatment condition than they are to adopt that same position in the control group where no party cues are present.<sup>13</sup>

The set-up of the MPC tests frees us from the constraints of finding a single position plausible for all parties and yet demands that we find a constellation of positions that can be attributed simultaneously to different parties, such that the overall pattern is plausible. As a result, the MPC questions pose a more realistic

<sup>10</sup> Details on question wording can be found in Appendix B.

<sup>11</sup> In all cases, we pretested the questions with a small group of respondents, which helped flag some—but unfortunately not all—potentially troublesome questions in this regard.

<sup>12</sup> This is not always a safe inference for voters in two-party systems either, but it is an inference many voters seem to make and some parties encourage.

<sup>13</sup> An interesting question for future research is how party cues from other parties affect partisans in multiparty systems. In the United States and perhaps two-party systems in general, the bipolar nature of politics encourages voters to infer both parties’ positions even if they learn only one (and following one’s own party typically means moving away from the other party). In multiparty systems, one party position does not imply as much about other party positions, and expectations for voter reactions are less clear. For example, it is possible that absent cues from their own party, citizens will be swayed by cues from other ideologically proximate parties or be repulsed by especially disliked parties. Testing such hypotheses would require a different experimental design and larger sample than the present study.

and harder test for party cue effects, because citizens may be partisans of Party C precisely because they feel strongly about Position or Rationale Z. Thus, to the extent parties only seem to lead voters because they stake out issue positions already attractive to those voters, the MPC experimental tests should yield identical results between control and treatment. On the other hand, we can attribute any difference in the extent to which respondents gravitate to “their party’s” position in the treatment condition as evidence of an impact of partisanship. In the MPC experiment, therefore, our dependent variable is the extent to which people pick the *same* position as “their” party.

Since the MPC question design requires a separate answer to be associated with each party, we formulated six distinct positions or rationales for each policy so that there would be an appropriate position for each of parties in our study. With this in mind, our experiments queried respondents about their reasons for supporting or opposing a proposed student exchange program between Russia and Germany, whether Russia should continue the process of reducing its number of regions through mergers like the one between *Perm Oblast* and the *Komi-Permyatski Autonomous Okrug*, and whether the number of legal guest workers in Russia should be increased. These issues are amenable to disagreement and opinion change, and they also allow us to translate the party’s typical political orientation into a concrete position. For example, the student exchange program allows us to describe the Union of Right Forces, a pro-business party, as supporting it because it will expose students to a functioning free market economy, while the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the ironically named nationalist party, can oppose it because it will likely lead to German students spying on Russia.

### **Further Design Details**

Two additional details of the experiments are worth noting. First, respondents were randomly assigned to the treatment or control group for the entire set of six experiments, so they either got party cues for all policy issues or for none.<sup>14</sup> Second, we could not include cues for every political party in Russia. Choosing where to draw this line involves trade-offs between including more parties (and thus more respondents) and complicating the questions by increasing the number of distinct policy positions needed in the MPC experiments, as well as the length of the questions themselves. Fortunately, the choice of parties in Russia in 2006 seemed fairly obvious. We included the four parties that surpassed the threshold to achieve parliamentary representation from the party list proportional-representation component of the 2003 Russian parliamentary elections: the KPRF, United Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Motherland. We also included the two prominent liberal parties that had surpassed this threshold in previous elections and still had

<sup>14</sup>Practically speaking, randomizing by item rather than respondent is only feasible with computer-assisted technology.

representatives in the current parliament elected from single member districts: Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the precise proposals and positions were created by the authors for purposes of this study, although in many cases, they were drawn from actual issues that had received discussion.<sup>16</sup> For the MPC questions, the positions attributed to parties were based on thorough research of party positions from primary sources (such as platforms and party websites), secondary sources (articles by both academics and journalists), and in consultation with the survey organization and country experts.<sup>17</sup>

## Empirical Results

### Opinion Taking: SPC Experiments

We begin by considering the results from the SPC experiments as presented in Figure 1 (see as well Appendix Table A1 for more details). In this and all figures, the dark bar on the left represents the average level of support for the policy among the control group; the light bar on the right represents the average level of support among the treatment group. The difference between each pair of bars, therefore, measures the effect of the partisan cue. To reiterate, our expectation is that the light bar on the right will be higher than the dark bar on the left, or, in other words, that receiving a cue that one's preferred party has proposed a particular policy will make one more likely to support that policy. Readers should note as well that all of the results in Figure 1 exclude respondents (from both the treatment *and* control groups) who did not identify a preferred party.

We find clear support for the hypothesis on both the metro and China policy proposals ( $p < .06$  and  $p < .05$ , respectively, in one-tailed t-tests), with the partisan cue accounting for, on average, an increase of .2 points of support (5 percent of the length of the scale) on the metro issues and .3 points of support (7.5 percent of the length of the scale) on the China issue; all of the SPC experiments use a five-point scale.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, however, there is no effect at all for the partisan cue on the question of whether Russia ought to import spent


<sup>15</sup> In the 2003 parliamentary election, Russia still used a mixed electoral system, with half of the seats allocated through proportional representation and half from single member districts. By the time of the 2007 parliamentary election, however, the electoral rules had been changed, resulting in the entire Russian parliament being elected by proportional representation.

<sup>16</sup> By definition, it would be nearly impossible to carry out the SPC experiments without using fabricated policy proposals; as noted earlier, there are few policies simultaneously "proposed" by every party. All respondents were debriefed following the survey regarding the constructed nature of these proposals.

<sup>17</sup> In particular, we thank Timothy Frye, Henry Hale, and Yoshiko Herrera for their time in this regard.

<sup>18</sup> We rely on one-tailed t-tests because we have a very clear prediction about the direction of our hypothesized effects; all subsequent reports of p-values refer to one-tailed tests as well.

**Figure 1.**  
**Opinion Taking: Single Party Cues\***




---

\*Includes only respondents indicating a preferred party.

*Note:* t-tests: China:  $p < .05$ ; Metro:  $p < .06$ ; Nuclear Fuel:  $p > .78$ .

---


nuclear fuel for reprocessing. It is worth noting, though, that this last proposal was exceedingly unpopular with our survey respondents; as close to 85 percent of respondents either strongly opposed (63 percent) or weakly opposed (21 percent) the proposal. Clearly, therefore, this question did not match our goal of a generating a well-distributed set of responses. It does, however, suggest that perhaps there is a lower bound to the effect of partisan cuing: if public opinion toward an issue—even a low salience issue—is too uniformly negative, then perhaps no amount of partisan cuing can affect people's positions.

### Opinion Taking: Multiple Party Cues

MPC experiments are testing a slightly different form of party cuing than the SPC experiments. While the SPC experiments sought to ascertain whether associating a preferred party with a policy issue led to increased support for that issue, the MPC experiments examine whether associating one's party with a particular position on an issue make respondents more likely to adopt that particular position on the issue as well. Accordingly, we present the results a little differently. Figure 2 reports the proportion of respondents who correctly "matched" their party's position for both the treatment group—where all positions were explicitly associated with parties—and the control group, where the same positions were given but without any reference to political parties.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> As the goal of the experiment is to see whether people choose the position of "their party" more often when presented a party cue, it seemed prudent to use a more demanding definition of

**Figure 2.**  
**Opinion Taking: Multiple Party Cues\***




---

\*Includes only respondents indicating a party that is either close or “my party.”  
 Note: t-tests: Admin:  $p < .01$ ; Guest Workers:  $p < .04$ ; High School:  $p < .28$ .

---

Again, we expect higher rates of matching among the treatment group (light bars) than the control group (dark bars).

As is evident from Figure 2 (more details are available in Appendix Table A2), in all three examples, the effect is in the predicted direction. Moreover, in two of the cases—the administrative reform and guest worker proposals—we find large, statistically significant effects ( $p < .01$  and  $p < .04$ , respectively). Respondents in the treatment group were almost twice as likely to match their party on the administrative reform question (28 versus 14.5 percent), and more than one and a half times as likely to do so on the guest workers issue (28 versus 18 percent).

Thus, across both the SPC and MPC experiments, we find remarkably consistent evidence that Russian citizens in 2006 were more likely both to generally support proposals that their party supported, as well as to report supporting (or opposing) proposals for the reason that their party supported (or

---


“preferred party” than we did for the SPC in an effort to limit the amount of noise in the analysis. For this reason, the results we present here are limited to those who either stated that there was a party toward which they felt “close to,” a party they called “my party,” or a party that “more than the others reflects your interests, views, and concerns.” That said, the results are robust to using the same, more inclusive measure of “preferred party” as we did for the SPC experiments, with the findings being practically identical, and, if anything, slightly stronger (e.g., the p-values are even lower in two of the three cases).

opposed) that proposal in the presence of partisan cues.<sup>20</sup> Thus despite the weakness of political parties in affecting policy formation or policy implementation in Putin's Russia, political parties continued to have the ability to influence public opinion formation.

### Opinion Giving

Having found evidence that suggests that party cues can affect the opinions of Russian citizens on issues of public policy, we now turn to the secondary question of whether these cues also make it easier for citizens to offer an opinion in the first place, or, put another way, whether party cues can reduce the number of nonresponses in a survey. Figure 3 (below) displays our findings in a similar

**Figure 3.**  
**Opinion Giving**




---

*Note:* t-tests: Admin:  $p < .03$ ; China:  $p < .00$ ; School:  $p < .05$ ; Metro:  $p > .5$ ; Nuke:  $p > .5$ ; Workers:  $p > .5$ .

---

<sup>20</sup> Moreover, these effects are not limited to supporters of United Russia, the ruling party. In analyses not shown here, we examined the effects of the different partisan cues broken down by individual parties. Although this dramatically reduces the statistical power, the effects largely appeared similar across all of the parties. In some cases, an effect was notably larger for one party, but the party varied by issue. Specifically, the effect was larger for supporters of the Union of Right Forces in one case (metro), Yabloko in another (student exchange), and United Russia (administrative reform) in a third. Although one may be tempted to see patterns in such results (e.g., that supporters were especially willing to follow the ruling party on a matter of government administration), caution is required given the small number of subjects involved. An experimental study designed explicitly to measure the effects of partisan cues by party would demand significantly more subjects than our study includes.

manner to the previous figures, with the bars now representing the proportion of respondents offering an answer to each question; as such, we can combine both the SPC and MPC experiments in one figure.<sup>21</sup> As before, the treatment effect is on the right (light bars); more details can be found in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.<sup>22</sup>

Here we find a fairly clear pattern that includes both the SPC (China, Metro, Nuclear Fuel) and MPC (Admin, High School, Guest Workers) experiments. For “high response” questions—essentially instances where at least 95 percent of respondents provided an opinion—there is no effect from the treatment. Put another way, in cases where very large proportions of the sample provided an opinion, getting a party cue did not seem to make the few remaining “hold outs” any more likely to provide an opinion. However, once the overall response rate drops below 95 percent of the sample, then the partisan cue kicks in exactly as hypothesized: respondents who receive the party cue are indeed more likely to give an opinion on the policy proposal than those who do not ( $p < .10$  for weapons to China;  $p < .05$  for the high school exchange and administrative reform questions).

Distinctions within these three cases also point to a growing effect for party cues as the questions become progressively harder to answer. We observe the largest effect of party cues on the administrative reform proposal, where almost one-quarter (23 percent) of respondents failed to answer the question. Specifically, the response rate was 9 percent higher among the treatment group (81 percent giving opinions) than among the control group (72 percent giving opinions). By way of comparison, only around a tenth of respondents failed to offer an opinion on the weapons to China and high school exchange policy proposals. For these questions, party cues increased the rate of opinion, giving roughly half as much as they had for Administrative Reform (a shift of 86 to 91 percent on the issue of weapons to China, and a shift from 90 to 95 percent for the high school exchange question). In sum, while there may be some ceiling past which party cues can no longer increase the level of opinion giving, the impact of cues on opinion giving nonetheless appears to increase with the share of the public that is initially unable or unwilling to provide an opinion.

<sup>21</sup> We have organized the questions in Figure 3 from left to right in order of the overall proportion of nonrespondents in an effort to most effectively display the key point from our findings, which is described below.

<sup>22</sup> As we are no longer dependent on matching a respondent with a preferred party for the treatment effect here, we include all respondents in our analyses. Restricting the sample to either people with a preferred party (as in the SPC experiments) or with the more restrictive “my party” or a close party (as in the MPC experiments) produces effects that are still in the same direction and of a roughly similar—although in all cases a bit smaller—magnitude, but the p-values increase in all three cases (which is not that surprising, given that we are weakening the power of the experiment by decreasing the number of respondents). Why would we find more tenuous results when focusing on partisans? Where *opinion giving* is concerned, the same citizens who indicate a party identity are also more likely to be knowledgeable about politics and provide opinions on policy questions. Thus, even if the pull of the party cue is stronger, there is less room for improvement (i.e., less variance to be explained) among partisans.

### Opinion Taking Among Nonpartisans

Although it was not the primary goal of our experiments, the data provide us with an opportunity, albeit a limited one, to examine the impact of party cues on citizens who disavow any party preference. Much as with opinion giving, party labels may not only attract partisans, but also convey information useful to citizens in general. In the SPC experiments, respondents who refused to name a preferred party and were randomly assigned to the treatment condition received a “preassigned” party cue. This party was always the KPRF.<sup>23</sup>

Because we are examining nonpartisans, expectations for how the cues may influence opinion taking are less clear. It depends on what information a citizen takes from the party label, and this in turn may vary from issue to issue.<sup>24</sup> We chose the KPRF in part because, of all possible party labels in Russia, it seemed especially likely to hold informational value for many citizens—a party that had been associated more clearly than most with a particular ideology, a particular historical legacy, and particular group interests in society (Brader and Tucker 2001). It is also a party about which many Russians had had strong feelings, which more often than not were negative (McFaul 1997; Rose 1998). Thus, we might expect nonpartisans on average to move in a direction opposite of that suggested by KPRF cue. On the other hand, a KPRF cue could influence opinions by communicating information about a policy by offering or withholding its endorsement. For example, if the KPRF endorsed a policy that could adversely affect poorer or older citizens, or that runs contrary to socialist ideals, then we might expect nonpartisans to find that cue unusually informative, inferring perhaps that it signals an especially credible or meritorious proposal given that the policy earned KPRF support despite being in tension with the party's typical positions.<sup>25</sup>


Figure 4 displays the mean level of support for three policies among respondents who did *not* indicate a preferred party and thus were excluded from the prior analysis of the SPC experiments presented earlier. The control group (dark bars) did not receive any party cue, while the treatment group (light bars) received the KPRF party cue. The statistical power of these tests is markedly lower than the tests reported in Figure 1 due to the smaller sample of 103 nonpartisans, though this does not influence the substantive conclusions we draw here.

<sup>23</sup> Although it would be interesting to examine the effects of different randomly preassigned party cues on nonpartisans, doing so in the present survey would have resulted in sample sizes too small to permit reliable analysis.

<sup>24</sup> It may also depend on the attitudes or feelings of the citizen toward the party in question, notwithstanding the citizen's lack of an expressed party preference. We leave aside for now differences rooted in individual attitudes, a full examination of which would require dividing the small sample up even further.

<sup>25</sup> Conversely, if the KPRF opposed a proposal that was likely to hurt the elderly and the poor, it would only signal that the KPRF was protecting its supporters and nothing about the underlying merit of the proposal.

**Figure 4.**  
**Opinion Taking among Nonpartisans with KPRF Cue (SPC Experiments)**




---

KPRF, Communist Party of the Russian Federation; SPC, single party cue.

---

Given the earlier (null) results for partisans on the highly unpopular proposal to import spent nuclear fuel, we did not expect to find results here and we did not. The other two issues offer a clear contrast. On the weapons sales to China, the KPRF cue also had neither a substantively meaningful nor a statistically significant effect upon respondents' support for the proposal. However, for the proposal to increase Metro fares, the KPRF cue increased mean support by 13 percent of the scale.<sup>26</sup> This effect is twice as large as any that we observed among partisans in the SPC experiments.

What should we make of this pattern of results? The pattern of results is not consistent with a general negative (or positive) reaction to the KPRF cue among nonpartisans, as we observe only one clear effect, and it is in the positive direction. It is consistent, however, with the idea that the informational content of the party cue matters. The selling of military technology to China and the importation of nuclear fuel do not have any obvious or special relationship to the party image of the KPRF. On the other hand, a flat fare increase is likely to impose a disproportionate burden on poorer or older citizens who rely on public transportation. Thus, KPRF endorsement of this proposal may have served as an unusually informative signal to nonpartisans about the credibility or merit of

<sup>26</sup>This is equivalent to moving half of the people one point on the five-point (0-4) scale—for example, from weakly to strongly supporting the proposal—or to moving one in eight respondents the entire length of the scale—that is, from strongly opposing to strongly supporting.

this proposal. If this is indeed the case, then it suggests yet another avenue by which parties might continue to “matter” in contemporary Russia.<sup>27</sup>

### Discussion

We began this paper by asking the question of whether it was possible that a legacy of Russia's democratic experiment—political parties—might still matter in Russia even if the normal avenue by which political parties exert influence—successfully running candidates for office who are then able to influence the making and implementing of public policy—seemed for the time being to be cut off. We examined one particular way in which parties might matter: by continuing to exert an influence on public opinion formation. With the important caveats that the experimental analyses we have run were confined to Moscow and were observed in the context of a survey, our study suggests that the answer to this question is yes. Across two different types of experimental designs, we find evidence that receiving a cue that one's party supports a particular policy proposal increases the likelihood that a respondent will support that proposal and that the respondent will be more likely to support it for the same reason as the party supports it. Partisan cues also make it more likely that respondents will express an opinion on an issue at all. Furthermore, we find that party cues can affect opinion even among citizens lacking a party preference, with the evidence suggesting that such influence may depend on whether the cue constitutes an unusually informative signal. In short, parties still seem to have some ability to affect public opinion in Russia. Thus, to the extent that public opinion matters in Russia—an open question to be sure, but one that does not seem unlikely—then it suggests a way in which political parties continue to matter in Russia.

Some caution is warranted, of course, in using these findings to infer the “typical” impact of party cues or endorsements in Russian politics, or to infer the overall actual impact of Russian parties on public opinion. As with any

<sup>27</sup> An alternative explanation for the positive effect is that our “nonpartisans” are in fact made up heavily of secret communist sympathizers, who were afraid of revealing this preference to a pollster. This is unsatisfying for a couple of reasons. First, unlike the informational story, it does not offer any clue as to why these alleged sympathizers would have responded on the Metro issue but not on the other issues (especially since earlier results showed partisans to be moveable on the China issue as well). Second, it is not clear why KPRF supporters would feel more intimidated in 2006 than supporters of several other parties, especially after a series of other parties had served as the Kremlin's foils or targets in all of the post-1996 national elections (Colton and McFaul 2003; Holmberg 2008; Tucker 2006). Indeed, empirically, the number of respondents in our survey who express a preference for the KPRF is similar to the number for the other four parties aside from United Russia (KPRF support is slightly higher than two parties and slightly lower than two others). Moreover, the profile of nonpartisans differs substantially from that of avowed KPRF supporters; nonpartisans are much younger, more educated, wealthier, and male. In sum, it seems safe to dismiss the “hidden communist sympathizer” explanation.

experimental approach, the strength of our study is internal validity: we can be confident that Russian party cues were *the cause* of the changes in opinion taking and opinion giving we observed. Yet the study offers less confidence in the external validity of the results. While our survey experiment, like many others, tried to mimic the sorts of party cues citizens receive in public discourse, a number of other factors may augment or diminish their relevance in actual politics. For example, respondents are less likely to miss party cues during the survey interview (when the interviewer usually has their complete attention) than they are during the ordinary course of life (when their attention is often divided and not closely attuned to politics). Moreover, political debate may generate even stronger party signals, or, alternatively, competition from other sources of personal or public influence. Finally, as noted earlier, our study focused on a restricted sample of Russians (Moscow residents only) and a restricted set of policy issues that are substantial but of low or middling salience. All of that said, there is little doubt that Russian citizens' policy positions correspond to those of their preferred parties (Brader and Tucker 2001; Colton 2000; Miller and Klobucar 2000), but the capacity of parties to *create* that correspondence by cuing their support is very much doubt, especially in countries like Russia where the role of parties has been waning of late. We focused on survey experiments in this study in order to answer the latter doubts as convincingly as possible.

One could pursue a number of interesting avenues for future research in Russia that would improve our knowledge of the topic in general and address confidence in the external validity of our claims in particular. A simple direction implied by the earlier comments is to expand the scope of study by conducting similar experiments outside of Moscow and for a greater range of issues. Another direction would be to contrast party cues with those from other sources. Perhaps most interesting in this regard would be cues taken directly from the Kremlin itself (even contrasting Medvedev cues versus Putin cues), although it would also be valuable to explore alternative centers of authority, such as military or religious leaders. It might also be worth assessing the effect of party cues from some of the new, Kremlin-sponsored "opposition" parties, such as Right Cause. Replicating these analyses outside of Russia would of course also be valuable, and we are already engaged in research in this regard (Brader and Tucker 2008a).

Furthermore, the current study may also hold important clues about how politics is likely to evolve in countries beyond Russia. In recent years, the number of countries that are clearly not democratic—e.g., do not hold free and fair elections to select their government in a context where civil and political rights are widely respected—but yet continue to feature political parties and elections has both been growing and receiving increased attention in the comparative politics literature. We are still in the early stages of learning about these types of polities, perhaps best known as "competitive authoritarian" regimes (Levitsky and Way Forthcoming). One crucial question is what exactly

political parties are doing in these places; clearly, we expect them to be doing less than in democracies, but perhaps more than in straight autocracies. This paper suggests one possible answer, which merits further investigation, by identifying that political parties can play such a role in one competitive authoritarian regime (Russia), and in so doing illustrates a means for studying the effects of parties in these types of polities more generally.

Finally, to return to the theme of this special issue, our study also represents an important step in the difficult task of figuring out what Russia's initial post-communist experiences may have meant for its current political situation. Great emphasis has been placed on the trauma that was the 1990s, with the experience being used to justify the rise of Putin, a preference for order over freedom, and a general abandonment of liberal values among vast swaths of the population. Less attention, however, has been paid to potential institutional legacies from Russia's (brief) era of competitive party politics.<sup>28</sup> In being so quick to forget this period of time, we may be overlooking important determinants of current Russian politics, as well as clues as to where Russian politics is headed in the future. In this paper, we have taken a modest step in that direction by investigating at least one function of political parties in contemporary Russia.

## Appendix

### A. Appendix Tables

**Table A1. Effects of Single Party Cues on Opinion Taking and Giving**

Issue	Opinion Taking	Opinion Giving
Metro improvements and fare hike	+ .20 (.06)	-.02 (.86)
Weapon sales to China	+ .25 (.05)	+ .05 (.08)
Import spent nuclear fuel	-.08 (.78)	.00 (.68)
N	271	374

*Note:* Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (for Opinion Taking, Support in Treatment – Support in Control; For Opinion Giving, Proportion Answering in Treatment – Proportion Answering in Control), and p-values in parentheses.

<sup>28</sup> This is in marked contrast to an intense interest in institutional legacies from the communist era; for examples, see Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2008.

**Table A2. Effects of Multiple Party Cues on Opinion Taking and Giving**

Issue	Opinion Taking	Opinion Giving
High school exchange with Germany	+0.04 (.28)	+0.05 (.04)
Reasons for reducing number of subnational regions	+0.14 (.01)	+0.09 (.02)
Increase number of guest workers	+0.10 (.04)	-0.01 (.57)
N	240	374

*Note:* Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (for Opinion Taking, Proportion Matching in Treatment – Proportion Matching in Control; For Opinion Giving, Proportion Answering in Treatment – Proportion Answering in Control), and p-values in parentheses.

**Table A3. Effects of Single (KPRF) Party Cues on Opinion Taking among Nonpartisans**

Issue	Opinion Taking
Metro improvements and fare hike	+0.52 (.00)
Weapon sales to China	+0.07 (.37)
Import spent nuclear fuel	-0.01 (.53)
N	103

*Note:* Cell entries are the effect of the party cue (For Opinion Taking, Support in Treatment – Support in Control), and p-values in parentheses.

**B. Question Wording for Control and Treatment Groups**

**Part I: Single Party Cue: Treatment and Control**

*SPC No. 1*

**TREATMENT GROUP**

⟨PARTY⟩ has recently proposed raising fares on the Moscow Metro to pay for a number of improvements to the Metro.

**CONTROL GROUP**

A bill has been proposed that will raise fares on the Moscow Metro to pay for a number of improvements to the Metro.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to make improvements to the Moscow Metro and pay for them by raising fares:

1. Strongly support making the improvements and raising fares.
2. Weakly support making the improvements and raising fares.
3. No opinion on whether the improvements should be made.
4. Weakly oppose making the improvements and raising fares.

5. Strongly oppose making the improvements and raising fares.

*SPC No. 2*

**TREATMENT GROUP**

⟨PARTY⟩ has recently proposed to remove most of the restrictions currently in place against selling modern and high-tech Russian weapons systems to China. By selling China more advanced weapons that they currently do not have, Russia can continue to earn billions of rubles in sales and preserve jobs in the weapons industries. While there is of course always a chance that Russia and China could engage in a military conflict in the future, it is unlikely occurrence.

**CONTROL GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Russia remove most of the restrictions currently in place against selling modern and high-tech Russian weapons systems to China. By selling China more advanced weapons that they currently do not have, Russia can continue to earn billions of rubles in sales and preserve jobs in the weapons industries. While there is of course always a chance that Russia and China could engage in a military conflict in the future, it is unlikely occurrence.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to remove existing restrictions on selling modern and high tech weapons systems to China:

1. Strongly support removing the restrictions and allowing China to purchase high-tech weapon systems from Russia.
2. Weakly support removing the restrictions and allowing China to purchase high-tech weapon systems from Russia.
3. No opinion on removing the restrictions and allowing China to purchase high-tech weapon systems from Russia.
4. Weakly oppose removing the restrictions and allowing China to purchase high-tech weapon systems from Russia.
5. Strongly oppose removing the restrictions and allowing China to purchase high-tech weapon systems from Russia.

*SPC No. 3*

**TREATMENT GROUP**

⟨PARTY⟩ has recently proposed that Russia import spent nuclear fuel from other countries for reprocessing and storage in Siberia. The project has the potential to earn Russia over \$20 billion over the next decade. Furthermore, it would help provide jobs for the over 300,000 Russians who currently work in

the nuclear industry. Of course, there are some serious environmental and health risks associated with the transport and storage of nuclear fuel.

### **CONTROL GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Russia import spent nuclear fuel from other countries for reprocessing and storage in Siberia. The project has the potential to earn Russia over \$20 billion over the next decade. Furthermore, it would help provide jobs for the over 300,000 Russians who currently work in the nuclear industry. Of course, there are some serious environmental and health risks associated with the transport and storage of nuclear fuel.

Please tell us how strongly you personally support the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel:

1. Strongly support the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel.
2. Weakly support the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel.
3. No opinion on the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel.
4. Weakly oppose the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel.
5. Strongly oppose the proposal to import spent nuclear fuel.

### **Part II: Multiple Party Cue: Treatment and Control**

#### *MPC No. 1*

### **TREATMENT GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Germany and Russia establish an exchange program for high school students. Under the terms of the proposal, 5,000 German high school students would study in Russia every year, and 5,000 Russian students would study in Germany. The costs of the program would be split between the German and Russian governments. Reaction to the proposal among Russia's political parties has been mixed. Unified Russia supports the proposal, because they think it will help deepen ties between Russia and Germany in the long run. The Union of Right Wing Forces also supports the proposal because they believe that it will be a good opportunity for Russian students to learn Western business techniques. Yabloko supports the proposal because they believe it would help more Russians learn about a country where citizens enjoy important social protections and civil rights. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, however, opposes the measure, which they believe is just another state subsidy for the children of wealthy families, who will be the only ones that ever get to go to Germany. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia opposes the measure because they think it is likely that some of the German students could end up spying on Russia. Motherland also opposes the proposal because there are already too many foreign students studying in Russia.

**CONTROL GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Germany and Russia establish an exchange program for high school students. Under the terms of the proposal, 5,000 German high school students would study in Russia every year, and 5,000 Russian students would study in Germany. The costs of the program would be split between the German and Russian governments. Reaction to the proposal has been mixed. Supporters believe that it will help deepen ties between Russia and Germany in the long run, provide a good opportunity for Russian students to learn Western business techniques, and that it would help more Russians learn about a country where citizens enjoy important social protections and civil rights. Opponents of the proposal, however, argue that it is just another state subsidy for the children of wealthy families, who will be the only ones that ever get to go to Germany, that some of the German students could end up spying on Russia, and that there are already too many foreign students studying in Russia.

Which of these opinions best describes your views of the proposed exchange program between Russian and German students?

1. It should be supported because it will improve ties between Russia and Germany in the long run.
2. It should be supported because it will help Russian students learn Western business techniques.
3. It should be supported because Russian students will learn how a country can both provide social protection and respect civil rights.
4. It should be opposed because it will only help the children of wealthy families.
5. It should be opposed because the German students may spy on Russia.
6. It should be opposed because there are already too many foreigners studying in Russian schools.

*MPC No. 2*

**TREATMENT GROUP**

One question facing Russia today is whether or not the number of regions of Russia should be reduced by merging existing regions into new regions. One such merger is now occurring between Perm Oblast and the Komi-Permyatski autonomous okrug. Most political parties support reducing the number of regions, although they do so for a number of reasons. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation believes that reducing the number of regions will lead back to the Soviet system of linking administrative regions to economic production. United Russia believes that it will lead to more efficient administration of regions by eliminating poorly run regional administrations. The Union of Right Forces believes that regional consolidation would spur economic growth by reducing the number of trade barriers within Russia. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, however, supports reducing the number of regions as a step toward making Russia a unitary state where special status would

no longer be granted to ethnic Republics. The Motherland party supports decreasing the number of Russian regions because it thinks it will increase the state's ability to constrain the power of oligarchs by strengthening the remaining regional governments. Yabloko, while not opposed to the mergers in principle, thinks that the discussion of merging regions distracts from the larger question of whether democracy and civil rights are respected in the regions.

### **CONTROL GROUP**

One question facing Russia today is whether or not the number of regions of Russia should be reduced by merging existing regions into new regions. One such merger is now occurring between Perm Oblast and the Komi-Permyatski autonomous okrug. A number of different arguments have been made in favor of reducing the number of regions, although they do so for a number of very different reasons. Some like the proposal because they think reducing the number of regions will lead back to the Soviet system of linking administrative regions to economic production. Others believe it will lead to more efficient administration of regions by eliminating poorly run regional administrations. Another argument is that it will spur economic growth by reducing the number of trade barriers within Russia. Some people like the proposal because they think it is a first step to a unitary state where special status would no longer be granted to ethnic Republics, while others think it will increase the state's ability to constrain the power of oligarchs by strengthening the remaining regional governments. Finally, some people are concerned that the discussion of merging regions distracts from the larger question of whether democracy and civil rights are respected in the regions.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding the effect of decreasing the number of regions in Russia?

1. Reducing the number of regions will help bring back a more Soviet style economy.
2. Reducing the number of regions will bring about more efficient government administration.
3. Reducing the number of regions will spur economic growth.
4. Reducing the number of regions will lead to the creation of a unitary state and weaken the power of ethnic republics.
5. Reducing the number of regions will weaken the oligarchs.
6. Reducing the number of regions is not nearly as important as ensuring that democracy and civil rights are respected in the regions.

*MPC No. 3*

### **TREATMENT GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Russia should expand the number of legal guest workers from other countries. United Russia supports this proposal

because it will help keep Russia's economy strong at a time when many Russians are getting older and leaving the work force. The Union of Right Forces supports this proposal because it will help the economy continue to grow by providing low-cost labor for jobs that Russians do not want to perform. Yabloko supports the proposal because legal guest workers are less likely to have their human rights violated than illegal immigrants. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation opposes the proposal because it could lead to more crime. Motherland opposes the proposal because more guest workers could lead to a repeat of the French riots in Russia. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia opposes the proposal because there are too many Russians unemployed as it is, and guest workers will only steal jobs from Russians.

### **CONTROL GROUP**

It has recently been proposed that Russia should expand the number of legal guest workers from other countries. Supporters have argued that this will help keep Russia's economy strong at a time when many Russians are getting older and leaving the work force, and that it will help the economy continue to grow by providing low-cost labor for jobs that Russians do not want to perform. Supporters also argue that legal guest workers are less likely to have their human rights violated than illegal immigrants. Opponents believe that more guest workers could lead to more crime or a repeat of the recent French riots in Russia. Others oppose the proposal because there are too many Russians unemployed as it is, and guest workers will only steal jobs from Russians.

Which of the following best reflects your views regarding the proposal to increase the number of legal workers from other countries in Russia?

1. The number of legal guest workers should be increased to help the Russian economy at a time when many Russians are leaving the work force.
2. The number of legal guest workers should be increased to help the Russian economy continue to grow by providing low-cost labor for jobs Russians do not want.
3. The number of legal guest workers should be increases in order to protect human rights.
4. The number of legal guest workers should not be increased because it could lead to a rise in crime.
5. The number of legal guest workers should not be increased because it could lead to a repeat of the recent French riots in Russia.
6. The number of legal guest workers should not be increased because it would take away jobs from Russians.

### **References**

ALDRICH, JOHN HERBERT. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

BERINSKY, ADAM, and JOSHUA A. TUCKER. 2006. "‘Don’t Knows’ and Public Opinion towards Economic Reform: Evidence from Russia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (1): 1-27.

BRADER, TED, and JOSHUA A. TUCKER. 2001. "The Emergence of Mass Partisanship in Russia, 1993-96." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1): 69-83.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2008a. "Do Party Cues Affect Policy Opinions in New Party Systems? Survey Experiments in Three Post-Communist Countries." Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts. August 28-31.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2008b. "Pathways to Partisanship: Evidence from Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24 (3): 263-300.

BULLOCK, JOHN G. 2006. "Cues and Policy Information: Real and Perceived Effects." Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. August 31-September 3.

COAN, TRAVIS G., JENNIFER L. MEROLLA, LAURA B. STEPHENSON, and ELIZABETH ZECHMEISTER. 2008. "It’s Not Easy Being Green: Minor Party Labels as Heuristic Aids." *Political Psychology* 29 (3): 289-405.

COLTON, TIMOTHY J. 2000. *Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

COLTON, TIMOTHY J., and MICHAEL McFAUL. 2003. *Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

DRUCKMAN, JAMES N. 2001. "Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 17 (1): 62-82.

FISH, M. STEVEN. 2005. *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

GREEN, DONALD P., BRADLEY PALMQUIST, and ERIC SCHICKLER. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven, CT, London: Yale University Press.

HALE, HENRY E. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics* 58 (1): 133-165.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2008. *Regime Limbo: Understanding Political Systems Between Dictatorship and Democracy*. Unpublished manuscript. Washington, DC: George Washington University.

HOLMBERG, CARL. 2008. *Managing Elections in Russia: Mechanisms and Problems*. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency. Accessed on April 25, 2009. Available online at <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2474.pdf>

KAM, CINDY. 2005. "Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences." *Political Behavior* 27 (2): 163-182.

LEVITSKY, STEVEN, and LUCAN A. WAY. 2002. "Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51-65.

\_\_\_\_\_. Forthcoming. *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

LITVINOVICH, DMITRY. 2003. "Russia: The Duma Tamed." *Transitions Online* 12/09. Accessed on April 27, 2009. Available online at <http://www.cceol.com/asp/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=9f6c93c5-2a46-11d8-91f3-0000b4a60532&articleId=9f6c93c6-2a46-11d8-91f3-0000b4a60532>

LUPIA, ARTHUR, and MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press.

McFAUL, MICHAEL. 1997. *Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press Stanford University.

\_\_\_\_\_. 2001. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

MICKIEWICZ, ELLEN PROPPER. 1999. *Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia*. Revised and expanded edition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

MILLER, ARTHUR H., and THOMAS F. KLOBUCAR. 2000. "The Development of Party Identification in Post-Soviet Societies." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (4): 667-686.

MYAGKOV, MIKHAIL, and PETER C. ORDESHOOK. 2008. "Russian Elections: An Oxymoron of Democracy." *NCEEER*. Accessed on April 27, 2009. Available online at [http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2008\\_822-11\\_Ordeshook.pdf](http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2008_822-11_Ordeshook.pdf)

ORTTUNG, ROBERT W. 2008. "Putin's Political Legacy." *Russian Analytical Digest* 36 (March): 2-4.

POP-ELECHES, GRIGORE, and JOSHUA A. TUCKER. 2008. "Communism's Shadow: A Theory of Post-Communist Legacies and Political Behavior." Presented at the 40th Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. November 20-23.

ROSE, RICHARD. 1998. "Negative and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries." *Electoral Studies* 17 (2): 217-234.

SMITH, STEVEN S., and THOMAS F. REMINGTON. 2001. *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

SNIDERMAN, PAUL M., and LOUK HAGENDOORN. 2007. *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

TUCKER, JOSHUA A. 2006. *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-99*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

WHITE, STEPHEN, RICHARD ROSE, and IAN MCALLISTER. 1997. *How Russia Votes*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.

WHITEFIELD, STEPHEN, and GEOFFREY EVANS. 1999. "Class, Markets and Partisanship in Post-Soviet Russia: 1993-96." *Electoral Studies* 18 (2): 155-178.