

classical model. When he realized this was unlikely to happen, Nietzsche made his books more than ever instruments of schooling intended to turn a whole generation toward a more adequate understanding of—what? Just about everything, Hutter shows, from the most general—an ontology or the way of all beings—to the particulars that matter: psychology based on taking the human animal as a mix of drives always superintended by some primary drive or other; culture as the unnatural overlay on human nature that makes it “natural for human beings to be unnatural” (160); history as a story of accumulating imprints on human nature stamped in by cultural destinies like Christianity and lived out in their heirs.

Hutter’s first chapter rescues Nietzschean soul care or therapy from self-help trivialities and gives it dignity by tracing its heritage to classical schools, by outlining the vocation of philosophers and their students, and by elevating severity and discipline. In the next two chapters Hutter makes meaningful the attention Nietzsche paid to solitude and friendship. Particularly useful is his long analysis of envy and hatred, resentment and revenge. What Hutter lays out is Nietzsche’s profound, historically based phenomenology of the modern soul and its discontents, the near universal self-deception built into modern self-understanding that now demands the disciplines of solitude and friendship in order to be understood and transcended—or if not transcended at least to some degree transfigured into healthier forms.

Hutter’s central chapter, “Writing the Future/Reading the Self,” deals with perhaps the central matter. He shows Nietzsche’s art of writing to be, in part, a gift to his readers whereby they “may learn to think by their efforts of exegesis” (109). Paying special attention to Socrates, Plato and Jesus as the fundamental lawgivers of Western civilization, Hutter shows that a proper understanding of the cultural achievements of these great founders of Western philosophy and religion equips one to understand Nietzsche’s aspiration, not as “some vain outdoing of Plato” (127) but as an act of philosophical philanthropy on Plato’s scale.

In the next chapter Hutter pays close attention to themes prominent in Nietzsche yet neglected in academic accounts, physiology and diet. “Food” becomes everything we “take in,” as the relationship between thought and matter turns distinctly practical. The final two chapters demonstrate again that Hutter is not among those enlightened Europeans Nietzsche blamed for no longer even knowing what religion is good for. Having shown how indelibly the monotheisms had written their envy and vengeance into the human soul, he here turns to what Nietzsche presents as positive possibilities for religion in full recognition of the damage done by our historic religions. Dance, in particular, receives a long, rich meditation; through that and other disciplines, “body work” he calls them, Hutter opens a way to healthy religion, performing a major service by showing how sense can be made of the return of Dionysos.

After his look into the far future, Hutter begins his last sentence as he must: “Meanwhile”—in the time given to us, transitional if we’re fortunate or effective, there’s work to do, the Nietzschean work set out in exquisite detail in Hutter’s book.

LAURENCE LAMPERT *Indiana University*

### **Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 1990–1999**

Joshua A. Tucker

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Recognizing and predicting the patterns of voting behaviour is a formidable task even in the case of mature and stable democracies. Needless to say, the identification of such trends in the wake of a fundamental political and economic restructuring, when

the basic rules of the game are still in flux, can be frustratingly elusive. In this ambitious and methodologically sophisticated study, Joshua Tucker takes on the challenge and suggests a fresh approach for cutting through the fog of post-communist institutional ambiguity. The book reports on several prominent regularities in the voting outcomes that span five countries, several distinct institutional designs, twenty national elections and ten years of transition. In contrast to the studies that rely on micro-level survey data or small-*n* cross-country comparisons, Tucker aggregates and analyzes the election results at the intermediate, regional level. Cross-regional comparison provides enough resolution for detecting systematic voting patterns shaped by local economic conditions. Explaining the observed connection between regional economy and regional vote is the central theme of Tucker's study.

A standard prediction of the economic voting literature can be described in terms of the incumbency hypothesis: all else being equal, the vote for the governing party should decline in economically depressed areas; conversely, the incumbents should gain support in the regions that are economically dynamic. From this perspective, elections can be viewed as referenda on how the ruling party manages the economy. The above referendum model was developed to account for economic voting in established democracies. It falters, however, in the context of simultaneous democratic and market reforms. As Tucker demonstrates, post-communist democracies generate weak and inconsistent empirical support for the standard model. The election results were sensitive to local economic conditions, but the incumbency status of political parties was only marginally relevant.

To explain the underlying logic of economic voting in transitional polities, Tucker puts forward an alternative theoretical framework. He proposes that the electoral response to economic circumstances is mediated by the so-called transitional identity of the competing political parties. The new regime parties identified with the introduction and continuing support of post-communist reforms should perform better in the regions that are economically vibrant. On the other hand, the old regime parties—the ones associated with the pre-transition rule—are expected to be more successful in the depressed areas. In a prominent departure from the standard approach, the transitional identity model predicts that an improving regional economy should penalize the incumbent old regime parties and benefit the pro-reform parties, even when the latter are out of office and cannot claim credit for the current economic success. Confirmed by the study's findings, this remarkable voting regularity appears to be independent of the specifics of national history, political culture, and institutional design. In all five countries as distinct as Russia and the Czech Republic, economic voting was a plebiscite on post-communist economic transformation rather than a reflection on the incumbents' recent policies.

To his credit, Tucker takes care not to overstate the scope of his findings and acknowledges that much of the proposed theorizing on individual level behaviour and future trends is tentative. Indeed, the book raises more questions about the origin of the observed voting patterns than it can definitely answer. The study is also inconclusive in terms of generalizability: it remains unclear to what extent its principal inferences can be extrapolated to other fledgling democracies (especially outside of Europe) and beyond the first decade of reforms. Despite these limitations, the underlying theoretical model and methodological approach developed by Tucker may find wide application in studies of democratization, voting behaviour, choice under uncertainty, and the effects of institutional change.

Potentially far-reaching policy implications of this study deserve a special mention. If it turns out that the transitional identity model extends to other cases of democratization, some of the current practices for promoting democracy will need to be fundamentally reassessed. For example, it logically follows from Tucker's model that sponsoring economic growth is a valid strategy for cultivating support for liberal

reforms in a struggling democracy, even when an illiberal, anti-reform party is in power. At the same time, the application of sanctions that exacerbate economic conditions in a transforming society can have an opposite result of undermining the popular base of the pro-reform parties. While further research is needed to ascertain the significance of these effects, Tucker's book develops both a strategy and a set of analytical tools for addressing such questions.

DMITRI MITIN *North Carolina State University*

### **Bienvenue dans le désert du réel,**

Slavoj Žižek,

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Le statut de Slavoj Žižek dans les universités américaines est ambigu. D'une part, sa popularité ne cesse de grandir – comme le démontrent le succès de ses livres et l'affluence à ses conférences – d'autre part, rarement pris au sérieux par ses pairs, il est relégué à l'univers des *cultural studies*. Élève de Jacques-Alain Miller, Žižek offre une vision originale de la politique où il mélange psychanalyse, commentaires philosophiques de haute voltige, anecdotes tirées de l'actualité, interprétations et réinterprétations de sujets divers allant du cinéma à la critique d'art, souvent avec un humour peu caractéristique des milieux universitaires. Après son *Plaidoyer en faveur de l'intolérance* (Éditions Climats, 2004) qui critiquait la fausse tolérance pratiquée par la société libérale et multiculturelle, son essai *Bienvenue dans le désert du réel*, traduit récemment en français, a été écrit dans l'urgence après les attentats du 11 septembre, au lendemain de l'invasion américaine de l'Afghanistan. Žižek présente dans ce livre la suite de certaines thèses qu'il avait déjà évoquées. Il remet non seulement en question le caractère « d'événement » attribué au 11 septembre – pour lui, rien n'aurait vraiment changé – mais il revisite l'opposition que les théoriciens politiques décrivent (et imposent) entre l'Occident et son Autre islamique : ces deux entités ne sont pas antagonistes, elles appartiennent au contraire à la même dynamique capitaliste mondiale et font le jeu de l'immobilisme. L'alternative doit être pensée en dehors des oppositions. Ce que cherche donc à faire Žižek, c'est moins d'offrir une thèse en remplacement de celles qui existent déjà que de réfuter celles-ci, en montrant l'identité intrinsèque d'opinions qu'on prétend être différentes.

Le livre est construit sous forme de cinq essais-chapitres : cinq occasions pour Žižek de dépasser les oppositions conceptuelles de la science politique par une réinterprétation des événements, en particulier celui du 11 septembre, mais aussi cinq occasions d'ébranler le lecteur. Žižek demande d'abord que choisir entre intégrisme et démocratie, choix que l'opinion politique impose aux Américains. Ce faux antagonisme auquel on nous demande d'adhérer cache un fait plus troublant : les islamistes sont le produit du capitalisme mondialisé. C'est pour cela, dit Žižek, qu'entre démocratie et Islam, il ne faut pas seulement se garder de choisir, mais il faut questionner l'élément qui, entre les deux, pose problème : la démocratie. Un système, explique Žižek, organise toujours ses propres excès, que le système doit ensuite éliminer par des mesures « spéciales » (c'est-à-dire en enfreignant ses propres lois) : l'Islam intégriste est l'excès actuel créé par le système.

Mais l'Autre que constitue l'Islam intégriste, l'avons-nous bien compris, demande ensuite Žižek : quel est le sens à donner à cet Autre qui nous fait face et comment agir avec lui ? Deux conceptions ont émergé après les attaques du 11 septembre : la première où l'Islam devenait subitement l'ennemi public numéro un et l'objet de la haine de tous, et la deuxième où l'Islam devenait une civilisation dont il fallait accepter la différence et chercher à résoudre les difficultés. Cette