

Euroskepticism and the Emergence of Political Parties in Poland

Radoslaw Markowski
Polish Academy of Sciences
and
Warsaw School of Social Psychology
00-625 Warszawa, ul Polna 18/20
radoslaw.markowski@swps.edu.pl

Joshua A. Tucker
Wilf Family Department of Politics
New York University
726 Broadway, NY, NY 10012
joshua.tucker@nyu.edu

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Abstract

One of the most interesting features of the 2003 Polish referendum on EU membership was the strong link between voting behavior in the 2003 referendum and voting behavior in the 2001 Polish parliamentary election. In this manuscript, we test two competing mechanisms that could account for this finding: a responsible party model, whereby citizens' attitudes toward EU membership would have been driven by their preferred party's position on the issue; and a more Downsian model, whereby the existence of an unrepresented Polish Euroskeptic electorate could have driven the success of two new Euroskeptic parties in the 2001 parliamentary elections. Drawing upon data from the 1997, 2001, and 2005 Polish National Election Studies, we find much stronger empirical support for the Downsian approach. Far from being led to their Euroskepticism by party leaders as the 2003 referendum on Polish EU membership approaches, voters for Poland's Euroskeptic parties in 2001 already possessed healthy degrees of Euroskepticism, especially when compared to supporters of other parties and even to non-voters. Additionally, we find evidence that Euroskepticism continued to play an important role in determining support for these two parties beyond the 2001 election.

Keywords: Political Parties, Poland, Elections, Voting, European Union

1. Introduction

One of the most interesting features of the 2003 Polish referendum on EU membership was the strong link between voting behavior in the 2003 referendum and voting behavior in the 2001 Polish parliamentary election. Simply put, voters who had supported one of the two Euroskeptic parties in the 2001 parliamentary election – which together captured almost one-fifth of the national vote – were much more likely to vote against EU membership in the 2003 referendum than voters who had supported pro-EU parties in 2001. Indeed, the effect of this one variable – vote choice in the 2001 parliamentary election – dwarfed the effect of all standard socio-demographic indicators in predicting the likelihood of voting for or against EU membership (*Gazeta Wyborcza* 2003; Markowski and Tucker 2005). For those who study public opinion towards EU membership in Western Europe, such findings might not be particularly surprising, as there is a history of citizens taking cues on their position towards EU membership from their preferred party (Anderson 1998; Taggart 1998). In post-communist countries, however, parties have long been presumed to be weak and less influential on the attitudes of their supporters, especially in Poland (Markowski 2002, Lewis 2000). Moreover, one of the Euroskeptic parties, the League of Polish Families (LPR), was created just months before the 2001 parliamentary elections, while the other, Self Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP), had received on average no more than 1% of the vote in previous national elections.

In this manuscript, we propose and test three different hypothesized mechanisms that could account for these findings. First, and perhaps most simply, voters could have decided to vote for one of the two Euroskeptic parties in the 2001 parliamentary election for reasons that had nothing to do with the issue of EU membership, only to choose later to adopt their party's position on EU membership as the 2003 referendum drew closer. This explanation fall under the

rubric of the more general “responsible party” model, whereby citizens take their cues from parties on policy issues (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999; Miller et al. 1999; Adams 2001; Grofman, Adams & Merrill 2005). Alternatively, the close link could be a result of the fact that voters chose to vote for either the LPR or SRP in 2001 precisely because they were interested in voting for a Euroskeptic party in 2001, and then continued to express their Euroskeptic sentiments by voting against the referendum on EU membership in 2003. If this were the case, then the Euroskepticism of these two parties could help explain their sudden success in the 2001 parliamentary election, a claim made potentially more credible by the fact that there were no openly Euroskeptic parties in the 1997-2001 Polish parliament. The idea that new parties will emerge when a segment of the electorate is unrepresented on an important policy dimension is consistent with the model of politics put forward by Downs (1957), so we refer to this as the “Downsian party emergence hypothesis” (or “Downsian hypothesis” for short) for the remainder of the manuscript.

For the task at hand, these two explanations – the responsible party model and the Downsian hypothesis – are analytically exclusive of one another. If we find empirical support for the responsible party model by observing that anti-EU voters largely came to oppose EU membership in the 2003 referendum based on cues that they received from their preferred political party, then we would not have found a viable reservoir of anti-EU voters at the time of the 2001 election to provide fertile soil for the growth of new parties. Similarly, if supporters of the LPR and SRP were already Euroskeptic at the time of the 2001 parliamentary election, then we will be unable to claim that they picked up their Euroskepticism from their preferred political party as the EU referendum approached. To test the relative support for these different explanations, we rely on the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Elections Studies¹. As will be

demonstrated in ensuing sections of the paper, the empirical evidence is remarkably clear in this regard: across numerous tests, there is much stronger evidence in support of the Downsian party emergence hypothesis than the responsible party hypothesis. Moreover, the idea that parties may have sought out an open portion of the electorate is further enhanced by the fact that the two parties offered different “brands” of Euroskepticism to voters, with SRP presenting a kind of left-of-center pragmatic Euroskepticism, and the LPR a more right-wing fundamental opposition to Europe.

Moreover, we also consider a third, more complex, explanation that builds on the idea that the Downsian hypothesis may very well explain the rise of the two parties, but then attempts to move beyond this original explanation to explore what happens next. For if the parties were successful in building a base of support via an unrepresented Euroskeptic portion of the electorate, then it would certainly behoove these parties to at the very least strive to maintain the Euroskepticism of their supporters. We therefore add the 2005 Polish national election to our analysis trace the evolution of the electorates of these parties. We find a complex and somewhat nuanced story in this regard, but one that certainly reveals some patterns consistent with an effort by these parties – and in particular the LPR – to continue to “socialize” a Euroskeptic electorate.

Our findings allow us to make important contributions to three different political science literatures. First, we are able to present evidence of new parties emerging in largely the manner Downs predicted that they would, which should be of interest to those concerned with the emergence of political parties and the development of party systems. Second, if Euroskepticism truly did affect the evolution of the Polish party system, then that suggests that attitudes towards Europe can have a larger effect on domestic political developments than is generally assumed in the context of most studies, where Europe is generally relegated to “2nd order” status (Reif and

Schmitt, 1980; Perrineau et al. 2002; although see the speculation regarding Poland in particular in Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002, 568-9). Third, our work helps provide some additional context to a very complex period of time in Polish political development, which should speak to those concerned with Polish politics more specifically (Millard 2003). Finally, as scholars, it is of crucial theoretical importance that we take advantage of historically important “critical junctures” such as Poland’s entry into the European Union to analyze the determinants of changes caused by these unique events. Joining the EU will undoubtedly have an effect on any country’s political system; consequently it is legitimate to consider whether this includes the emergence of new political parties. If so, we have to be able to explain how exactly the causal mechanism works: is it all along an elite constructiveness that drives party creation, or is it a rational response of organized political parties to the demand side – the social moods, aspirations and interests of the people – that drives the creation of new parties?

It is also worth noting that although our empirical work concentrates on two parties that were relatively small and originally considered fringe parties, with few exceptions this is how parties come about: initially they are at the margins of the political system and only then do some manage to grow in importance. And this is exactly what happened with the LPR and SRP. Seemingly on the edges of the political spectrum after the 2001 parliamentary election, by 2006 both were participating in the government. Their impact on the effectiveness of governing and quality of democracy, although a fascinating topic, is not of interest to us here. Nor does the fact that both were apparently punished by the electorate in 2007 for their participation in what turned out to be an unpopular coalition. What we are trying to analyze here is the mechanism that occurred at a critical historical and political moment that, we will argue, led to the emergence of new Polish political parties.

The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some brief background on the Polish political system, and in particular the role of the SRP and LPR in that system. In Section 3, we compare the empirical support for the Downsian hypothesis and the responsible party hypothesis; we then do the same for the “socialization” argument in Section 4. We conclude with an assessment of the implications of our findings.

2. The Emergence of Polish Euroskeptic Parties

Since its democratic rebirth in 1989, the Polish party system has been characterized by extraordinary fluidity. In any comparative sense, Polish political parties have remained largely unconsolidated, whether that applies to party elites, their electorates, or the relationship between the two. In particular, voter volatility has been extremely high, even by Central and Eastern European standards, and the 2001 parliamentary election was no exception (Markowski 2006a).

From 1997-2001, a coalition of Solidarity successor parties gathered under the banner of the “Solidarity Electoral Action” (AWS) had ruled in coalition with a smaller liberal party, the Union of Freedom (UW). While the government had launched several important reforms, in general its four years in office were marked by relatively poor economic performance.

Additionally, the first of Poland’s now apparently chronic large-scale corruption scandals appeared during this period of time, which was especially shocking for much of the public given Solidarity’s prior association with ethical integrity. As a result of both the economic and ethical stagnation, the overall social mood of the public turned more pessimistic. Simultaneously – and perhaps not for not entirely unrelated reasons – support for EU membership in Poland, initially very high in the mid 1990s, began to decrease.

In this context, the 2001 election was held, and the result was a major upheaval of the Polish party system. The post-communist left (the Democratic Left Alliance) emerged as the clear victor with 41% of the vote, the largest share of the vote ever received by a single party in a Polish election. Shockingly, neither the AWS nor the UW managed to secure enough votes to receive any seats in the 2001-2005 parliament, let alone return to power.² However, prior to the election several new right-wing parties emerged in the wake of AWS's collapse, one of which was the League of Polish Families (LPR). The core of its leadership came from what in the mid-1990s was the National Party, as well as a few other minor nationalist groupings. Its popular support came mainly from provincial areas, small and medium-sized localities, and rather poorly educated and less affluent people. Additionally, LPR enjoyed disproportionate support among women, elderly, and devout Catholics, most of whom were listeners of Radio Maryja.³ The LPR can best be labeled as a Christian-nationalist right party; it was also an extreme and at times anti-systemic party. Both its program and elite rhetoric featured elements of xenophobic populism (although somewhat more moderate than similar parties in other European countries). As is often the case with populist parties, the LPR was highly critical of incumbent Polish political elites.

From its inception until the time of the 2003 Polish Referendum on EU membership, the stance of the LPR on EU membership did not change: at the most basic level, it opposed the idea of Poland joining the EU.⁴ In most of their publications, posters, and billboards, EU membership was presented as another occupation or partition of Poland by neighbors from the West. Consequently LPR's anti-European outlook was of a fundamental nature. It rejected the very idea of EU integration as a threat to the "Polishness" of the nation, its fundamental cultural values, and essential elements of national identity. Economic concerns therefore played only a secondary role.

In contrast, Self Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) had been – as a trade union called “Samoobrona” – in place since 1992, and had contested a number of elections without any even rudimentary electoral success until 2001.⁵ For most of the 1990s, a group of activists organized around Samoobrona’s leader Andrzej Lepper became famous for their direct radical actions (road blockades, attacking public buildings, seizing grain transports, and the like). These activists were generally medium to large scale farmers who had attempted to take advantage of the transition to a market economy but had been unsuccessful in doing so; many had defaulted on loans. They blamed international conspiracies and liberals in general – and high interest rates at banks in particular – for their fate. SRP can probably best be labeled as a radical populist-left party that concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues. In 2001, the party primarily targeted the rural population and marginalized social groups, as well as any outsiders that might be considered victims of the transition. There was little of religious or cultural elements in its programmatic stance; to the extent that such issues appeared, it was only as a corollary of economic considerations. It was strongly anti-elitist, anti-institutional, anti-procedural and de facto anti-democratic. SRP’s unexpected success in 2001 was mainly brought about by the support of middle-aged small towns inhabitants. Its electorate was also distinguished by a high overrepresentation of males and those of very low educational attainment. Contrary to some published reports, SRP was not mainly supported by failed entrepreneurs and the unsuccessful provincial middle classes, but instead more by the excluded, lost, and helpless.

SRP’s EU campaign differed considerably from the one offered by the LPR. Lepper argued that his party was not fundamentally against EU entry, but simply rejected particular terms of the agreement at the time, especially in economic and agricultural policy domains. The liberal elites were responsible for this predicament, which had contributed to the destruction of

the Polish enterprises, fishery and agriculture. Lepper claimed to be a “eurorealist”, arguing that Poland should not have joined the EU at that point in time, but instead should have waited until it was able to bargain better terms for accession.⁶

3. Downsian vs. Responsible Party Models

The best way to test the Downsian party emergence hypothesis vs. the responsible party model seems relatively straightforward. If cues from the LPR and SRP led their supporters to oppose the EU (the responsible party model), then at the time of the 2001 election we should see little, if any, distinction in the degree of Euroskepticism among voters for the LPR and SRP and voters for other parties (as well as non-voters). However, if voters for the LPR and SRP were significantly more Euroskeptic than voters for other parties as early as the 2001 parliamentary election, then we can conclude the opposite: voters were already Euroskeptic when they made the decision to support the LPR and SRP in 2001, and thus could not have been “led” to this position in the ensuing years by these new political parties. Put another way, it would represent evidence that these two new parties were attracting a previously unrepresented portion of the electorate, which is what the Downsian model suggests should occur.

-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --

We therefore begin with our most direct measure of depth of Euroskepticism at the time of the 2001 election, a 0-10 scale of attitudes towards EU membership.⁷ Both panels in Table 1 point to the same overall conclusions. First, voters for the LPR and SRP in 2001 are indeed significantly more Euroskeptic than either those who voted for other parties or non-voters. This conclusion holds both among the electorate at large (Panel 1) and, interestingly, among only Euroskeptics (Panel 2), who we define as those with a score of 6-10 on the EU issue position.⁸

So not only was the average the LPR and SRP voter more Euroskeptical than supporters of other parties, but even among Euroskeptics, the LPR and SRP attracted more extreme Euroskeptics.⁹

-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --

This same pattern holds when we move to a series of other questions that tap into a variety of different EU-related attitudes among Euroskeptics, including the effect of EU membership on various facets of Polish life, opinions regarding the EU and its leadership, a respondent's sense of national identity, and opinions on NATO (as indicative of general attitudes towards the west). As Table 2 demonstrates, in any instance when Euroskeptics from these four categories are distinguished in terms of the degree of Euroskepticism of their attitudes (e.g., less trust in the EU, belief that EU membership is bad for Poland, etc.), it is *always* the case that Euroskeptical supporters of the LPR, SRP, or both parties that have more strongly anti-EU views than Euroskeptical supporters of other parties or non-voting Euroskeptics. Conversely, it is *never* the case that Euroskeptical voters for either the LPR or SRP have significantly more positive views of the EU than either Euroskeptical non-voters or Euroskeptical voters for the other parties.¹⁰ The consistency of this finding across so many issues is actually quite striking. Second, similarly to Table 1, it is more often the case, although not exclusively so, that Euroskeptical LPR supporters have more extreme anti-EU positions than Euroskeptical SRP supporters.¹¹

This raises the question of the extent of the similarity across the electorates of the two Euroskeptical parties. While the simplest Downsian prediction along a single-issue dimension is that new parties should try to capture all of the unrepresented voters (Downs 1957, e.g., Ch.8, Fig.8), it would also be well within the Downsian spirit to suspect that when faced with the possibility that multiple parties might try to represent a hitherto unrepresented portion of the electorate, individual parties would try to carve out distinctive niches within that electorate.

Such a prediction would seem that much more credible in a country using proportional representation electoral rules (which Poland does), where a small proportion of the popular vote could vault the party into parliament. Put another way, we might expect that the LPR and SRP would put forward different “brands” of Euroskepticism in an effort to distinguish themselves from one another.

To assess whether this was indeed the case, we can first revisit the attitudes of Euroskeptics on the 16 EU-related questions presented in Table 2. Here, we find some evidence to support the idea that SRP Euroskeptics did appear to be more “pragmatic” than LPR Euroskeptics. One of the main examples of extreme Euroskepticism on the part of SRP Euroskeptics was their belief that their own material well being would be adversely affected by EU membership. They did not, on the other hand, seem to feel any less “European” than other Euroskeptics, nor did they have any less trust in NATO than other Euroskeptics. Taken together, we find an electorate that seems to be more attracted to claims that incompetence and intransigence on the part of the Polish government had combined to produce a raw deal for Poland, as opposed to a more fundamental belief that European project itself was evil.

Turning to the LPR, perhaps the best evidence to support the argument that LPR Euroskeptics were more fundamentally anti-Europe can be found in the fact that they consistently have the most negative opinions of the EU, especially in questions that ask for the most broad-based evaluation of the EU. LPR Euroskeptics also had the least European-based identity of any of the Euroskeptics, and they were significantly less trusting of NATO, an organization towards which even the average Euroskeptic had a generally positive view. It is also interesting to note that it is SRP Euroskeptics, and not LPR Euroskeptics, that are most concerned about the impact of EU membership on their personal financial situation, although this

is clearly a matter of degree, as both groups lean strongly towards believing that their personal financial situation will be adversely affected by EU membership.¹²

-- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --

Another way to cut into the question of whether the LPR and SRP attracted different types of Euroskeptics is to examine their prior political behavior. In Table 3, we break down our four categories of Euroskeptics by their 1997 vote choice.¹³ We can note that the 2001 LPR Euroskeptics overwhelmingly came from voters for the Solidarity Electoral Action coalition (AWS) in 1997. Conversely, SRP picked up the majority of its Euroskeptics from Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and the Union of Labor (UP), all parties associated with the left-wing of Polish politics. Continuing with the theme of distinctive niches among the unrepresented Euroskeptical voters, we can thus add the clear pattern that the LPR was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of right-wing political behavior, while the SRP was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of left-wing political behavior.¹⁴

As demonstrated in Table 4 (below), we come to a similar conclusion when we observe the self-placement of Euroskeptics on a traditional left (0) – right (10) scale. LPR Euroskeptics are overwhelming more rightist than the average Euroskeptical, and SRP Euroskeptics are significantly more leftist than the average Euroskeptical. There is also little distinction between Euroenthusiasts and Euroskeptics as a whole, with the average Euroskeptical (4.8) only marginally more rightist than the average Euroenthusiast (4.7). This again points to the importance of both a left and right wing Euroskeptical option for the electorate, as Euroskepticism does not appear by itself to inherently be an issue of the left or right.

-- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --

Finally, it is important to note what apparently did not happen in 2001: the attraction of Euroskeptics to the LPR and SRP does not appear to be a story of mobilizing the formally unmobilized “silent majority”. With the appropriate caveats regarding the use of a recall vote question, it is clear that both parties drew the vast majority of their support among Euroskeptics in 2001 from those who had voted in 1997. Indeed, over three-quarters of Euroskeptical non-voters in 1997 remained non-voters in 2001, which is identical to the overall proportion of 1997 non-voters that remained non-voters in 2001, suggesting that Euroskepticism did not play an important role in drawing voters into the political process. It is also crucial to note that in 2001 the LPR and SRP did not capture the vote of *all* Euroskeptical voters (see Table AI.1 in the Appendix). What they did do, though, was attract enough votes to capture almost 20% of the vote, and they did this in part by attracting voters that on average were significantly more Euroskeptical than the voters for other parties.

To this point, then, we can conclude the following. In 2001 there existed a portion of the Polish electorate possessing Euroskeptical views that were not echoed by any of the parties in the 1997-2001 Polish parliament. This electorate went on to form a disproportionately larger part of the electorates of the two new Euroskeptical parties than it did of other parties. Moreover, these two parties put forward different “brands” of Euroskepticism and attracted somewhat different voters in terms of prior voting behavior, ideological orientation, and variation in attitudes towards the EU. In this sense, the parties appear to have followed a successful Downsian strategy of positioning themselves to pick up voters from an unrepresented segment of the electorate on an important policy issue.

4. Party “Socialization” of the Electorate

While Downs has some fairly clear predictions about the circumstances likely to give rise to the emergence of new parties, he has less to say about what these parties do once they have captured that electorate. The question of what happens after 2001 therefore brings us to the question of whether the LPR and SRP could have been actively seeking to maintain an anti-European component of the electorate. If such a “socialization” mechanism was at work, we would expect to see the following three patterns.

First, the proportion of supporters of the LPR and SRP exhibiting Euroskeptic views should continue to increase over time *and* to exceed the proportion of Euroskeptic supporters of other parties. If this is the case through 2005, then it would suggest that the parties were continuing to emphasize their Euroskeptic identity and using this as part of their electoral appeal.

Second, there should be a positive relationship between the strength of partisanship among supporters of the LPR and SRP and their level of Euroskepticism. If one of the dominant reasons that voters supported the two new Euroskeptic parties was the persuasive and ultimately effective appeal of Euroskepticism, then we would expect that the strength of their identity with the party would be to at least some degree determined by their level of Euroskepticism.

Third, we would expect to see a “loyalty” effect, whereby voters that stayed with these parties through both the 2001 and 2005 elections would also be consistently more Euroskeptic than voters that had more recently joined either of the parties. This is a particularly telling test, as it can help us to distinguish between whether the electorate as a whole was itself merely becoming more Euroskeptic over time, or if association with these two particular parties actually itself led to more Euroskeptic views.

-- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --

Before testing these specific hypotheses, it is useful to have a sense of the changing attitudes towards the EU among Polish citizens from 1997-2005. As illustrated in Figure 1, in 1997 Poles considered EU membership to be an important issue about which most people were enthusiastic. By 2001, the importance of EU membership as an issue had declined while opposition to membership had risen. In 2001 there was also a considerable increase in differences both between and within electorates concerning the issue of EU entry. However, by 2005 we see an evident “return to stability”, as the within and between electorates cohesion increased simultaneously with the growth of salience of the EU issue. At the same time, there was an overall moderate further growth in Euroskepticism among Polish citizens.

– TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE –

To assess the empirical support for the socialization hypotheses we add data from the 2005 Polish National Election Study, conducted at the time of the 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential elections. Turning to the first socialization hypothesis, Table 5 revisits the question of the Euroskeptic composition of the electorates of different Polish parties, but this time in a dynamic framework.¹⁵ The data in Table 5 demonstrates that Polish Euroskeptic parties were successful over time in attracting both more Euroskeptic Poles than other parties, as well as more “hard”, intense Euroskeptics than the other Polish parties (see especially the ratios presented in panel C). Note in particular how the proportion of Euroskeptics among voters for Euroskeptic parties grew dramatically between 1997 (36%) and 2005 (72%). The same change among the “hard Euroskeptics” (see panel B) is even more illuminating: the proportion of hard Euroskeptics among Euroskeptic parties more than tripled between 1997 and 2005, whereas among the two other groups of voters the increase fell short of even doubling. Moreover, the magnitudes of ratios presented in panels A and B clearly show that the highest rise in the proportion of

Euroskeptics takes place between 1997 and 2001 and that the biggest expansion is among the electorates of the Euroskeptical parties. This dynamics is even more pronounced among the hard Euroskeptics (see Panel B). While between 2001 and 2005 there was a slight decrease in the relative number of hard Euroskeptics among the electorate of the non-Euroskeptical parties (from 23% to 21%), the proportion of hard Euroskeptics in the electorate of the Euroskeptical parties continued to grow (from 39% to 46%).

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The second socialization hypothesis tests the extent to which partisan identification with Euroskeptical parties is a function of the degree of a voter's Euroskepticism. To reiterate, assuming we are witnessing socialization effects, we expect to find that the more Euroskeptical the supporters of the LPR and SRP are, the more strongly they will identify with their party.

Table 6 leads to the following conclusions. First, in general there is virtually no difference in party identification among the Polish Euroenthusiasts and Euroskeptics (see totals in the last row of Table 6). We also see very little difference and change in time in the – very low, of course – partisan identification of non-voters (see upper row of Table 6). Second, in 2001 the SRP supporters have stronger levels of identification with their party if they happen to be Euroskeptics (0.82), and hard Euroskeptics (1.20) in particular, than if they are not Euroskeptics; supporters of the LPR do not display a similarly positive linear relationship between Euroskepticism and partisan identification. The relationship is reversed among the constituencies of the other (non-Euroskeptical) parties – the lower their Euroskepticism the stronger their party identification. Third, party identification is higher among voters for the pro-EU parties (1.10) than the Euroskeptical parties (0.92 and 0.85 for the SRP and LPR, respectively).

The picture changes dramatically in 2005. The overall pattern of partisanship is now the opposite of what it was in 2001: the Euroskeptic parties now have much more devoted and attached followers (1.36 and 1.26, for the LPR and SRP, respectively) compared to the "other" parties (1.14). Moreover, it is now only the LPR supporters that have a positive relationship between their level of Euroskepticism and the intensity of their party identification.

The fact that Euroskepticism ceased to be a predictor of the strength of partisanship among SRP supporters is interesting to note. As has been discussed, SRP supporters were not as Euroskeptic as LPR supporters in 2001, nor, as can be seen in Table 7, were they as Euroskeptic as LPR supporters in 2005. If anything, the gap had widened by 2005. Taken together, this suggests that perhaps the "pragmatic" Euroskepticism offered by the SRP in the campaign leading up to the 2003 referendum on EU membership had the overall effect of diluting the importance of the EU issue as a determinant of SRP support, and especially so by 2005, once Poland had joined the EU.

-- TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE --

The final socialization hypothesis predicts that we should see a "loyalty" effect whereby 2005 voters for either of these parties who also voted for the party in 2001 would exhibit more Euroskeptic views than new voters for the party. Table 7 presents findings that at the very least do not falsify this hypothesis. It is most strikingly clear among 2005 voters for the LPR, where the – albeit very few – survey respondents who reported voting for LPR in both 2001 and 2005 were extremely Euroskeptic. But that pattern also holds generally among the voters for the SRP as well, with previous SRP voters having the most Euroskeptic views of any of the categories, and particularly so in comparison with 2005 SRP voters who had voted for another party in 2001. Of course, it is worth noting that given the small number of SRP and LPR voters in the

2005 sample who could recall their 2001 vote, the standard deviations of these means remain high enough to warrant a strong degree of caution in overstating these results.

Taking these three tests together, we can conclude the following. Over time, the electorates of the Euroskeptic parties did become increasingly Euroskeptic. This was especially so for the loyal voters that stayed with one of these two parties between 2001 and 2005. Moreover, by 2005 supporters of these parties were among the strongest partisan identifiers in Poland, and, for supporters of the LPR, the more strongly Euroskeptic the supporter, the more she or he identified with the LPR. Clearly, therefore, anti-European sentiment did not stop playing a role in determining the supporters (and the strength of support) for these parties once the 2003 referendum had passed. Thus we can not falsify the hypothesis that the Euroskeptic parties – following the 2001 election – sought to play a role in strengthening the Euroskepticism of their already Euroskeptic supporters, as well as in continuing to try to attract Euroskeptic supporters away from other parties.

5. Euroskepticism and Polish Political Development

We began this paper with a puzzle: why was there such a close link among voters who supported either the LPR or SRP in the 2001 parliamentary election and the subsequent decision to vote against Polish entry into the EU in the 2003 referendum on EU membership? We have effectively falsified the simplest answer to this question: it does not appear to be the case the LPR and SRP simply attracted voters in 2001 that had no opinion on EU membership and then provided a cue for them on how to behave regarding a second order concern when necessary two years later. On the contrary, our analyses provide an example of how new parties can emerge when a large proportion of the electorate is unrepresented on an important policy dimension. We

have also moved a bit beyond the Downsian model and to examine the question of what happens next. Here, we see that the relationship between anti-EU sentiment and support for these parties continued through the 2005 election, albeit in a stronger form for the LPR than SRP.

–TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE –

Given all this, it is still of course legitimate to ask the question of how important attitudes towards the EU are in determining vote choice for the LPR and SRP. After all, there were Euroskeptics who supported other parties as well. Table 8 (below) therefore reports the results of logit analyses of the vote for both the SRP and the LPR in the 2001 and 2005 elections. In each case, the dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent voted for the party in question, and a 0 if the respondent voted for one of the other non-Euroskeptic parties. The results are illustrative: in 2001, opposing EU membership made one more likely to vote for the LPR even after controlling for demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, and evaluations of other issues. The results for the SRP are a bit more nuanced. The sign on the variable is in the correct direction, and in models limited to issue attitudes, the EU attitude variables are statistically significant.¹⁶ However, when we include the EU variable in the full model shown in Table 8, the standard errors are high enough that the variable fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < .115$).¹⁷ These findings actually dovetail very nicely with our findings from the previous section: once again, we have evidence of the fundamentalist anti-EU sentiment of the LPR playing a stronger political role than the more pragmatic anti-EU sentiment of the SRP. This suggests that while perhaps pragmatic opposition to the EU was a successful strategy to attract voters to the party in 2001 before Poland had actually joined the EU, it may have been a less successful long term strategy for building party support than the more fundamental opposition put forward by the LPR.

In closing, we want to suggest an answer to the question of *why* anti-EU sentiment could play such a role in the Polish political upheaval of 2001. After all, EU concerns are assumed to be of the second order variety in Western Europe, and low turnout in the European Parliamentary election of 2004 in Poland suggests a similar pattern holds true for Poland (Adshead and Hill 2005). Why then might anti-EU sentiment play such an important role in domestic politics? We propose the following as a potential explanation. In 2001, the Polish political system was clearly crumbling. A number of new parties had arisen to contest the election, and the ruling party looked unlikely to even make it back into parliament (and indeed did not). Polish citizens were confronted with a largely new party system and forced to try to make sense of it. Most policy questions are nuanced and have lots of answers. All parties are against unemployment – the question is just how best to attack it. All parties want a strong Poland – the question is how to achieve this. EU membership, however, presented an issue with at least an illusion of a dichotomous choice – at the end of the day, you were either for it or against it. And going into the 2001 election, there were a number of parties clearly for EU membership, and the two we have identified standing against it. Moreover, opposition to Europe signaled a general kind of anti-systemic or anti-elitist (read: populist) streak on the part of Polish parties. In this sense, it could function as a kind of crude heuristic for citizens in sorting out the once again new political system. Moreover, as Table 9 demonstrates, attitudes towards Europe were closely bundled with attitudes on a number of different issues, including economic policies such as taxes and privatization, attitudes towards foreign capital, and religion.

-- TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE --

Indeed, all of these other issues were better predictors of attitudes towards Europe in 2001 than standard socio-economic variables. Polish citizens therefore had the option of using attitudes

towards Europe as a filter for finding new parties to support in the 2001 election. Those who opposed anti-systemic, populist policies could therefore safely exclude the anti-European parties from their choice set, while, perhaps even more importantly, those who were displeased with politics as usual in Poland could choose from among the anti-European parties. In this manner, one of the simpler issues on which to formulate an opinion – am I for or against Poland joining the EU? – could play a role narrowing down vote choice to a smaller group of parties that were likely to share one's preferences across a wider range of more complex issues.¹⁸

Overall, the 2001 parliamentary election presented a cross-roads in Polish politics. For political scientists, it also presented an opportunity to observe the emergence of new political parties. Based on our research, we believe that attitudes towards Polish accession towards the EU played a role in determining the support for some of those parties, and consequently the shape of the newly emerging political system. Despite what one might think about the commitment of either the LPR or SRP to liberal democracy, the fact remains that the Polish Euroskeptic electorate was unrepresented in the national parliament for much of the lead up to Poland's EU accession. Much as Downs predicted 50 years ago, parties emerged to fill that void, and with the electoral success of the LPR and SRP in 2001, that void was occupied. While it may not have been the desired outcome of those hoping to see liberal democratic parties dominate Polish politics, it does look a lot like how we expect representative democracy to work in practice.

Six years later, of course, the Polish political scene (again!) looks very different. After two years of rule by a government (first supported by and then including SRP and the LPR) that ultimately came to be seen as threatening Poland's role in Europe by its alternatively antagonistic and incompetent policy towards Poland's partners in the EU, the people have once again

revealed their will in the ballot box. Following early elections in the fall of 2007, the LPR and SRP were cast out of both the government and the parliament as part of a vote that put a more pro-EU government in power. Another blow for the instability of the Polish party system to be sure, but most likely yet another sign of the effect that Poland's relationship to the EU continues to exert on Polish domestic politics, including the birth (and death?) of new political parties.

End Notes

¹ We rely on the main component of the Polish NES, a mass survey of a representative sample of the Polish adult population eighteen years and older conducted using face-to-face interviews by the Polish polling firm CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej). The sample size in 1997 was N=2003; in 2001 N=1794; and in 2005 N=2404.

² Poland employs an open-list proportional representation electoral system with different thresholds for parties and coalitions.

³ Radio Maryja is a Catholic-based radio station which espouses politically radical, xenophobic and nationalistic views. Its non-political programs, however, play an important role in targeting the needs of Poland's more marginalized populations, including especially the poor and uneducated.

⁴ Although eventually it would suggest support for the idea either of a "Europe of sovereign nations" or a "confederation of independent states".

⁵ Between the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary election, a law was enacted that prohibited all organizations other than political parties or citizens' committees from participating in elections. Thus the Self-Defense (Samoobrona) trade union reorganized as the Self-Defense for the Republic of Poland (SRP) political party.

⁶ For further evidence that SRP and the LPR presented different "brands" of Euroskepticism, consider first the differences in their programmatic appeals. The LPR's program clearly rejects the very essence of the idea of the EU, resulting in a clear "hard" anti-EU stance (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004, Słodkowska & Dolbakowska 2006, 2005). On the other hand, the SRP manifesto reveals a more "soft" opposition towards the EU that is mainly socio-economic and pragmatic. One can also see the hard opposition in the campaign slogans used by the LPR, such as "Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels" (intended to equate the Soviet occupation of Poland with the loss of Polish sovereignty following EU entry), "We don't need the capital in Brussels, our capital is in Warsaw", "Poland for Poles: and the like. In their electoral campaigns for the 2001 parliamentary election, the 2003 EU referendum and the 2004 European Parliamentary election, the LPR also used several historical symbols in a way that suggests that their Euroskepticism was far more fundamental and hard than that of the other parties. In the referendum campaign they used a poster of famous painter, Jan Matejko, called 'Rejtan's

Defiance', recalling the patriotic and emotional protest of one of the deputies to the 1773 Sejm against the first partition of Poland. By invoking this picture, the suggestion was made that Polish entry into the EU would be just like another partition of Poland. The literary references to occupation and partition also include the Soviet-German Pact of August 1939 and the fact that the organization established to collect signatures in order to launch a national referendum against the free purchase of Polish land by foreigners was called "Placówka" referring to the famous book by Bolesław Prus, written at the end of nineteenth century that described the Polish peasants' fight for their land under Prussian rule (Czernicka 2005). Evidence of the LPR's hard Euroskepticism can also be found in the deeds, motions proposed, and struggles of the Polish MEPs from LPR in the European Parliament (EP). All of them belong to the Ind/Dem group, where Polish members comprise 10 out of the 11 members of the group from the new member states. On occasion they try to introduce changes in the EP itself, from moderate ones – one of their MEPs had asked the President of the EP to organize Christian chapels in the EP buildings – to radical ones, such as the motion by MEP B. Rogalski: "...I raise a formal motion for self-dissolution of the EP. The Parliament has become kidnapped by the European homosexual lobby. It is an inefficient, expensive and unproductive institution." The SRP attitude towards the EU is different. First of all, their program was vague to say the least, but if anything it concentrated on clearly populist appeals against ruling elites, procedures and institutions. Its main issue was agricultural policy, and from this angle it evaluated all other questions of Polish politics and economic development. In general it saw EU entry as opening of the Polish market for the surpluses of goods produced in the West. Its leader, A. Lepper, presented himself as a "Eurorealist" - critical of the way in which Poland was being invited to join the EU, not the very idea of the EU itself (Pienkos 2004).

⁷ The scale is anchored on one end by "our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible" and on the other by "Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty".

⁸ Later in this section we refer to Euroenthusiasts, who are defined as people who score between 0-4 on the EU position scale.

⁹ Both also had a larger proportion of "hard core" Euroskeptics – which we define as those having a 9 or 10 Euroskeptic score – of their Euroskeptic supporters; Table AI.1 in the Appendix.

¹⁰ As a validation tests of these measures, we compared the means of Euroskeptics as a whole (the total row from Table 2) with the mean for the Euroenthusiasts (0-4 on the EU position scale). Across all 15 variables, the mean Euroskeptic position was indeed always further in the Euroskeptic directions (e.g., less trusting of the EU) than the mean position of Euroenthusiasts. In most cases, this difference was quite substantial, sometimes even as high as 0.5 on a one point scale. The most notable exceptions concerned the degree to which respondents thought EU membership would help foreign firms in Poland – pretty much everyone thought that it would – and the extent to which Poland could influence NATO decision making.

¹¹ In Table 2 we deliberately report on the 16 issues separately to show the exact answers to these questions. While we could have simplified the table by using factor analysis or another statistical method that would allow us to say something about the number of dimensions of Euroskeptics' attitudes towards EU, this was not our main goal. In Table 2 we only want to show that, even if

most Poles know fairly little about the technicalities and details of the EU machinery, we can still find a very strong and logical pattern clearly distinguishing the electorates of the Euroskeptical parties from the rest across multiple issues and aspects of EU accession.

¹² These distinctions continued to hold in 2005 as well; see Table AI.2 in the Appendix.

¹³ Readers should note that the 2001 Polish NES study is not a panel study, and thus when we refer to 1997 vote choice we are relying on a question asked in 2001 of respondents' recall of their vote choices in 1997.

¹⁴ These patterns mimic the movement of voters across parties between 1997 and 2001 from the electorate as a whole, but the patterns were more extreme among Euroskeptics. For example, the LPR picked up approximately 12% of the overall 1997 AWS electorate in 2001, but almost 20% of the Euroskeptical 1997 AWS electorate. Similarly, the SRP picked up 3%, 5%, and 19% of the 1997 SLD, UP, and PSL electorates overall, respectively, but 6%, 13%, and 24% of their Euroskeptical 1997 electorates.

¹⁵ The 1997 Euroskeptical electorate is composed only of voters for the Polish Peasant Party, at the time of the 1997 election the only party that could have been considered Euroskeptical. Readers who therefore find the comparison between 1997 and 2001 or 2005 contentious on these grounds should examine only the differences between 2001 and 2005, which reveal essentially the same patterns.

¹⁶ Results available from authors upon request.

¹⁷ Similar results can be found for analyzing the 2005 vote in this manner as well (see Table AI.4 in the Appendix).

¹⁸ While there are of course sets of policy preferences (such as an opposition to the presence of foreign capital in Poland) that likely pushed voters to both oppose Polish EU membership and support more populist parties, this does not in any way negate the link between opposition to the EU and support for the SRP and the LPR. On the contrary, being for or against Europe seems to be a much more fundamental attitude than a particular policy position. Heuristically, too, it seems an easier issue conceptually to rally a particular bundle of populist attitudes around than any particular populist policy.

APPENDIX I: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
(Note: Could be web-based)

Table AI.1 Percentage (Number) of Hard Core (9-10) Euroskeptics by Vote Choice

Vote choice	Euroskepticism Intensity	
	Weak (6-8)	Strong (9-10)
Non-Voters	42.4% (106)	57.6% (144)
Other Parties	43.7% (118)	56.3% (152)
SRP voters	34.0% (18)	66.0% (35)
LPR voters	20.0% (7)	80.0% (28)
Total	40.9% (249)	59.1% (359)

NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party

Pearson $\chi^2(3) = 8.4868$ Pr = 0.037

Table AI.2. Euroskeptical Positions on EU related issues by vote choice in 2005

Vote choice		Trust in EU a lot (1) – a little (4)	Identity: all Polish (1) - mostly European (5)	Trust in NATO: a lot (1) – a little (4)	EU will promote Western interests on the expense of Eastern newcomers: agree(1) disagree (4)	In case of real crisis NATO will never defend Poland: agree (1) disagree (4)	Polish civil servants more corrupted (1) – less corrupted (2) than officials in EU countries
Non-Voters	Mean	2.49	2.20	2.43	2.19	2.63	1.20
	N	932	1112	888	847	812	704
Voters for other parties	Mean	2.36	2.43	2.21	2.28	2.74	1.18
	N	861	960	844	857	817	669
SRP	Mean	2.65	1.97	2.42	2.06	2.29	1.26
	N	101	112	94	89	80	69
LPR	Mean	2.87	1.89	2.54	1.93	2.28	1.28
	N	67	79	58	59	53	43
TOTAL	Mean	2.46	2.28	2.34	2.21	2.66	1.20
	N	1961	2263	18884	1852	1762	1486

Table AI.3: 2001 Euroskepticism by 1997 Vote Choice**Panel 1. SRP**

SRP 2001	Mean	N	SD
'other' parties' voters 1997	6.19	62	3.01
non-voters 1997	5.82	19	2.83
DK whom voted for in 1997	6.69	20	3.60
Total	6.21	101	3.08

*Eta sq = 0.8%**Scale of Euroskepticism: 0 (Euroenthusiast) – 10 (Euroskeptic)***Panel 2. LPR**

LPR 2001	Mean	N=	SD
'other' parties voters 1997	7.18	51	2.99
non-voters 1997	5.00	1	0.0
DK whom voted for in 1997	5.51	11	4.31
Total	6.85	63	3.25

*Eta sq = 4.5%**Scale of Euroskepticism: 0 (Euroenthusiast) – 10 (Euroskeptic)*

Table A1.4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Vote Choice in 2001
Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	SRP	LPR
Age	-0.1815 (0.1492)	-0.2146 (0.176)
Education	-0.3721** (0.159)	0.0315 (0.1917)
Income	-0.4279*** (0.1035)	-0.0178 (0.1233)
Residence	-0.2409*** (0.0819)	-0.0864 (0.0934)
Religion	0.0102 (0.2919)	0.7264** (0.3458)
Issue: Privatization	0.0424 (0.0539)	0.1583** (0.0801)
Issue: Role Of Religion	-0.0684 (0.0436)	0.1566*** (0.0459)
Issue: Unemployment	0.0542 (0.0473)	-0.1113 (0.0712)
Issue: Tax Policy	-0.0952** (0.0437)	0.0479 (0.0456)
Issue: EU Integration	0.0559 (0.0409)	0.1962*** (0.0585)
Issue: Social Safety Net	-0.1371*** (0.0506)	-0.0904 (0.0633)
Issue: Foreign Capital	-0.0004 (0.0376)	-0.0217 (0.0468)
Issue: Immigrants	0.0701 (0.046)	0.1334** (0.0571)
Constant	0.6171 (1.1814)	-7.5707*** (1.5581)

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Attitudes towards EU membership by Non-Voters, Voters for Euroskeptical Parties, and Voters for Other Parties, 2001

Panel 1. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Full Electorate

Vote Choice	Mean	Standard Deviation
Non-Voter	5.23	.13
Other Party	4.75	.12
SRP	6.17	.30
LPR	6.92	.41
F = 12.54		Sig < .001

N=1571, NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights. 0-10 Scale, with 10 = most Euroskeptical.

Panel 2. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Euroskeptical

Vote Choice	Mean	Standard Deviation
Non-Voter	8.66	.10
Other Party	8.67	.09
SRP	8.91	.20
LPR	9.31	.18
F = 2.44		Sig = .063

N=608, Euroskeptical = 6-10 on EU position score. NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights. 0-10 Scale, with 10 = most Euroskeptical.

Table 2 : Euroskeptical Positions on EU Related Issues by Vote Choice

		Changes in Borders: Good (1) vs. Bad (2)	Polish owned private industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	Are EU politicians are honest and efficient (1) or corrupt/inefficient (2)	Trust in EU a lot (1) - a little (4)	Poland can affect NATO a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	On the whole, the EU is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	Poland can affect EU a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	Identity: all Polish (1) - mostly European (5)	Polish agriculture will be helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Trust in NATO: a lot (1) - a little (4)	Your family's standard of living helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	State owned industries helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Foreign industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	On the whole, NATO is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	People from other countries working in Poland is Better (1) or Worse (2)	Vote because of Economy (1) vs Politics and Culture (2)
NV	Mean	1.45	1.66	1.47	2.79	2.90	1.59	2.95	2.24	1.82	2.27	1.73	1.85	1.12	1.12	1.58	1.25
	N	173	183	133	220	196	172	192	248	196	225	147	203	201	190	229	154
Other	Mean	1.48	1.60	1.41	2.75	2.89	1.53	2.97	2.24	1.80	2.28	1.72	1.83	1.09	1.13	1.56	1.21
	N	191	205	135	232	224	202	221	265	220	236	159	216	226	222	245	214
SRP	Mean	1.71	1.85	1.66	3.07	3.03	1.77	3.30	2.36	1.80	2.24	1.88	1.88	1.17	1.19	1.59	1.18
	N	34	40	32	40	39	37	38	51	46	40	36	43	45	39	47	39
LPR	Mean	1.69	1.83	1.64	3.22	3.33	1.85	3.06	1.99	1.94	2.60	1.78	1.85	1.14	1.16	1.64	1.14
	N	27	30	22	35	22	31	21	36	33	34	18	25	33	26	32	29
Total	Mean	1.50	1.66	1.48	2.83	2.93	1.59	2.99	2.24	1.82	2.29	1.74	1.85	1.11	1.13	1.57	1.22
	N	424	458	321	528	482	442	473	600	495	536	359	486	505	476	553	435
	F	4.06	4.68	3.01	5.03	2.88	5.98	2.20	0.71	1.27	2.08	1.34	0.26	1.06	0.52	0.43	0.85
	Sig.	0.007	0.003	0.031	0.002	0.036	0.001	0.087	0.546	0.285	0.102	0.262	0.852	0.367	0.667	0.730	0.468
	Eta	0.168	0.173	0.166	0.167	0.133	0.198	0.118	0.060	0.088	0.108	0.106	0.040	0.079	0.057	0.049	0.077
	EtaSq	2.8%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	1.8%	3.9%	1.4%	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	1.1%	0.2%	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%

Table 3: 2001 Euroskeptical Voter by 1997 Vote

2001 Vote		1997 Vote								
		NV	SLD	AWS	UW	SRP	PSL	ROP	UP	Total
NV	N	85	20	34	3	0	12	2	6	162
	% Non-Voters 01	52.5%	12.3%	21.0%	1.9%	0.0%	7.4%	1.2%	3.7%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	77.3%	20.6%	29.1%	11.5%	0.0%	26.7%	40.0%	40.0%	38.9%
Other	N	18	70	57	19	0	21	0	7	192
	% Other Parties 01	9.4%	36.5%	29.7%	9.9%	0.0%	10.9%	0.0%	3.6%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	16.4%	72.2%	48.7%	73.1%	0.0%	46.7%	0.0%	46.7%	46.2%
SRP	N	7	6	3	1	0	11	1	2	31
	% SRP 01	22.6%	19.4%	9.7%	3.2%	0.0%	35.5%	3.2%	6.5%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	6.4%	6.2%	2.6%	3.8%	0.0%	24.4%	20.0%	13.3%	7.5%
LPR	N	0	1	23	3	1	1	2	0	31
	% LPR 01	0.0%	3.2%	74.2%	9.7%	3.2%	3.2%	6.5%	0.0%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	0.0%	1.0%	19.7%	11.5%	100%	2.2%	40.0%	0.0%	7.5%
Total	N	110	97	117	26	1	45	5	15	416
	% LPR 01	26.4%	23.3%	28.1%	6.3%	0.2%	10.8%	1.2%	3.6%	100%
	% Vote Choice 97	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

NV=Non-voter; SLD = Democratic Left Alliance; AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action; UW = Freedom Union; PSL = Polish Peasant Alliance; ROP = Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland; UP = Union of Labor

Table 4. Average Left-Right self-placement of Euroskeptics by 2001 vote choice

Vote choice	2001	
	Mean	N
Non-Voters	4.78	249
Other Parties	4.66	265
SRP voters	4.19	51
LPR voters	6.90	36
Total	4.81	600

0 (left) – 10 (right) Scale

Table 5. Distributions of Voters and Euroskepticism by Election Year

Panel A. Euroskeptics

Skeptics (6-10)

% of Skeptics

	A	B	C	D
	Non-Voters	Voters for non-Euroskeptic Parties	Voters for Euroskeptic Parties	Total
1997	35.7%	28.3%	36.0%	31.7%
2001	46.4%	41.5%	57.0%	46.3%
2005	50.6%	47.5%	71.8%	51.0%
Ratio of Euroskeptics growth among groups of Euroskeptic voters				
2001/1997	1.30	1.47	1.58	1.46
2005/2001	1.09	1.14	1.26	1.10

Panel B. Hard Euroskeptics

Hard Skeptics (9-10)

% of Hard Skeptics

	Non-Voters	Voters for non-Euroskeptic Parties	Voters for Euroskeptic Parties	Total
1997	17.4%	11.5%	14.0%	14.1%
2001	25.0%	22.5%	39.4%	26.5%
2005	27.0%	20.6%	46.3%	25.8%
Ratio of growth of "hard Euroskepticism" among groups voters				
2001/1997	1.44	1.96	2.81	1.88
2005/2001	1.08	.91	1.18	.97

Panel C Ratio of relative growth of Euroskeptics (the ratio of Euroskeptics among Euroskeptic parties [C] to Euroskeptics among "other" parties [B])

In:	Among Skeptics (6-10)	Among Hard Skeptics (9-10)
1997	C/B = 1.27	C/B = 1.22
2001	C/B = 1.37	C/B = 1.75
2005	C/B = 1.51	C/B = 2.25

Table 6 Party Identification intensity and Level of Euroskepticism by Groups of Voters

Panel A. 2001

2001 Vote		Level of Euroskepticism					
		None (0-5)	Weak (6-8)	Strong (9-10)	Total	F	Sig.
Non-Voters	Mean	.52	.56	.57	.54	0,277	0,758
	SD	.71	.69	.72	.71		
	N	385	116	136	636		
Voters for other Parties	Mean	1.16	1.05	.98	1.10	3,051	0,048
	SD	.84	.85	.81	.84		
	N	482	116	150	747		
SRP	Mean	.78	.82	1.20	.92	3,055	0,051
	SD	.73	.79	.92	.82		
	N	59	17	34	109		
LPR	Mean	.91	.28	.99	.85	1,965	0,149
	SD	.94	.67	1.00	.95		
	N	27	9	27	63		
Total	Mean	.87	.79	.84	.85	1,393	0,249
	SD	.84	.81	.83	.83		
	N	952	258	346	1556		

Scale of Partisanship: 0 (weak) – 3 (strong)

Panel B. 2005

2005 Vote		Level of Euroskepticism					
		None (0-5)	Weak (6-8)	Strong (9-10)	Total	F	Sig.
Non-Voters	Mean	.72	.77	.74	.73	0,450	0,638
	SD	.75	.73	.81	.76		
	N	514	203	232	949		
Voters for other Parties	Mean	1.16	1.10	1.13	1.14	0,546	0,579
	SD	.77	.73	.82	.77		
	N	516	220	166	903		
SRP	Mean	1.41	1.09	1.21	1.26	1,231	0,296
	SD	.91	.78	.78	.84		
	N	40	23	39	102		
LPR	Mean	1.29	1.31	1.44	1.36	0,201	0,819
	SD	.89	.47	1.09	.89		
	N	17	18	29	64		
Total	Mean	.96	.96	.96	.96	0,001	0,999
	SD	.80	.74	.86	.80		
	N	1088	464	466	2018		

Scale of Partisanship: 0 (weak) – 3 (strong)

Table 7: 2005 Means Of Euroskepticism By 2001 Groups Of Voters,

Panel A. SRP

SRP 2005 =>	Mean	N=	SD
SRP 2001 voters	6.98	23	3.57
'other' parties voters 2001	5.89	35	3.64
non-voters 2001	6.23	15	3.45
DK whom voted for in 2001	6.90	33	3.13
	<i>F = 0,687</i>		<i>Sig. = 0,562</i>

Eta sq = 2.0%;

Scale of Euroskepticism: 0 (Euroenthusiast) – 10 (Euroskeptic)

Panel B. LPR

LPR 2005 =>	Mean	N=	SD
LPR 2001 voters	9.27	5	1.44
'other' parties voters 2001	7.34	30	2.68
non-voters 2001	7.04	10	3.11
DK whom voted for in 2001	7.76	19	2.20
	<i>F = 1,035</i>		<i>Sig. = 0,384</i>

Eta sq = 4.9%

Scale of Euroskepticism: 0 (Euroenthusiast) – 10 (Euroskeptic)

Table 8: Logistic Regression Analysis of Vote Choice in 2001
Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	SRP	LPR
Age	.1591 (.1473)	-.0217 (.9043)
Education	-.4442*** (.1716)	-.0350 (.8679)
Income	.0247 (.1062)	.0690 (.6073)
Religion	.2660 (.2806)	.1925 (.5696)
Residence	-.3272*** (.0904)	-.0457 (.6520)
Issue: Privatization	-.0605 (.0535)	.0278 (.6893)
Issue: Role Of Religion	.0761* (.0450)	.2730*** (.0000)
Issue: Unemployment	-.0372 (.0573)	.0881 (.1521)
Issue: Tax Policy	-.0925* (.0480)	-.0299 (.5903)
Issue: EU Integration	.0717 (.0454)	.1318** (.0191)
Issue: Agricul. Subsidies	.0705 (.0526)	.1110 (.1446)
Issue: Foreign Capital	-.0087 (.0431)	-.0598 (.2604)
Constant	-15.005 (11.452)	-45.10*** (.00156)


*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$

Table 9: Determinant of Attitudes Towards Europe
Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

Age	0.109 (0.071)
Education	-0.040 (0.075)
Income	-0.056 (0.051)
Residence	-0.019 (0.036)
Religion	0.298** (0.125)
Issue: Privatization	0.172*** (0.025)
Issue: Religion	0.032 (0.023)
Issue: Unemployment	-0.038* (0.023)
Issue: Tax	0.088*** (0.019)
Issue: Agricultural Subsidies	0.105*** (0.023)
Issue: Foreign Capital	0.166*** (0.021)
Issue: Foreigners settling in Poland	0.038 (0.024)
Party ID Intensity	-0.003 (0.086)
Does who governs matter?	-0.032 (0.048)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.062 (0.098)
Evaluation of the political system	0.231** (0.094)
Interest in politics	0.050 (0.078)
Alienation from politics	-0.203 (0.141)
Evaluation of the former (communist) regime	0.197** (0.093)
Evaluation of political situation in Poland, last year	0.012 (0.090)
Evaluation of economic situation in Poland, last year	0.106 (0.091)
Evaluation of material situation of ones own household, last year	0.145 (0.089)
Evaluation of the democratic transition period, last 16 years	0.090 (0.120)
"Democracy unveils problems, but is better than any other system"	0.277*** (0.093)
Constant	-0.767 (0.844)

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$;

Figure 1.



	1997	2001	2005
mean salience (0 - low; 1 - high)	7,19	5,96	7,22
salience SD	2,58	2,92	2,25
explained variance - Eta sq - of the between electorates differences	2,10	4,90	1,10
mean policy stance on EU issue (0 – enthusiast; 1 – skeptical)	3,54	5,08	5,73