

**Past is Still Present:
Micro-level Comparisons of Conventional vs. Transitional
Economic Voting in Three Polish Elections**

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Abstract

Using survey data from three Polish parliamentary elections, we provide the first systematic micro-level test contrasting a standard incumbency-based model of economic voting with a transitional economic voting model in the post-communist context. To do so, we introduce a novel temporal component to micro-level studies of economic voting that supplements standard short term retrospective economic evaluations (e.g., “do you feel the economy has improved in the past 12 months?”) with longer “transitional” retrospective economic evaluations (e.g., “do you feel the economy has improved since the collapse of communism?”). Our analyses reveals a nuanced picture suggesting multiple paths for economic influences on voting in Poland. We find evidence consistent with the standard incumbency-based approach, but only for the specific set of evaluations to which the theory is most appropriately applied: short-term retrospective economic evaluations and the vote for incumbent parties. By contrast, the transitional model is strongly supported by evidence that evaluations of changes in economic conditions since the collapse of communism (“long term economic evaluations”) have an effect on the vote for a range of parties. We demonstrate that these results are robust to model specification and generational effects.

Introduction

Since the publication of Gerald Kramer's landmark *APSR* article "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior" over 45 years ago, scholars have been fascinated with trying to understand the relationship between economic conditions, voting behavior, and election results (Kramer 1971). Originally, the vast majority of this research focused on economic voting within the relatively stable two-party system of the United States. Not surprisingly, almost all of the theoretical energy of this endeavor was focused on better understanding the relationship between economic conditions and the vote for incumbent political parties; in a two-party system, such a model can sufficiently characterize the effect of the economy on the entire electorate. As studies of economic voting spread beyond the United States, initially into other advanced industrial democracies, attention to the political context in which elections were held led to new avenues of theoretical inquiry concerning the context in which economic conditions might have more or less of an effect on the vote for incumbent parties (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2007). More recently, studies of economic voting in post-communist countries – responding to the fact that incumbency centered approaches have a limited scope in multi-party systems, and, especially, multi-party systems with large numbers of new and unstable parties – have tended to examine the effect of economic conditions on a much wider range of political parties, including but not limited to incumbent parties.

While some of this new work has examined the effect of the economy systematically on ever major party competing in an election (Gibson and Cielecka 1995; Bell 1997), other studies have considered a context-specific theory grounded in the transition from communism. The central theoretical question for these studies has been whether the lineage and affiliation of current political parties *vis a vis* the communist past and the transition away from communism

influences the relationship between economic conditions and electoral support (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b; Jackson et al. 2003b, 2005, Tucker 2006). Tucker (2006) for example, offers a “Transitional Identity Model” of economic voting, whereby “New Regime” parties, or those parties that are primarily identified with the transition away from communism and the implementation of market reforms, are predicted to perform better in parts of the country with better economic conditions. Conversely, “Old Regime” parties, or parties descended from the old ruling communist parties, are predicted to perform better in parts of the country where the economy is worse.¹

While these recent studies employ somewhat different theoretical motivations, adopt different nomenclature, and consider different cases, they are unified in their use of aggregate-level data. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to extend this line of research to micro-level tests of individual voting decisions. Thus in examining the effect of attitudes about economic conditions on vote-choice in three Polish parliamentary elections, we provide the first micro-level study explicitly contrasting the predictions of a standard incumbency-based model of economic voting (hereafter “conventional economic voting” or the “conventional model”) and these newer transitional economic voting models (hereafter, “transitional economic voting” or the “transitional model”).

Our study also makes a second important theoretical and empirical contribution to the economic voting literature by extending existing theories to account for the temporal dynamics of regime transition. More specifically, we make the theoretical argument that individuals’ beliefs about changes in economic conditions since the fall of communism can continue to exert a “long-term economic effect” on vote choice just as evaluations of economic conditions over

¹ Since Tucker (2006) provides the most comprehensive and definitive aggregate-level study in this literature, we employ this study’s nomenclature.

recent months can have a “short-term economic effect” on voting. We test this novel claim empirically using a new measurement of voter perceptions that measures longer, “transitional” retrospective economic evaluations (e.g., “do you feel the economy has improved since the collapse of communism?”) in addition to standard measures of short-term retrospective evaluations (e.g., “do you feel the economy has improved in the past 12 months?”).

The empirical findings of our analyses of the 1997, 2001, and 2005 Polish parliamentary elections are nuanced but clear. We do find some evidence of support for the conventional incumbency model – which should come as a relief to those who believe that support for such a model is an important prerequisite for establishing accountable democratic governance – but this evidence is limited to the specific set of evaluations for which the theory is most clearly intended: short-term retrospective economic evaluations and the vote for incumbent parties. The transitional economic voting model, on the other hand, is strongly supported by tests of longer-term economic evaluations across a range of parties. Moreover, we even find some support for the transitional model in predicting the effect of short-term economic evaluations on the vote for opposition parties. Thus as in established democracies, Polish voters do not hesitate to blame or reward incumbent parties for short-term changes in the state of the economy; otherwise, though, the effect of economic perceptions on vote choice is very much in line with the predictions of the transitional model. Moreover, these results are remarkably robust to re-estimating all of our analyses using an alternative dependent variable of party affect as opposed to vote choice. In the remainder of this paper, we elaborate on our theoretical arguments, supply some contextual information on the three Polish elections analyzed, and present our empirical analyses.

Models of Economic Voting

A wealth of evidence suggests that economic conditions exert a substantial effect on election outcomes in established democracies.² The emergence of competitive multi-party elections in East-Central Europe following the collapse of communism has presented an opportunity for further testing of existing models of economic voting and, perhaps even more importantly, new theorizing about the effect of the economy on elections in transition countries. In the remainder of this section, therefore, we present two potential models of economic voting in transitional countries. The first follows the dominant strand of the economic voting literature in established democracies by focusing on voting for or against incumbent parties. The second draws on recent work on economic voting in post-communist countries (in particular Tucker 2006, although see as well Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b; Jackson et al. 2005) to hypothesize about the effect of economic conditions on the vote for particular “types” of political parties.

In its most straightforward form, the predominant model of economic voting employed in studies of established democracies expects that voters will tend to punish the incumbent in bad economic times and reward the incumbent when the economy is doing well. In this framework, elections function much like referenda on economic conditions during the incumbent party’s term in office. Scholars have produced a vast amount of evidence supporting this basic premise using both macro and micro-level data.³ It is important to note that the conventional model has

² For a review of the literature in established democracies, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Anderson 2007. For a review focused on post-communist countries, see Tucker 2002, p.292-5.

³ In the American context, see for example Kramer 1971; Tufte 1975, 1978; Chappell and Keech 1985; Erikson 1989, 1990; MacKuen et al. 1992 at the macro-level, and Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lockerbie 1991; Lanoue 1994 at the micro-level. In the comparative context, see for example Powell and Whitten 1993; Remmer 1993; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Chappell and Veiga 2000; Palmer and Whitten 2000 at the macro-level and Alvarez et al. 2000, Wlezien et al. 1997; Anderson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002 at the micro-level; although see Anderson 2007 for a provocative argument about whether “contingent”

little to say about how economic conditions ought to influence the fate of non-incumbent parties. In two party systems this is not a serious concern, as the impact of economic evaluations on the vote for the opposition party follows directly from the prediction of the effect of the economy on the vote for incumbent. For multi-party systems, however, the conventional model provides little guidance as to the relationship between economic conditions and the support for different non-incumbent parties.

The weight of evidence consistent with the conventional model suggests that this model may provide insight into the dynamics of elections in transitional democracies. In fact, the assumption that voters in new democracies would behave in accordance with its predictions helped to spur a great deal of the early literature on the politics of economic reform (e.g., Sachs 1993, Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Przeworski 1991).⁴ Therefore, the conventional model seems the logical place to begin any empirical analysis of economic voting patterns, even in post-communist countries.⁵

economic voting does not in some way at its core invalidate the fundamental claims underlying conventional incumbency-based models of economic voting.

⁴ Duch (2001) compellingly adapts the conventional theory to the post-communist context in arguing that that economic voting is a learned behavior and that as citizens develop more trust in democratic institutions and acquire more political knowledge they will be more likely to engage in economic voting. While Hungary's 1997 election is the focus of this paper, analysis of a 1997 pre-election Polish survey finds evidence that (prospective) economic voting is evident only among individuals who are both well-educated and have high levels of confidence in Poland's democratic institutions. While this analysis finds no evidence of retrospective economic voting and our analysis does, the methods employed by the two studies are similarly diverse. In particular, Duch (2001) relies on survey data collected three months prior to the September election in June 1997 while we use post-election survey data which should offer a more accurate measure of citizens' actual voting behavior. In addition, the two studies employ different statistical models. Duch (2001) employs a trichotomous 'incumbent support' variable and ordered probit analysis while we employ multinomial logit models in order to identify the unique effect of economic perceptions on support for each party.

⁵ One critique of this approach is made by Susan Stokes, who has argued that the conventional model of economic voting ought not to apply in transitional countries. She argues instead that citizens may interpret bad economic times as a sign that the short-term pain required of a transition is underway, and thus initially reward reformist incumbents for painful economic changes; indeed in Stokes (1996) she cites a Czechoslovak finance minister who stated that "Unless the unemployment rate grows to 8% to 10% this year, we will not be doing our job." Nevertheless, there are two reasons to suspect this model will be of

There is, however, a growing body of evidence that supports an alternative model of economic voting specific to countries in transition (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b; Jackson et al. 2003a, 2005; Tucker 2006). In established democracies, the issue of the economy largely reduces to the question of which party is best able to create positive economic conditions while working within a broadly accepted set of economic rules. In contrast, the appropriate economic system is often very much a part of economic policy debates in transitioning countries. Even if a return to a prior economic (e.g., communist) system *in toto* is unlikely, the memory of an alternative economic system – crucially with a different set of economic strengths and weaknesses – is posited to linger well into the transition. In this framework, citizens can use information about economic conditions to update their beliefs about whether they would prefer to have parties in power that are likely to continue the policies of the transition or, conversely, likely to be able to provide some relief from the transition due to their association with the old economic system. The “transitional identity” of political parties enables voters to connect economic conditions and vote choice, and therefore supplants incumbency status at the heart of the model (Tucker 2006).⁶

The transitional model of economic voting accordingly predicts a positive relationship between evaluations of economic conditions and support for “New Regime” parties that are associated with the economic transition away from communism. In contrast, “Old Regime”

limited use in explaining recent elections in post-communist countries. First, while such an approach might have been appropriate early in the transition process, in the decade following the transition, it seems unlikely that citizens would still be willing to conceive of bad economic conditions as a ‘good sign’ about things to come and/or as the consequences of economic decisions made by the old regime prior to transition (and indeed, Tucker 2006 finds no evidence to support these claims at the aggregate cross-regional level even in the earliest Polish elections; see p.72, nt.48). Second, these models expect citizens to interpret information about economic conditions in a rather sophisticated way. A good deal of work in even well established democracies suggests that expecting this sort of reasoning from citizens is unrealistic (Achen and Bartels 2004).

⁶ In the section we adopt the terminology employed Tucker (2006). Other studies following a similar theoretical trajectory of focusing on a party’s “type” in post-communist countries have used a reformist/liberal vs post-communist/leftist distinction that leads to a similar classification of parties (Fidrmuc 2000a, 2000b; Jackson et al. 2003a, 2005; Mach and Jackson 2006).

parties are defined as those most closely associated with the prior ruling Communist party. As citizens can associate these Old Regime parties with a period of time when economic problems that accompanied the transition either did not exist (or were much less serious), the transitional model predicts that voters who are unhappy with economic conditions ought to be more likely to gravitate to Old Regime parties than other parties, all else being equal, especially those about which little else is known. Theoretically, the New Regime and Old Regime categories are not exhaustive, and there are parties that fall into neither category; in these cases, the transitional model would not predict a systematic effect for economic evaluations on vote choice.

One additional point regarding Old Regime parties bears mention. As a substantial body of work has demonstrated, not all Old Regime parties evolved in the same manner; indeed, the literature often speaks of “reformed” and “unreformed” communist successor parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Ishiyama 2002; Ziblatt and Biziouras 2002). The very point of the transitional model of economic voting, however, is that the Old Regime hypothesis ought to apply to both reformed and unreformed Old Regime parties alike, because the key linkage is to the association with the communist past. Of course, theoretically, we might expect this linkage to be stronger in the case of unreformed than reformed Old Regime parties, although interestingly Tucker (2006) does not find any empirical evidence suggesting that this is the case at the aggregate level.

The conventional and traditional models of economic voting also diverge with respect to the temporal framework citizens adopt when evaluating economic conditions.⁷ In order to generate an evaluation of a given set of economic conditions, an individual must compare these conditions to some alternative set. When the first set entails more (less) desirable economic

⁷ The issue of temporal evaluations also calls to mind the wide-ranging debate in the political science literature regarding prospective vs. retrospective voting (MacKuen et al. 1992; see Mach and Jackson 2006 for a discussion in the Polish context). We are self-consciously *not* referencing the debate here in an effort to call attention to a much less studied aspect of the temporal nature of economic evaluations: the temporal quality of one’s reference point for assessing changes in the state of the economy.

outcomes compared to the alternative, positive (negative) evaluations result. Citizens may reasonably compare current conditions to a host of different alternatives including the state of the economy when the incumbent took office, conditions in neighboring countries, some average of actual economic conditions over some period of elapsed time, etc. (Powell and Whitten 1993; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Whitten and Palmer 1999). In most micro-level survey-based work on economic voting in established democracies the reference point is assumed to be relatively recent economic conditions (e.g. “over the past 12 months would you say the economy has...”) or is simply left to the respondent (e.g. “how would you evaluate the economy today, is it...”). These two types of questions reflect both the general belief that voters tend to be fairly myopic and the difficulty inherent in identifying a commonly used alternative reference point.

In post-communist democracies, however, there is an obvious reference point against which citizens might reasonably compare current economic conditions: the pre-transition economy. While voters might rationally conduct fairly sophisticated comparisons – e.g., a voter might compare present conditions to present day conditions had the old regime remained in power – we assume voters are likely to take a more straightforward approach. Specifically we expect some voters may compare current conditions to a general conception of the economy under the communist regime.⁸ The transitional model of economic voting thus directs attention to economic evaluations distinct from the short-term evaluations in which the conventional model is grounded. Simply put, a more positive evaluation of the changes in economic conditions since the collapse of communism ought to lead voters to be more likely to support New Regime parties

⁸ Tucker 2006 hints at such an approach in his conclusion when he discusses the idea that there could be two different types of “incumbent parties to be blamed or rewarded for the state of the economy following a dramatic change in a country’s economic circumstances – the incumbent party of the pre-transition period (here the Old Regime parties) and the incumbent parties of the transition period (here the New Regime parties) – neither of which need to actually be in power at the time of a given election to be considered an incumbent” (p.280).

and less likely to support Old Regime parties regardless of who is currently in power. By contrast, the conventional model offers no inherent reason why voters' preferences for either an incumbent party or opposition party ought to be affected by considerations of how the economy has changed since a period of time before that incumbent came into office. Table 1 therefore concisely summarizes our hypotheses.

-- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --

One set of predictions warrants additional discussion. We have laid out our arguments for why the conventional model predicts an effect for short-term economic evaluations on the vote of incumbent parties and no effect for long-term economic evaluations on the vote for any party, as well as why the transitional model predicts an effect for long-term economic evaluations on the vote for both New Regime and Old Regime parties. This leaves open the question of what the appropriate prediction of the transitional model for the effect of short-term economic evaluations on the vote for New and Old Regime parties ought to be. Unlike in the case of the conventional model – where there is no compelling reasons to think that an evaluation of changes over the past 15 years ought to affect a decision of whether or not to re-elect a party that has been in power for 4 years⁹ – here we might expect the logic of the transitional model to still apply: voters look at the state of the economy, and if they like what they see they vote for a New Regime party; if not, they vote for an Old Regime party. Of course, we would expect this effect to be more consistently present when making an explicit comparison to changes since the beginning of the transition, but there is no reason *per se* that voters could not use the same calculus when thinking about more recent changes in economic conditions. For this reason, we include a prediction in

⁹ If the reader disagrees with this contention, then he or she is free to consider it an additional prediction of the conventional model. As we will demonstrate, though, the effect of long-term economic evaluations on vote choice is almost completely in line with the predictions of the transitional model.

Table 1 for the transitional model for short-term economic evaluations, although we expect it to be less pronounced than for long-term economic evaluations.

It is also worth noting a number of other temporally based hypotheses, although all of these should be taken with the caveat that it is unclear whether we ought to expect to find evidence in their support over a nine-year time period, which is the span of the data included in our analyses. That being said, most generally, as elections are held further from the moment of transition, we might expect the transitional model to enjoy correspondingly less support. Similarly, as time passes and democracy becomes more “established”, we might expect to see more support for the conventional model. Finally, as time passes and voters acquire more information about party types, they may be able to distinguish between different subsets of New and Old Regime parties. To use the language of Tucker (2006), voters should become better able to distinguish reformed Old Regime parties who accept the need for some economic reforms from more unrepentant Old Regime parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Ishiyama 2002; Ziblatt and Biziouras 2002), as well as New Regime parties that consistently put forward a liberalizing agenda in contrast to New Regime parties with a more populist bent. Thus in later elections, the transitional model might continue to explain support for unreformed Old Regime parties and consistently liberalizing New Regime parties, but might become less useful in explaining the effect of economic evaluations on the vote for reformed Old Regime parties and more populist New Regime parties.

The Polish Context

As noted previously, our empirical work focuses on multiple elections from a single country. While we are of course interested in the applicability of the model beyond a single

country, we felt the best research design for an initial foray into this topic consists of trying to hold as much as we could constant – including both issues related to survey design and the overall political context – while still incorporating multiple elections that allow us to provide a systematic analysis of our hypotheses over time. We chose Poland from among the post-communist countries for three reasons, in addition to the fact that as a country of over 38 million people Poland is the largest of the post-communist countries in the European Union (and indeed the 6th largest country in the EU overall).

First, we can rely on an excellent source of data for our analysis in the form of the Polish National Election Studies, which have been conducted under the leadership of a single director for the last three election cycles (1997, 2001, 2005).¹⁰ Not only are these studies remarkably thorough in general, but they are particularly good in terms of providing suitable questions for studies of economic voting.¹¹ Second, Poland has been a particularly popular country for studies of voting and elections in post-communist countries, trailing only Russia in scholarly interest.¹² This allows us to tie our empirical findings to a developing literature. Most crucially, a number of studies have already explored something akin to what we have labeled here as transitional economic voting at the aggregate level in Poland (Tucker 2006, Jackson et al 2005, Fidmurec 2000a,b).¹³ However, all aggregate level studies by definition lack a test of voting behavior at the

¹⁰ Radoslaw Markowski of the Polish Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Study of Politics (ISP-PAN).

¹¹ Had we moved to a multi-county framework, in particular we would have had to really stretch to find appropriate questions for measuring long-term economic evaluations in other surveys. It is our hope that such questions will be incorporated into more surveys in the future.

¹² See Tucker 2002, Figure 2.

¹³ Moreover, Jackson et al (2005) also find very limited support for the conventional model of economic voting in Poland and some suggestive evidence that supports the idea that citizens vote based on preference for certain economic policies. In a related paper, Mach and Jackson (2005) use data from a three wave panel study to explore the link between personal and regional employment changes, attitudes about economic policies, and vote choice in 1993 and 1997 in Poland. They find a relationship between individuals' medium term economic evaluations and vote choice consistent with the transitional model. In both 1993 and 1997 those who believe that the Poles 'like themselves' are better off compared to five years prior are more likely to support the Liberal reform parties. Similarly, Powers and Cox 1997 direct

micro-level. Thus our study builds on these previous works by providing the first explicit test of the conventional and transitional economic voting models at the micro-level and by specifying and operationalizing long-term “transitional” economic evaluations. We also extend the study of economic voting in Poland well into the second decade of post-communist Polish democracy.

Perhaps most importantly, the Polish political experience is especially well suited for testing our hypotheses because there is variation in the transitional identity of the incumbent parties during the period we study. The 1993 Polish parliamentary elections witnessed the triumphant return of the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) to power in coalition with the former communist satellite Polish Peasant’s Party (PSL) (Millard 1994; Chan 1995). Despite some bumps in the road, the coalition remained in office until the scheduled 1997 parliamentary elections, when it lost power despite improving economic conditions (Tucker 2006, 145-8). It was replaced by a coalition of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), itself a coalition of right and right-of-center parties drawing on the legacy of the anti-communist solidarity movement, and the Freedom Union (UW), which was the descendent of the parties most closely associated with the original implementation of Poland’s economic reforms. As noted in Table 1, we can classify both the UW and AWS as New Regime parties, although it is important to note that of the two it is the UW that remained most clearly associated with Poland’s economic reforms, both through its political legacy and its policy positions. In contrast, the SLD is the clear successor to the former ruling communist party in Poland (the Polish United Workers Party), so it is classified as an Old Regime party. In view of the theoretical discussion in the previous section regarding reformed and unreformed Old Regime parties, it is important to

attention to the context of transitional democracies and demonstrate that beliefs about whether the communists or liberal reformers were to blame for the poor economic conditions in the 1993 Polish parliamentary elections are strongly related to vote choice in the election of that year. For additional aggregate level studies of economic voting in Poland, see Gibson and Cielecka 1995; Bell 1997; and Lubecki 2004.

note that SLD was is clearly in the camp of “reformed” Old Regime parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Szczerbiak 2007), thus making this particular case, if anything, a more “difficult test” of the Old Regime hypothesis.¹⁴ Moreover, it is precisely one of the parties for which we might expect the predictive power of the transitional model to diminish over time.¹⁵

The 2001 parliamentary election witnessed a complete reversal in the fate of the AWS and UW following a troublesome time in office marred by increasingly serious scandals. Not only were they voted out of government, neither party even managed to secure the minimum votes necessary to return to the parliament. Instead, the 2001 elections witnessed the return of the SLD and PSL to power and the emergence of four new parliamentary parties.¹⁶ The Citizen’s Platform Party (PO) and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) can both be described as what Tucker (2006) calls “second generation” New Regime parties, as both clearly trace their lineage to the original anti-communist movements. Of the two, PO was much more clearly associated with Poland’s economic reforms, and continued to advocate for more reform of this nature; PiS took, and has continued to take, an increasingly populist line. So as with AWS and UW, we can think of PiS as a more populist-leaning New Regime party and PO as a more consistent liberalizing

¹⁴ It would have been interesting to consider the effects of economic conditions on both a reformed and unreformed Old Regime party, but unfortunately – from the perspective of our research agenda! – Poland has only one Old Regime party, the SLD. Future research in countries such as Slovakia or Hungary, however, could take up this topic.

¹⁵ The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was formerly a satellite party of the PUWP during the communist era. However, it broke decisively with the PUWP in 1989, and has always maintained a separate identity as an agrarian party. Given that it has no direct organizational link with the former ruling communist party, we follow the lead of Tucker (2006) in *not* coding the PSL as an Old Regime party. Readers who disagree with this decision, however, can assess the support the PSL would have provided for the Transitional Model by observing the results for the PSL in Figures 1 and 2.

¹⁶ In 2001, SLD formed an electoral coalition with the Union of Labor, a small party with roots as social-democratic forces in the Solidarity movement (Ost 2005). By the time of the 2001 election, however, most of the “Solidarity-oppositionists” (Millard 2003) had left the party, thus making an alliance with the SLD possible. Due to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the SLD and its prominence as the lead partner in the coalition, we continue to code the SLD as an Old Regime party in 2001. However, the presence of some members of the UP on the party list would, if anything, present our empirical tests with even more of a challenge to find significant results.

New Regime party. The other two parties that emerged in this election were more extreme populist parties, one with a left-of-center tinge, Self-Defense, and one with a much more nationalist and religious right-wing flavor, the League of Polish Families (LPR). These two parties would also provide most of the elite opposition to Poland's EU accession.¹⁷

The SLD and PSL's second term in office, however, also became severely tainted by scandal, and both parties limped into the 2005 election with little hope of remaining in office. Both were spared the indignity of not making it into the next parliament, but they easily lost control of the government. PiS and PO finished in the top two places and were expected to form a government, but last minute maneuverings led a more populist-oriented coalition between the PiS, LPR, and Self-Defense (now called Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP)).

Data and Methods

To test the predictions of the conventional and transitional models of economic voting laid out in Table 1, we analyze survey data from three waves of the Polish National Election Study. Interviews for this survey were conducted shortly after each of the 1997, 2001, and 2005 legislative elections.¹⁸ The primary dependent variable in our analyses is respondent vote choice. We model vote choice as a function of recent and longer-term economic evaluations and a series of control variables. Since Polish elections involve multiple political parties, we estimate our vote choice model using multinomial logit regression.¹⁹ We exclude from our analysis opposition

¹⁷ For more on the 2001 election, see Maksymiuk 2001; Millard 2003; Benoit and Hayden 2004.

¹⁸ The 2005 study has a panel component. First wave interviews occurred from 9/27 to 10/10 following the legislative elections held on 9/25. The second wave was conducted between 12/12 and 12/30 after the 10/23 Presidential election. The economic evaluations were asked during the first wave of this panel study. All studies were carried out on nationally representative samples of the Polish voting age population by the Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS).

¹⁹ For additional details on the multinomial logit model, see Greene 1993. One important potential limitation is the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). While the decisions of

parties that earned less than 5% of the national vote due to the difficulty of estimating MNL models for categories with so few respondents.²⁰

As discussed in more detail earlier, the primary independent variables of interest are retrospective evaluations of economic conditions.²¹ Within the economic voting literature there has been some debate over whether citizens' electoral choices respond more strongly to change in one's personal economic conditions or the well-being of the national economy. This debate, however, is tangential to our focus on the applicability of the conventional and transitional models of economic voting within the context of post-communist Poland. Therefore, for each election we have measures of perceived change in both national and personal economic conditions over both the past twelve months and as compared to conditions under the old

voters in the elections we study may not be consistent with this property of the MNL model, effective statistical tests for violations of this assumption are not available (Cheng and Long 2007). The multinomial probit model provides a potential alternative approach. Application of this model, however, faces serious estimation problems. Research comparing the two models finds little difference in the substantive results (Whitten and Palmer 1996; Dow and Endersby 2004). Accordingly, we employ the more computationally tractable multinomial model. We also verify our conclusions by exploring the same relationships using a different empirical strategy, which we discuss later in the paper.

²⁰ Only one incumbent party, the UW in 2001, performed so poorly as to miss the 5% threshold; we do not, however, exclude it from our analysis, due to the centrality of incumbency in the conventional model. Full election results are included in Appendix V in the "supplementary materials".

²¹ The Polish Election Studies also include questions on respondents' expectations of future economic conditions (12 months from now). While such questions might allow us to contribute to the debate within the conventional framework as to whether citizens rely more on evaluations of past conditions (retrospective voting) or expectations of the future (prospective voting), the timing of the data collection inhibits such a comparison. In all three years the surveys were conducted after the results of the legislative election were known. There is thus a distinct possibility that citizens' expectations about future economic conditions were partially caused by their knowledge of which parties were about to form the government. We conducted a supplementary analysis using short-term prospective economic evaluations and found that in all instances where a significant relationship between prospective evaluations and vote choice exists, the direction of the relationship is consistent with the idea that citizens adjust their expectations about the economy in light of the recent election outcome (results not shown). More specifically, following all three elections, there was a strong positive correlation between a belief that the economy would improve over the next 12 months and a vote for the *winning* party (AWS in 1997, SLD in 2001, and PiS in 2005), but not with the vote for the incumbent party, as standard prospective voting models predict. We are pursuing the methodological implications of this particular finding in a separate paper.

regime.²² We include these economic variables in vote choice models for each of the three elections we consider.

In addition to a standard set of control variables, we also control for membership in the communist party and respondents' position on the question of lustration (i.e. whether to allow high-ranking members of the communist party to hold public positions).²³ Given the duration and pervasiveness of the communist regime a comprehensive model of vote choice must surely account for attitudes toward this regime. Of particular importance to the present investigation, however, is the likely relationship between these attitudes and perceptions of economic conditions (Powers and Cox 1997). Since it is distinctly possible that support for the communist regime colored perceptions of post-transition economic conditions, then failing to control for these attitudes will yield a misleading strong relationship between economic perceptions and vote choice.²⁴ We therefore use these two distinct measure of support for the communist regime in order to account for this possibility.²⁵

²² Question wording appears in the appendix. We do wish to draw readers' attention to the fact that the transitional economic evaluation question in 1997 asks respondents to "retrospectively - evaluate the effects of the so-called 'Balcerowicz Plan'". The "Balcerowicz Plan" refers to Poland's coordinated effort at a (relatively) quick transition to a market economy (Sachs 1993). While it is our belief that this question in the Polish context will generally be interpreted as "what is your overall impression of the economic changes since the transition?", it is of course possible that some respondents will answer the question with only their evaluation of how the economic reforms were implemented (e.g., the merits of the Balcerowicz Plan as a plan) and not in terms of the ultimate economic outcome of those reforms. However, should this be the case, it would actually work *against* our Transitional Economic Model hypotheses (e.g., due to the presence of people who dislike the Balcerowicz plan but still think the economy had improved since the collapse of communism), thus making our proposed empirical tests that much more conservative, and, therefore, that much more suggestive of a true underlying effect should these analyses generate empirical support.

²³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to this particular measure of support for the communist regime.

²⁴ Controlling for attitudes towards lustration and prior membership in the PUWP also conveniently addresses any concern that the actual questions employed to measure transitional economic evaluations (see Appendix A6 for question wording) could be picking up general attitudes towards the communist era as opposed to the specific economic evaluations requested by the question.

²⁵ One additional question concerns the causal direction of the relationship between economic perceptions and vote choice. One important limitation of cross-sectional survey based studies of economic voting is

To test the conventional and transitional models of economic voting, we estimate the relationship between vote choice and economic perceptions after controlling for attitudes toward lustration, membership in the Communist party (or its' satellite parties), along with standard covariates including age, income, education, frequency of church attendance, residence in a village, and employment on a privately owned farm.

Empirical Results and Discussion

-- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --

Figure 1 displays empirical estimates of the relationship between citizens' perceptions of economic conditions and vote choice in Polish parliamentary elections and provides evidence consistent with both the transitional and conventional models. This figure reports an estimate of the change in the predicted probability of voting for each party associated with a change in perceptions of economic conditions over both the past year (short-term in Figure 1) and since the transition from communism (transitional in Figure 1).²⁶ Specifically, the points presented in Figure 1 are the estimated effect of changing a respondent's transitional (short-term) perceptions of both national and personal economic conditions from very negative to very positive (while

that perceptions of economic conditions are potentially endogenous to vote choice (Wlezien et al. 1997; Anderson et al. 2004; Evans and Andersen 2006). While this is generally a legitimate concern and our estimates may accordingly overstate the true relationship, there is good reason to expect that this bias is much smaller in Poland during this time period than evidence from established democracies suggests. Specifically, the fluidity of the Polish party system during this time frame and the recent nature of the transition to democracy suggest that individuals were unlikely to hold the long-standing and more stable evaluations of political parties that characterize party identification in older democracies (Lewis 2000; Markowski 2002). Less stable evaluations of political parties should yield result in a much weaker effect of party evaluation on perceptions of economic conditions. That being said, it should be noted that if there is an endogeneity bias present, we would be more likely to expect it in the case of short-term economic evaluations than long-term economic evaluations; we elaborate on this point in footnote 28 below.

²⁶ In order to demonstrate the net effect of economic perceptions, we estimated the change in predicted probability of voting for each party given a change in both national and personal economic conditions. The coefficients and standard errors from these regression results can be found in Appendix II.

holding all other variables, including the short-term (transitional) economic variables, at their means.²⁷

For example, the predicted probability of voting for the SLD in 1997 when short-term economic change is perceived to be very bad, and all other independent variables are held at their mean, is 0.08. This probability is 0.56 when recent economic conditions are perceived as very good. The point estimate in the first row of the first panel in Figure 1, which represents the difference between these two estimates and thus the predicted effect of economic conditions, is 0.48. The horizontal line bisecting this point indicates the 95% confidence interval surrounding this point estimate.

The Conventional Model

The results of our analysis indicate that the conventional model offers some useful insights into the dynamics of these turn of the century Polish elections. The conventional model predicts a positive relationship between evaluations of recent economic conditions and support for incumbent political parties. The incumbent parties in both the 1997 and 2005 elections were the SLD and PSL. In both elections, the predicted positive relationship is apparent. In 1997, an average respondent who believed that the state of the economy had ‘gotten much better’ in the past 12 months was 48% more likely to vote for the SLD than an average respondent who thought the economy had ‘gotten much worse’. The same positive effect is evident in 2005 but it is substantially smaller at around 14%. This decrease contradicts the notion that the conventional model should generate increasingly strong results over time as citizens of Poland adopt the behavior of individuals in more established democracies. This same pattern is evident in the

²⁷ We estimated the multinomial logit models and the predicted probabilities using the mlogit model contained in the Zelig package for R (Imai et al. 2007).

results from analyses of PSL support. Short-term evaluations of national economic conditions are also positively, albeit quite weakly, related to support for the PSL, in 1997 and 2005. The fact that the PSL comprised the junior member of the governing coalition in 1997 and 2005 is consistent with the claim that economic voting can be conditional on attributions of responsibility for economic policy (Powell and Whitten 1993) and that it ought to be smaller for junior members of coalitions (Wilkin et al. 1997; Tucker 2001, 2006).

For the 2001 election we find no evidence that evaluations of short-term economic changes are associated with support for the incumbent parties, AWS and the UW. There is no statistically significant positive effect for either party. The absence of any relationship may result partially from the difficulty of estimating a relationship with the very limited number of respondents who reported voting for either AWS (38 out of 1006) or UW (22 out of 1006). Our suspicions are grounded in the fact that when we are able to bring more data to bear on this question, we do indeed find the expected effects; we return to this finding in greater detail in the following section.

An extension of the basic claim of conventional model implies that there should be a negative relationship between evaluations of economic conditions and support for all non-incumbent parties. For a number of party-year dyads, this is indeed true (UW-1997; AWS-1997; SLD-2001; PiS-2005, LPR-2005) but it is also true that there is no significant relationship in a similar number of cases (ROP-1997; PSL-2001; PO-2001; SRP-2001 & 2005; LPR-2001) and an unexpectedly positive relationship in one case (2005-PO). Thus the conventional model's predictive power is largely limited to the case of incumbent political parties. Fortunately, the transitional model can shed light on the pattern of the economy-vote relationships across non-incumbent parties.

The Transitional Model

The observable implications of the transitional model of economic voting are that evaluations of economic conditions should be positively related to support for New Regime parties, negatively related to support for Old Regime parties, and unrelated to support for parties without a clear ‘transitional identity’. Moreover, we expect to find the clearest evidence of support for the transitional model when we examine the effect of long-term “transitional” economic evaluations of how the economy has changed since the collapse of communism on vote choice. The results of this analysis provide strong support for the transitional model.²⁸

The transitional model’s prediction of a negative relationship between economic evaluations and voting for Poland’s Old Regime party is well supported by the data. In all three elections there is a negative relationship between evaluations of economic change since the transition and voting for the SLD. Even when the SLD was the incumbent party (1997, 2005) perceptions of positive long-term economic changes coincide with a decreasing chance of voting for the SLD. Interestingly, the strength of this negative relationship for the SLD appears to decrease over time with the predicted effect of improved evaluations of the economy on support for the SLD declining from -.44 in 1997 to -.26 in 2001 and -.12 in 2005. This change is

²⁸ Since it is decidedly unlikely something as fundamental as a voter’s assessment of the post-transition changes to the economy could be caused by one’s vote choice in one of Poland’s recent elections – especially given Poland’s remarkably fluid party system – concerns about the potential endogeneity of economic evaluations are likely unwarranted in this case. One might plausibly argue, however, that some basic affect toward the communist regime causes both support for political parties and evaluations of the post-transition economy. Whether or not one should control for attitudes toward the old regime depends on the anticipated causal relationship between ‘transitional economic perceptions’ and regime attitudes. If regime attitudes cause economic perceptions, then an accurate estimate of the effect of economic perceptions requires this additional control. In contrast, if one expects that perceptions of post-transition economic change influence feelings toward the regime, then including regime feelings will result in estimates that do not account for the net effect of economic conditions. In the interest of caution and avoiding a false positive concerning the effect of economic perceptions, we control for general regime attitudes in all models.

consistent with the idea that the relevance of parties' transitional identities should decline as time passes. As the SLD is a reformed Old Regime party, it is not surprising that after the eight years in office during which it largely pursued pro-reform economic policies that the extent to which it should be preferred by voters who disapprove of the overall direction of the transition should decrease. It may also be the case that the electoral coalition formed by the SLD with the Union of Labor (UP, see footnote 16 above) made the party appear slightly less "Old Regime" in the eyes of voters. Nevertheless, these facts make the negative relationship between economic change since the transition and SLD support all the more remarkable, and all the more indicative of the stickiness of the transitional identities of parties, at least in so far as they affect economic voting.²⁹

We also find support for the transitional model in the results for the New Regime parties. For the UW in 1997 and the AWS in 2001, there is a positive relationship between evaluations of economic change since the transition and support for these parties. Even in 1997, when these two parties were not in power we find a positive relationship between transitional economic perceptions and support for the UW and AWS (though the latter result is not statistically significant). The absence of an effect for the UW, the party with the most entrenched New Regime identity, in 2001 is puzzling, but as noted previously this is based on only 28 respondents who reported voting for the UW. When we employ our alternative estimation strategy in the following section, we again find the predicted result for the UW (although it remains of a much smaller magnitude than the effect in 1997).

²⁹ It is also interesting to note that in 1997 and 2005, the effects of long-term evaluations also had a small negative on the vote for the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). As noted previously in the paper, the PSL does not meet our definition of an Old Regime party because of its agrarian identity and the fact that it was a former satellite party of the ruling communist party in the communist era and not a direct descendent of that party. That being said, if there was a party in Poland where we might expect to witness a spillover of the Old Regime effect according to the logic of the transitional model, it would be the PSL.

Estimates of the relationship between longer-term economic evaluations and support for the second generation New Regime parties, the PO and PiS, are also broadly consistent with the transitional model. In both 2001 and 2005 there is a strong positive relationship between long-term economic evaluations and support for the PO, the more consistently liberal of these two second generation New Regime parties. A similar result is apparent for PiS in 2005 but surprisingly the relationship is much weaker – and indeed not significantly distinct from zero – in 2001. We suspect this result derives from the fact that in its first election, PiS distinguish itself by its commitment to law and order, whereas by 2005 it was relying more on its economic identity (Szczzerbiak 2007).³⁰

Finally, for parties whose primary identities are unrelated to the economic transition, we find no relationship between long-term economic evaluations and vote choice in all instances but one. Consistent with the transitional model, these long-term economic evaluations are not significantly related to party support for the PSL in 2001 and 2005, LPR in 2001 and 2005, and SRP in 2001.³¹ In 2005, however, we find a negative relationship between evaluations of the economy and support for the SRP. This result is consistent, however, with a prediction made (but not tested) in Tucker (2006, see p.294-5) that over time anti-EU parties might supplant Old Regime parties as the party of choice among those upset about long-term changes in the the economy. For the other anti-EU party, the LPR, however, we find no evidence of such an effect.

Overall, therefore, we find very strong support for the predictions of the transitional economic voting model when we consider long-term economic evaluations. Our final step,

³⁰ A further speculation is that – given developments in Polish politics during the years of the PiS government from 2005-2007 – the effect would be likely to return to 2001 levels or even disappear completely during the 2007 election, but we do not yet have the data available to test such a prediction.

³¹ In 1997, there is a small negative effect for the PSL, a point addressed above in footnote 29, and a small negative effect for ROP. Neither of these effects, however, are robust to re-estimating our results using attitudes towards the political parties as our dependent variable (see Figure 2).

therefore, is to evaluate support for the transitional model using short-term economic evaluations. Recall our earlier prediction that we would expect these effects, if present, to be less pronounced than the effects of long-term economic evaluations.

In the cases when the transitional model contrasts with the predictions of the conventional model (in 1997 and 2005), it is clearly the conventional model that holds sway in terms of short-term economic evaluations. The relationship between short-term economic evaluations on the vote for the SLD is consistent with the conventional model. Put another way, even if the senior member of the coalition is an Old Regime party, voters who are upset with short-term changes in the economy are still willing to punish that party. In 2001, when the SLD was out of power, we do find a clear negative effect for short-term economic evaluations as predicted by the transitional model, although it should be noted that this result is also consistent with the general logic of the conventional model which implies that opposition parties should tend to gain support during bad economic times.

Similarly, the empirical results in 1997 for the two New Regime parties run counter to transitional model's predictions that more positive evaluations of economic conditions should be associated with a higher probability of voting for these parties. Instead, we find what the conventional model would predict for opposition parties: greater support among those upset with short-term economic changes. Note, however, that the magnitude of this effect is much smaller for the UW (-.13), the consistently liberalizing New Regime party, than for the AWS (-.39).

In the 2001 election, we find no relationship between short-term economic evaluations and the vote for the two 'second generation' New Regime parties. For both the PO and PiS, the difference in the predicted probability of voting for each party associated with improved perceptions of economic conditions cannot be distinguished from zero. While this is clearly

inconsistent with the predictions of the transitional model, it is worth noting that we do not find short-term economic evaluations having a statistically significant effect on the vote for any party in that election. This finding may in part be due to the fact that among voters 81% said that over the past 12 months the national economy had gotten worse or much worse and only 4% said it was better; there may insufficient variation in these data to yield strong effects.

By 2005, however, we see a rather different pattern and one consistent with the transitional model. For the more consistent liberalizing PO, the predicted effect of improved evaluations of the economy is positive (0.23). Note that this result is inconsistent with the conventional model as the non-incumbent PO gains support among those approving of economic changes even though it is in the opposition. We do not, however, see similar results for the more populist PiS (-.34). Despite its second generation New Regime status – which we speculate did lead to it being preferred by those approving of economic changes since the transition – PiS did apparently succeed in gaining the support of those who disapproved of recent economic changes.

Finally, for parties whose primary identity is unrelated to the transition toward free market economic policies – PSL, ROP, SRP, and LPR – we find no strong relationships between short-term economic conditions and vote choice. Recall that the conventional model implies a generic prediction of a negative economy-vote relationship for all non-incumbent parties. Yet in 7 of the 13 instances of non-incumbent parties considered here, there is no significant relationship between vote choice and evaluations of short-term economic conditions. The absence of a relationship in five of these seven cases, however, is consistent with the transitional model. In fact for all cases involving parties whose primary identity is unrelated to the transition (PSL-2001, ROP, SRP, LPR), we find no relationship between short-term economic conditions and electoral support – precisely as the transitional model predicts.

Overall, the relationships between vote choice and perceptions of economic change over the short-term and since the transition for the nine parties studied here suggest that both the transitional and conventional models shed light on vote choice in these three Polish elections. Our analysis finds support for the conventional model among incumbent parties with voters tending to hold incumbent parties accountable for changes in economic conditions over the short-term.³² These same results are generally inconsistent with the transitional model. In contrast, however, the conventional model fares less well when we consider non-incumbent parties. The basic prediction of a negative economy-vote relationship is supported in only 4 of 13 cases. The transitional model, on the other hand, offers clear predictions about the pattern of relationships among non-incumbent parties and the data are generally consistent with these predictions. Furthermore, the transitional model receives strong support in our analysis of the relationship between vote choice and evaluations of economic changes since the transition from communism. We find quite consistently that New Regime parties do better among those pleased with long-term economic changes, Old Regime parties enjoy more support among those with more negative evaluations, and that support for parties without a clear transitional identity tends to be unrelated to long-term economic evaluations.

Robustness Tests

In this section, we consider two important robustness tests for our findings. First, given the possibility that the MNL estimation technique coupled with a multiparty system with a large and changing number of parties can significantly strain the available data, we conduct a complete secondary analysis testing the same relationships but using an alternative dependent variable and statistical model. We conduct this additional analysis to ensure that the results derived from the

³² 2001 is an exception which we investigate in further detail below.

MNL models represent true relationships. Specifically, for each party we estimate the relationship between all voters' evaluations of a party and the same set of independent variables employed in the MNL models. The dependent variables in this case are voters' placement of each party on an 11 point 'like-dislike' scale.

By employing respondents' evaluations of each political party as a measure of respondents' utility for each party, this secondary analysis speaks directly to the MNL results presented above. Recall that the latent dependent variables in a discrete choice model of vote choice, such as multinomial logit and probit, are party utilities. Discrete choice statistical models assume that citizens identify utilities for each of the competing parties and vote for the party with the highest utility. Absent a direct measure of these utilities, they are empirically deduced by comparing the frequency with which parties are selected across individuals in analyses that account for all relevant control variables. A compelling alternative to this approach encourages efforts to directly measure these party utilities (van der Eijk et al. 2006). Thus the analysis below which models self-reports of party utilities is simply a different procedure designed to explore the same relationships considered above through multinomial logit estimation of vote choice. The chief advantage of this second approach is that our estimates of the determinants of support for the smaller Polish parties are based on directly observed data from a much larger number of respondents (e.g., everyone who ranks the party on the like-dislike scale). This strength is particularly important in verifying our results concerning the incumbent New Regime parties UW and AWS in the 2001 election.

-- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --

The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 2 in a manner intended to be as analogous as possible to the results in Figure 1. To generate these results we regressed party

evaluations (rescaled as 0-1) for each party in each election on economic evaluations and our set of controls using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis; these regression results can be found Appendix III. Figure 2 should therefore not be interpreted as a change in the predicted likelihood of voting for a party, but rather the predicted changed in how much an individual likes a given party on a 0-1 scale; by definition, this predicted change is bounded between -1 and 1.

All told, the results from our re-estimation of all of the relationships of interest using our alternative dependent variable are remarkably consistent with the conclusions drawn from our analysis of vote choice. The most noteworthy difference in the results from the two procedures is that analysis of party evaluations reveals a positive relationship between evaluations of the economy over both time frames and evaluations of the incumbent New Regime parties in 2001. By relying on party-evaluation instead of vote choice, we now find statistically significant results in the correct direction for the AWS and UW across both long-term economic evaluations (consistent with the transitional model) and short-term evaluations (consistent with the transitional and conventional models). Because so few voters ultimately supported these two parties, results from the MNL models of vote choice should be viewed with caution. This secondary analysis sheds useful insight on the most surprising results from the vote-choice analysis and confirms that positive perceptions of economic change were associated with greater support for the UW and AWS.

More broadly, the remaining results are very similar and serve to buttress the findings from the vote choice models. As the limitations of the multinomial logit model are real and warrant serious attention, we believe that replicating our analysis with a different procedure and generating very similar results implies that our conclusions reflect real phenomena and are not merely an artifact of modeling choices.

Our second robustness test considers whether patterns of economic voting differ across generations. Since a comparison between competing economic systems is central to the transitional model, it is plausible that individuals with less personal experience with a state-run economic system should be less likely to engage in such a comparison and thus we should see no evidence of transitional economic voting. For an individual without a well-defined belief about the previous economic system, it would be difficult both to compare current and prior conditions and to generate expectations about what would happen if Old Regime parties were to steer the economy toward this older system. Our study of elections occurring 8, 12, and 16 years after the transition from communism provides us with an opportunity to investigate this generational dynamic.

The notion that direct experience with the old regime is a precondition for Transitional economic voting assumes that one's beliefs about economic conditions under that regime are primarily the product of living through at least part of this historical period. Alternatively, if citizens without personal experience of the old regime are able to form beliefs about the economic conditions associated with this regime through other means – such as talking to their parents, learning in school, etc. – then we should not expect significant differences in the nature of economic voting across generations.

These competing theories speak directly to the ideas about the expected decline in transitional economic voting over time. If personal experience with communism is key, then we should expect transitional economic voting to decline via population replacement: as time passes, the segment of the electorate with first-hand knowledge of the old regime will decrease. Alternatively, if beliefs about economic conditions under communism are not solely the product of direct experience then we might expect to see patterns of transitional economic voting

continue for longer periods of time. To test if transitional economic voting is contingent on personal experience with the previous regime, we estimated a modified version of the party evaluation models presented above. The models are identical to those used to produce Figure 2 but include a dichotomous variable indicating those younger than 18 when communism fell and an interaction between this indicator variable and economic evaluations. The coefficient of the interaction term will indicate whether or not those individuals who reached adulthood after communism display different patterns of economic voting than the rest of the population.

Full results of these analyses can be found in Appendix IV, but the bottom line is relatively clear: the pattern of results offer no support for the notion that younger Poles who came of age after the fall of communism were less likely to engage in transitional economic voting than older Poles. The modal result is actually one of no difference between the strength of transitional economic voting between the young and the old. While there are a few instances (e.g., UW and AWS in 1997) when the effect of long-term economic evaluations appear to be larger for older voters than young voters, there are just as many cases (e.g., SLD-1997, PiS-01) where the effects actually seem to be larger for younger citizens. Given the overall results, however, we can confidently reject the hypothesis that transitional economic voting is a phenomenon limited to voters who lived through communism as adults.³³

This finding has two important implications. First, it suggests that the transitional identities of parties can be learned even by those who did not experience the reasons for these transitional identities first hand as adults. Second, it should give us more confidence in the accuracy of our estimates of the size of these effects. Had we been inadvertently including a population for which there was no real effect (here, hypothesized to be the young) in our

³³ We also estimated our vote choice models a second time after excluding all respondents younger than 18 in 1989. See Figure A3 in the appendix for these findings. The substantive results remain the same.

analysis, this could have dampened the findings (e.g., biased our coefficients towards zero), suggesting that the true effects for the appropriate population (here, hypothesized to be the older voters) could have been stronger than we were reporting. As this does not appear to be the case – and at the very least not the case consistently across the board – we can have greater confidence in the size of the estimates we presented throughout the paper.

Conclusions

In some ways, all studies of voting in post-communist countries are measured against the (admittedly straw-man like) null hypothesis that political circumstances are too fluid in these countries to allow for any systematic patterns of voting – especially those found to exist in stable, established democracies – to be present. Here, we join many other important recent studies in continuing to reject that null. But we also move the literature forward by providing a more nuanced description of the myriad of ways in which economic evaluations influence voting behavior in at least one important post-communist country. Voters dissatisfied with recent economic developments do indeed provide less support for incumbent political parties than those who are more satisfied with the state of the economy, much as has been found to be common in the West and in particular in the United States. However, this finding does not falsify recent theoretical arguments about the importance of economic evaluations in affecting the vote for reformist New Regime parties or post-communist Old Regime parties. Quite to the contrary, such transitional economic voting patterns are also important predictors of the vote. Crucially, we identify that the major path through which these evaluations affect voting behavior is through more long-term economic evaluations, specifically in comparing current economic conditions to pre-transition economic conditions. But these evaluations are no less important, and indeed can

results in effects of equal if not larger magnitudes than short-term retrospective evaluations. Moreover, the transitional economic voting model can also help explain the different effects of short-term economic evaluations on different types of opposition parties; most interestingly, it can explain why opposition New Regime parties are at times preferred by voters who have even short-term positive retrospective evaluations, a finding for which conventional incumbency-centered approaches to economic voting have no explanation. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that these results are robust to model specification, as we have essentially replicated all of our key findings using an alternative dependent variable with a different statistical model.

While we made a conscious decision in this paper to concentrate our empirical analyses on a single country in an effort to be as thorough as possible with our study, it is of course interesting to speculate about how these findings might apply to other countries. Two conclusions seem particularly relevant. First, we have found that the transitional economic model applies to Old Regime parties well into the second decade of post-communist elections, despite the fact that the SLD had sought to reinvent itself as a social-democratic party. The magnitude of this effect, however, was clearly declining over time. Thus it might be interesting to see whether a similar decline in magnitude could be found in a country such as Hungary, where the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) has also fashioned a similar reinvention, as opposed to, for example, the Czech Republic, where the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) has remained much more true to its communist roots. Second, the Polish case suggests that New Regime identity can be transferred to “second generation” parties, although these effects do seem to be weaker. Thus it would be interesting to see if the effects on New Regime parties remained stronger in the second decade of post-communist elections in countries where

the original New Regime parties are still going strong – again the Czech Republic and Hungary would offer good comparisons for future studies – or if the transitional economic voting framework has a natural lifespan, regardless of the stability of particular parties.

Overall, our findings continue to highlight the importance of considering context in modeling patterns of economic voting. We suspect that the transitional model of economic voting works well in the Polish context precisely because there is a common frame of reference for longer-term retrospective evaluations – the collapse of communism – and parties that are clearly associated with political regimes both before and after that reference point. While we suspect similar patterns may be at work in other transitional democracies, this remains an important subject for future research, both within and beyond the post-communist world.

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
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Table 1. Summary of main hypotheses and coding of political parties incumbency and transitional identities.


Party Type	Polish Political Parties	Temporal Frame of Reference	Model of Economic Voting	
			<i>Conventional</i>	<i>Transitional</i>
New Regime Incumbent	2001 – AWS, UW	Short Term Since Transition	Positive No relationship	Positive Positive
New Regime Non-Incumbent	1997 – AWS, UW 2005 – PO, PiS	Short Term Since Transition	No prediction No relationship	Positive Positive
Old Regime Incumbent	1997 – SLD 2005 – SLD	Short Term Since Transition	Positive No relationship	Negative Negative
Old Regime Non-Incumbent	2001 – SLD	Short Term Since Transition	No prediction No relationship	Negative Negative

Figure 1: Predicted effects of perceptions of economic conditions on vote choice.



Note: This figure presents estimates of the relationship between perceptions of the economy and vote choice in the Polish legislative elections of 1997, 2001, 2005. For each year we estimated the relationship between vote choice and perceptions of economic conditions over the past year and since the transition from communism (along with a set of control variables) using multinomial logit regression. The point estimates displayed in the figure represent the predicted change in the probability of voting for a given party associated with changing sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations from the most negative perception of the economy to the most positive while holding all other variables at their means.

Figure 2: Predicted effects of perceptions of economic conditions on evaluations of Polish political parties.



Note: This figure presents estimates of the relationship between perceptions of the economy and evaluations of Polish political parties following the elections of 1997, 2001, 2005. For each year in each election year we estimated the relationship between party evaluation and perceptions of economic conditions over the past year and since the transition from communism (at both the national and household level) using OLS regression. The point estimates displayed in the figure represent the predicted change in evaluations of a given party (scaled 0-1) associated with changing sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations from the most negative perception of the economy to the most positive while holding all other variables at their means.

Supplementary Materials (would be posted electronically and/or available from the authors upon request):

Appendix I: Predicted effects of egocentric (Figure AI) and sociotropic (Figure A2) perceptions of economic conditions on evaluations of Polish political parties.

Appendix II: Comprehensive Regression Results for Vote Choice Models.

Appendix III: Comprehensive Regression Results for Party Evaluation Models.


Appendix IV: Comprehensive Regression Results for Party Evaluation Models – Generational Analysis.

Appendix V: Party Vote and Seat Share in the 1997, 2001, 2005 Polish Parliamentary Elections

Appendix VI: Economic Variables Question Wording.


Appendix I

Figure A1: Predicted effects of egocentric perceptions of economic conditions on evaluations of Polish political parties.



Note: This figure presents estimates of the relationship between perceptions of the economy and evaluations of Polish political parties following the elections of 1997, 2001, 2005. For each year in each election year we estimated the relationship between party evaluation and perceptions of economic conditions over the past year and since the transition from communism (at both the national and household level) using multinomial logit regression. The point estimates displayed in the figure represent the predicted change in evaluations of a given party (scaled 0-1) associated with changing one *household level* economic variable from the most negative perception of the economy to the most positive perception of the economy while holding all other variables, including the other economic variables, at their means.

Figure A2: Predicted effects of sociotropic perceptions of economic conditions on evaluations of Polish political parties.



Note: This figure presents estimates of the relationship between perceptions of the economy and evaluations of Polish political parties following the elections of 1997, 2001, 2005. For each year in each election year we estimated the relationship between party evaluation and perceptions of economic conditions over the past year and since the transition from communism (at both the national and household level) using multinomial logit regression. The point estimates displayed in the figure represent the predicted change in evaluations of a given party (scaled 0-1) associated with changing one *national level* economic variable from the most negative perception of the economy to the most positive perception of the economy while holding all other variables, including the other economic variables, at their means.

Appendix II: Comprehensive Results for Vote Choice Models.

Table A2-1: Vote choice in the 1997 Polish Parliamentary Election – Multinomial Logit Results.

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t value
(Intercept):UW	-0.10	0.95	-0.11
(Intercept):AWS	1.03	0.88	1.17
(Intercept):SLD	0.72	0.93	0.78
(Intercept):PSL	-3.18	1.26	-2.52
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:UW	2.37	0.43	5.49
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:AWS	0.76	0.36	2.14
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.23	0.39	-0.60
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PSL	0.03	0.45	0.06
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:UW	0.28	0.46	0.60
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:AWS	0.15	0.40	0.38
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.78	0.45	1.74
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PSL	0.92	0.53	1.73
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:UW	0.18	0.46	0.40
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:AWS	-0.11	0.41	-0.26
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.28	0.45	-0.63
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PSL	-0.25	0.53	-0.47
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:UW	-0.57	0.50	-1.12
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:AWS	-0.41	0.45	-0.91
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.49	0.50	0.99
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PSL	-0.13	0.56	-0.23
Frequency of Church Attendance:UW	-0.26	0.90	-0.29
Frequency of Church Attendance:AWS	1.37	0.85	1.61
Frequency of Church Attendance:SLD	-2.27	0.87	-2.61
Frequency of Church Attendance:PSL	1.31	1.19	1.10
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:UW	-0.41	0.55	-0.76
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:AWS	-0.85	0.49	-1.74
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:SLD	0.62	0.50	1.24
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:PSL	0.30	0.56	0.53
Age:UW	0.88	1.15	0.77
Age:AWS	1.07	1.04	1.04
Age:SLD	1.54	1.13	1.36
Age:PSL	1.14	1.33	0.86
Income:UW	-1.20	2.39	-0.50
Income:AWS	-1.61	2.25	-0.71
Income:SLD	-0.09	2.43	-0.04

Note: Table continues on next page.

Table A2-1- continued

Income:PSL	0.06	3.09	0.02
Education:UW	0.44	0.68	0.64
Education:AWS	-0.41	0.61	-0.67
Education:SLD	0.15	0.67	0.23
Education:PSL	0.60	0.79	0.76
Reside in Village:UW	-0.15	0.54	-0.27
Reside in Village:AWS	0.40	0.47	0.86
Reside in Village:SLD	-0.27	0.52	-0.53
Reside in Village:PSL	1.61	0.57	2.80
Farmer:UW	-1.99	1.20	-1.65
Farmer:AWS	-1.13	0.65	-1.75
Farmer:SLD	-1.56	0.82	-1.90
Farmer:PSL	0.24	0.71	0.34
Lustration: UW	1.80	0.72	2.51
Lustration: AWS	0.03	0.67	0.04
Lustration: SLD	4.49	0.70	6.39
Lustration: PSL	2.75	0.77	3.57
N = 713			
Log Likelihood = -715.2			

Note: This figure reports the coefficient estimates, standard errors and t-values for our multinomial logit model of vote choice in the 1997 Polish Parliamentary election. ROP is the base category and the substantive results are identical regardless of the choice of base category.

Table A2-2: Vote choice in the 2001 Polish Parliamentary Election – Multinomial Logit Results

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t value
(Intercept):SLD	6.40	1.66	3.86
(Intercept):SRP	5.11	1.79	2.85
(Intercept):PiS	4.27	1.75	2.43
(Intercept):PSL	4.33	1.84	2.36
(Intercept):PO	4.93	1.71	2.87
(Intercept):LPR	3.48	1.91	1.82
(Intercept):AWS	0.76	2.14	0.36
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.20	0.55	0.36
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SRP	0.71	0.60	1.20
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PiS	0.41	0.59	0.70
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PSL	0.52	0.61	0.86
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.61	0.57	1.06
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:LPR	0.54	0.62	0.87
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:AWS	0.85	0.67	1.28
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.06	0.71	0.08
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.29	0.78	-0.37
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PiS	0.45	0.75	0.60
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PSL	0.37	0.79	0.47
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.18	0.74	0.24
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:LPR	-0.41	0.80	-0.51
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:AWS	-1.20	0.87	-1.39
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.58	0.55	-1.04
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.88	0.60	-1.47
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PiS	-0.51	0.58	-0.88
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PSL	-0.60	0.61	-0.98
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.51	0.58	0.89
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:LPR	0.03	0.61	0.04
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:AWS	0.54	0.66	0.82
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.87	0.75	-1.16
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.71	0.83	-0.86
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PiS	-0.29	0.79	-0.37
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PSL	-0.19	0.83	-0.23
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PO	-0.58	0.77	-0.75
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:LPR	0.38	0.83	0.46
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:AWS	0.27	0.87	0.31
Frequency of Church Attendance:SLD	-1.66	1.12	-1.49

Note: Table continues on next page.

Table A2-2 Continued.

Frequency of Church Attendance:SRP	-0.48	1.24	-0.38
Frequency of Church Attendance:PiS	0.77	1.22	0.63
Frequency of Church Attendance:PSL	-0.29	1.29	-0.22
Frequency of Church Attendance:PO	0.60	1.19	0.50
Frequency of Church Attendance:LPR	2.05	1.47	1.39
Frequency of Church Attendance:AWS	2.96	1.77	1.67
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:SLD	0.93	0.87	1.07
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:SRP	0.81	0.93	0.87
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:PiS	-0.14	0.94	-0.15
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:PSL	1.02	0.94	1.09
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:PO	-0.18	0.95	-0.19
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:LPR	-0.69	1.13	-0.61
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party:AWS	0.82	1.00	0.83
Age:SLD	-1.35	1.54	-0.88
Age:SRP	-1.12	1.68	-0.66
Age:PiS	-0.84	1.61	-0.52
Age:PSL	-1.59	1.72	-0.92
Age:PO	-1.70	1.60	-1.07
Age:LPR	-0.91	1.72	-0.53
Age:AWS	0.56	1.86	0.30
Income:SLD	-1.54	5.50	-0.28
Income:SRP	-7.22	10.70	-0.67
Income:PiS	-6.82	8.18	-0.83
Income:PSL	-17.54	12.90	-1.36
Income:PO	-1.88	5.42	-0.35
Income:LPR	-2.60	9.56	-0.27
Income:AWS	3.53	4.26	0.83
Education:SLD	-5.16	1.34	-3.84
Education:SRP	-6.05	1.41	-4.29
Education:PiS	-3.68	1.38	-2.65
Education:PSL	-5.09	1.42	-3.58
Education:PO	-4.53	1.38	-3.29
Education:LPR	-5.08	1.43	-3.56
Education:AWS	-4.93	1.46	-3.37
Reside in Village:SLD	-0.26	0.72	-0.35
Reside in Village:SRP	0.80	0.76	1.05
Reside in Village:PiS	-0.82	0.78	-1.06

Note: Table continues on next page.

Table A2-2 Continued.

Reside in Village:PSL	1.68	0.78	2.16
Reside in Village:PO	-0.48	0.76	-0.64
Reside in Village:LPR	0.29	0.78	0.37
Reside in Village:AWS	0.45	0.83	0.55
Farmer:SLD	9.75	162.62	0.06
Farmer:SRP	9.03	162.62	0.06
Farmer:PiS	-1.17	247.57	0.00
Farmer:PSL	10.89	162.62	0.07
Farmer:PO	11.29	162.61	0.07
Farmer:LPR	10.72	162.62	0.07
Farmer:AWS	-1.50	258.02	-0.01
Lustration:SLD	2.67	0.89	2.99
Lustration:SRP	0.88	0.95	0.92
Lustration:PiS	0.57	0.94	0.61
Lustration:PSL	1.83	0.97	1.88
Lustration:PO	0.48	0.94	0.51
Lustration:LPR	0.02	1.00	0.02
Lustration:AWS	0.21	1.07	0.20
N = 688			
Log Likelihood = -957.4			

Note: This figure reports the coefficient estimates, standard errors and t-values for our multinomial logit model of vote choice in the 2001 Polish Parliamentary election. UW is the base outcome and the substantive results are identical regardless of the choice of base category.

Table A2-3: Vote choice in the 2005 Polish Parliamentary Election – Multinomial Logit Results

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t value
(Intercept):PiS	4.18	0.79	5.28
(Intercept):PO	4.15	0.81	5.14
(Intercept):SRP	3.12	0.91	3.45
(Intercept):SLD	1.10	0.92	1.21
(Intercept):LPR	0.59	1.02	0.57
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PiS	0.36	0.36	0.98
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.51	0.37	1.37
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.40	0.42	-0.96
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.39	0.42	-0.92
Household Transitional Econ. Evaluations:LPR	1.00	0.45	2.19
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PiS	0.17	0.46	0.37
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.37	0.48	0.78
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SRP	0.30	0.52	0.58
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.35	0.54	0.65
Household Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:LPR	-0.24	0.58	-0.42
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PiS	0.41	0.32	1.29
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:PO	0.61	0.34	1.82
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.17	0.37	-0.47
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:SLD	0.21	0.37	0.56
National Transitional Econ. Evaluations:LPR	-0.19	0.40	-0.46
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PiS	-1.13	0.42	-2.66
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:PO	-0.46	0.44	-1.04
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SRP	-0.83	0.49	-1.70
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:SLD	-0.07	0.50	-0.14
National Short-Term Econ. Evaluations:LPR	-1.12	0.53	-2.11
Frequency of Church Attendance:PiS	-0.19	1.45	-0.13
Frequency of Church Attendance:PO	-2.53	1.47	-1.72
Frequency of Church Attendance:SRP	-2.52	1.66	-1.52
Frequency of Church Attendance:SLD	-4.46	1.63	-2.74
Frequency of Church Attendance:LPR	3.68	1.97	1.87
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Parties:PiS	-0.26	0.51	-0.52
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Parties:PO	-0.65	0.55	-1.20
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Parties:SRP	-0.28	0.61	-0.47
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Parties:SLD	-0.12	0.56	-0.21

Note: Table continues on next page.

Table A2-3 Continued.

Member of Communist (or Satellite) Parties:LPR	-0.53	0.68	-0.77
Age:PiS	-0.05	1.13	-0.04
Age:PO	-0.76	1.16	-0.65
Age:SRP	-0.08	1.32	-0.06
Age:SLD	1.72	1.34	1.28
Age:LPR	0.86	1.40	0.61
Income:PiS	-2.25	2.05	-1.10
Income:PO	-1.79	2.07	-0.86
Income:SRP	-8.55	3.19	-2.68
Income:SLD	0.42	2.26	0.18
Income:LPR	-2.86	2.89	-0.99
Education:PiS	-1.17	0.58	-2.02
Education:PO	-0.59	0.60	-0.98
Education:SRP	-2.08	0.67	-3.08
Education:SLD	-0.19	0.67	-0.29
Education:LPR	-0.96	0.73	-1.31
Reside in Village:PiS	-1.73	0.38	-4.56
Reside in Village:PO	-1.94	0.40	-4.91
Reside in Village:SRP	-0.82	0.44	-1.87
Reside in Village:SLD	-1.25	0.45	-2.77
Reside in Village:LPR	-1.49	0.48	-3.14
Farmer:PiS	-1.28	0.43	-2.94
Farmer:PO	-1.06	0.50	-2.12
Farmer:SRP	-0.59	0.46	-1.28
Farmer:SLD	-2.11	0.82	-2.57
Farmer:LPR	-0.46	0.53	-0.86
Lustration:PiS	-1.32	0.46	-2.88
Lustration:PO	-0.81	0.48	-1.70
Lustration:SRP	0.38	0.51	0.74
Lustration:SLD	1.03	0.53	1.95
Lustration:LPR	-0.32	0.56	-0.58
N = 813			
Log Likelihood = 1075			

Note: This figure reports the coefficient estimates, standard errors and t-values for our multinomial logit model of vote choice in the 2005 Polish Parliamentary election. PSL is the base outcome and the substantive results are identical regardless of the choice of base category.

Appendix III: Comprehensive Results for Party Evaluation Models.

Note: These tables present the full results of our models of party evaluations in each of the three Polish parliamentary elections. For each party and in each year we ran a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable was the ten-point party evaluation scale (re-scaled 0-1). All independent variables are scaled 0-1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Figure 2 presents the key substantive results from these tables.

Table A3-1: Party Evaluations in the 1997 Polish Parliamentary Election – OLS Results.

	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS	ROP
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- Personal	-0.020 (0.048)	0.037 (0.044)	0.037 (0.042)	0.077 (0.050)	0.058 (0.050)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- Personal	0.127 (0.053)	0.004 (0.048)	0.020 (0.046)	-0.053 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.055)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- National	-0.169 (0.040)	-0.130 (0.037)	0.424 (0.035)	0.157 (0.041)	0.035 (0.041)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- National	0.154 (0.048)	0.119 (0.044)	0.013 (0.041)	-0.110 (0.049)	-0.105 (0.049)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.259 (0.043)	0.130 (0.040)	-0.034 (0.038)	0.334 (0.045)	0.244 (0.046)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.098 (0.028)	0.025 (0.026)	0.018 (0.024)	-0.099 (0.029)	-0.057 (0.029)
Age	0.058 (0.058)	0.041 (0.054)	-0.039 (0.051)	0.011 (0.061)	-0.090 (0.062)
Income	0.024 (0.139)	-0.260 (0.128)	-0.127 (0.121)	-0.343 (0.144)	-0.174 (0.143)
Education	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.032)	0.050 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.036)	-0.064 (0.036)
Reside in Village	0.012 (0.026)	0.081 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.027)
Farmer	-0.108 (0.044)	0.073 (0.040)	-0.053 (0.039)	0.047 (0.045)	0.059 (0.045)
Lustration Position	0.474 (0.030)	0.102 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.411 (0.031)	-0.326 (0.031)
Constant	0.355 (0.061)	0.218 (0.056)	0.320 (0.053)	0.506 (0.064)	0.482 (0.064)
R-Squared	0.382	0.135	0.210	0.328	0.218
N	790	785	790	798	774

Table A3-2: Party Evaluations in the 2001 Polish Parliamentary Election – OLS Results.


	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS	PO	PiS	SRP	LPR
Transitional Economic Evaluations								
-- Personal	-0.080 (0.046)	-0.014 (0.040)	0.016 (0.041)	0.059 (0.040)	0.023 (0.046)	0.140 (0.045)	0.013 (0.043)	0.004 (0.049)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations								
-- Personal	0.067 (0.059)	0.064 (0.051)	-0.027 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.050)	0.087 (0.058)	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.046 (0.064)
Transitional Economic Evaluations								
-- National	-0.136 (0.043)	-0.090 (0.036)	0.059 (0.037)	0.102 (0.036)	0.158 (0.042)	-0.070 (0.041)	-0.197 (0.039)	0.025 (0.045)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations								
-- National	-0.117 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.054)	0.175 (0.054)	0.236 (0.053)	0.148 (0.061)	0.113 (0.060)	-0.007 (0.056)	0.179 (0.066)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.258 (0.045)	0.071 (0.039)	0.015 (0.039)	0.213 (0.039)	0.152 (0.044)	0.073 (0.044)	-0.036 (0.041)	0.316 (0.048)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.090 (0.032)	0.014 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.030)	0.005 (0.029)	-0.027 (0.033)
Age	-0.018 (0.065)	0.002 (0.057)	-0.063 (0.057)	0.095 (0.056)	-0.090 (0.063)	0.009 (0.063)	-0.012 (0.059)	-0.009 (0.070)
Income	-0.089 (0.272)	-0.087 (0.230)	-0.054 (0.235)	0.459 (0.232)	0.212 (0.256)	0.027 (0.257)	-0.165 (0.242)	0.023 (0.271)
Education	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.063 (0.032)	0.072 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.032)	0.038 (0.036)	-0.074 (0.036)	-0.254 (0.034)	-0.130 (0.039)
Reside in Village	0.000 (0.025)	0.149 (0.022)	0.006 (0.022)	0.030 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.025)	0.145 (0.023)	0.052 (0.027)
Farmer	-0.078 (0.080)	0.042 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.069)	-0.013 (0.068)	0.164 (0.075)	-0.002 (0.076)	-0.196 (0.071)	0.054 (0.082)
Lustration Position	0.318 (0.032)	0.083 (0.027)	0.016 (0.028)	-0.083 (0.027)	-0.065 (0.031)	-0.133 (0.030)	0.031 (0.029)	-0.136 (0.033)
Constant	0.656 (0.057)	0.340 (0.049)	0.152 (0.050)	-0.048 (0.049)	0.158 (0.055)	0.491 (0.056)	0.566 (0.051)	0.211 (0.060)
R-Squared	0.252	0.139	0.033	0.152	0.121	0.054	0.271	0.166
N	699	677	681	695	662	666	684	609

Table A3-3: Party Evaluations in the 2005 Polish Parliamentary Election – OLS Results.

	SLD	PSL	PO	PiS	LPR	SRP
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- Personal	-0.067 (0.034)	0.008 (0.034)	0.020 (0.043)	0.094 (0.041)	0.065 (0.041)	-0.045 (0.040)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- Personal	0.125 (0.044)	0.028 (0.044)	-0.036 (0.056)	-0.019 (0.053)	0.017 (0.054)	-0.032 (0.052)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- National	-0.003 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.197 (0.041)	0.035 (0.039)	-0.107 (0.039)	-0.200 (0.038)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- National	0.119 (0.039)	0.066 (0.040)	0.072 (0.051)	-0.049 (0.048)	-0.112 (0.049)	0.043 (0.047)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.191 (0.061)	0.116 (0.063)	0.009 (0.078)	0.383 (0.074)	0.475 (0.075)	0.066 (0.073)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.046 (0.025)	0.013 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.033)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.021 (0.031)
Age	-0.123 (0.051)	0.109 (0.052)	-0.196 (0.066)	0.022 (0.062)	0.130 (0.063)	0.092 (0.061)
Income	0.096 (0.093)	-0.089 (0.095)	0.227 (0.121)	-0.241 (0.114)	-0.297 (0.118)	-0.248 (0.112)
Education	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.051 (0.027)	-0.030 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.032)	-0.127 (0.033)	-0.215 (0.032)
Reside in Village	-0.006 (0.018)	0.069 (0.019)	-0.060 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.022)	0.015 (0.023)	0.085 (0.022)
Farmer	0.003 (0.030)	0.091 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.038)	0.009 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.037)	0.108 (0.036)
Lustration Position	0.202 (0.022)	0.041 (0.023)	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.164 (0.027)	-0.046 (0.028)	0.010 (0.027)
Constant	0.158 (0.036)	0.276 (0.037)	0.469 (0.046)	0.601 (0.044)	0.382 (0.044)	0.515 (0.043)
R-Squared	0.144	0.069	0.096	0.089	0.133	0.236
N	910	893	917	918	908	923

Appendix IV: Comprehensive Results for Party Evaluation Models – Generational Analysis.

Figure A3: Predicted effects of perceptions of economic conditions on evaluations of Polish political parties among those respondents who reached adulthood prior to the end of communism.



Note: This figure replicates the analysis presented in Figure 1 but excludes those respondents who were younger than 18 when the communist regime ended. For each year in each election year we estimated the relationship between party evaluation and perceptions of economic conditions over the past year and since the transition from communism (at both the national and household level) using multinomial logit regression. The point estimates displayed in the figure represent the predicted change in evaluations of a given party (scaled 0-1) associated with changing both national and household economic perceptions from the most negative to the most positive perception while holding all other variables at their means.

Note: These tables present the full results of our analysis of the potential moderating effect of generation on Transitional economic voting. These models are identical to those presented in Appendix III with the addition of a dichotomous variable indicating the respondent was younger than 18 in 1989 and interactions between this indicator variable and the two economic variables. For each party and in each year we ran a separate OLS regression where the dependent variable was the ten-point party evaluation scale (re-scaled 0-1). All independent variables are scaled 0-1. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A4-1: Party Evaluations in the 1997 Polish Parliamentary Election – Generational Analysis

	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS	ROP
Post-Communist Generation	-0.000 (0.160)	0.119 (0.147)	0.190 (0.139)	0.214 (0.167)	-0.210 (0.173)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- Personal	-0.019 (0.049)	0.043 (0.045)	0.036 (0.043)	0.083 (0.051)	0.054 (0.051)
Transitional Personal * Post Comm Generation	-0.026 (0.213)	0.016 (0.195)	0.062 (0.186)	-0.106 (0.222)	0.172 (0.251)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- Personal	0.122 (0.055)	0.037 (0.051)	0.007 (0.048)	-0.036 (0.058)	-0.035 (0.058)
Short-Term Personal * Post Comm Generation	0.051 (0.203)	-0.324 (0.186)	0.030 (0.182)	-0.069 (0.211)	-0.208 (0.226)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- National	-0.164 (0.041)	-0.132 (0.038)	0.439 (0.036)	0.162 (0.043)	0.024 (0.043)
Transitional National * Post Comm Generation	-0.108 (0.170)	0.045 (0.156)	-0.227 (0.148)	-0.064 (0.177)	0.144 (0.177)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- National	0.150 (0.049)	0.113 (0.045)	0.013 (0.042)	-0.104 (0.051)	-0.111 (0.050)
Short-Term National * Post Comm Generation	0.123 (0.219)	0.028 (0.200)	-0.008 (0.190)	-0.178 (0.228)	0.140 (0.225)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.258 (0.044)	0.128 (0.040)	-0.034 (0.038)	0.331 (0.045)	0.245 (0.046)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.098 (0.028)	0.024 (0.026)	0.022 (0.024)	-0.101 (0.029)	-0.058 (0.029)
Age	0.068 (0.066)	0.042 (0.061)	0.036 (0.058)	0.002 (0.069)	-0.130 (0.069)
Income	0.029 (0.139)	-0.272 (0.128)	-0.107 (0.121)	-0.348 (0.144)	-0.189 (0.143)
Education	-0.053 (0.035)	-0.045 (0.032)	0.049 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.063 (0.036)
Reside in Village	0.013 (0.026)	0.080 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.023)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.027)
Farmer	-0.109 (0.044)	0.074 (0.040)	-0.057 (0.039)	0.049 (0.045)	0.061 (0.045)
Lustration Position	0.473 (0.030)	0.101 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.410 (0.031)	-0.326 (0.031)
Constant	0.350 (0.064)	0.204 (0.059)	0.279 (0.056)	0.497 (0.067)	0.507 (0.067)
R-Squared	0.379	0.135	0.216	0.325	0.216
N	790	785	790	798	774

Table A4-2: Party Evaluations in the 2001 Polish Parliamentary Election – Generational Analysis

	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS	PO	PiS	SRP	LPR
Post-Communist Generation	-0.001 (0.086)	0.089 (0.074)	0.094 (0.076)	0.086 (0.073)	0.053 (0.086)	-0.055 (0.086)	0.135 (0.079)	0.201 (0.094)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- Personal	-0.087 (0.050)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.044)	0.049 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.049)	0.112 (0.048)	0.046 (0.046)	0.012 (0.052)
Transitional Personal * Post Comm Generation	0.026 (0.139)	-0.152 (0.123)	0.121 (0.122)	0.056 (0.119)	0.128 (0.133)	0.189 (0.140)	-0.250 (0.125)	-0.065 (0.161)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- Personal	0.088 (0.063)	0.054 (0.054)	-0.026 (0.056)	-0.040 (0.054)	0.080 (0.062)	-0.049 (0.061)	-0.058 (0.057)	-0.062 (0.068)
Short-Term Personal * Post Comm Generation	-0.208 (0.178)	0.056 (0.154)	-0.021 (0.155)	0.201 (0.151)	0.020 (0.171)	0.051 (0.170)	-0.058 (0.159)	0.128 (0.197)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- National	-0.141 (0.045)	-0.089 (0.039)	0.077 (0.039)	0.112 (0.039)	0.166 (0.044)	-0.073 (0.043)	-0.201 (0.041)	0.045 (0.047)
Transitional National * Post Comm Generation	0.056 (0.133)	0.005 (0.116)	-0.146 (0.117)	-0.081 (0.113)	-0.050 (0.128)	0.039 (0.136)	0.036 (0.119)	-0.172 (0.151)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- National	-0.134 (0.064)	-0.027 (0.056)	0.172 (0.056)	0.256 (0.055)	0.145 (0.063)	0.125 (0.062)	-0.015 (0.058)	0.191 (0.068)
Short-Term National * Post Comm Generation	0.245 (0.249)	-0.048 (0.214)	-0.016 (0.220)	-0.367 (0.211)	-0.004 (0.238)	-0.150 (0.245)	0.060 (0.222)	-0.327 (0.268)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.255 (0.045)	0.067 (0.039)	0.012 (0.039)	0.209 (0.039)	0.152 (0.044)	0.076 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.041)	0.303 (0.048)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.089 (0.032)	0.013 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.028)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.031)	-0.039 (0.030)	0.004 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.033)
Age	0.004 (0.080)	0.034 (0.069)	0.006 (0.070)	0.157 (0.069)	0.007 (0.077)	0.043 (0.078)	0.023 (0.072)	0.055 (0.086)
Income	-0.088 (0.274)	-0.095 (0.231)	-0.016 (0.236)	0.505 (0.233)	0.265 (0.257)	0.086 (0.258)	-0.201 (0.243)	0.035 (0.272)
Education	-0.007 (0.038)	-0.061 (0.032)	0.071 (0.033)	-0.042 (0.032)	0.039 (0.036)	-0.076 (0.036)	-0.251 (0.034)	-0.133 (0.040)
Reside in Village	-0.002 (0.026)	0.149 (0.022)	0.009 (0.022)	0.037 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.025)	0.144 (0.023)	0.056 (0.027)

Table A4-2: Party Evaluations in the 2001 Polish Parliamentary Election – Generational Analysis (continued)

Farmer	-0.080 (0.081)	0.043 (0.068)	-0.055 (0.069)	-0.021 (0.068)	0.153 (0.076)	-0.013 (0.076)	-0.192 (0.071)	0.047 (0.082)
Lustration Position	0.320 (0.032)	0.083 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	-0.083 (0.027)	-0.062 (0.031)	-0.132 (0.031)	0.031 (0.029)	-0.137 (0.033)
Constant	0.642 (0.063)	0.322 (0.054)	0.115 (0.054)	-0.077 (0.053)	0.111 (0.060)	0.478 (0.060)	0.543 (0.056)	0.179 (0.066)
R-Squared	0.249	0.136	0.032	0.155	0.122	0.055	0.273	0.168
N	699	677	681	695	662	666	684	609

Table A4-3: Party Evaluations in the 2005 Polish Parliamentary Election – Generational Analysis

	SLD	PSL	PO	PiS	LPR	SRP
Post-Communist Generation	0.054 (0.064)	0.045 (0.065)	-0.150 (0.082)	-0.058 (0.077)	-0.022 (0.078)	0.045 (0.076)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- Personal	-0.082 (0.038)	0.009 (0.038)	0.027 (0.049)	0.134 (0.046)	0.087 (0.046)	-0.042 (0.045)
Transitional Personal * Post Comm Generation	0.075 (0.083)	0.000 (0.084)	-0.052 (0.106)	-0.217 (0.100)	-0.146 (0.101)	0.003 (0.099)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- Personal	0.115 (0.050)	0.070 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.064)	-0.046 (0.061)	0.012 (0.062)	-0.026 (0.060)
Short-Term Personal * Post Comm Generation	0.022 (0.104)	-0.183 (0.106)	0.100 (0.132)	0.115 (0.124)	0.013 (0.125)	-0.032 (0.122)
Transitional Economic Evaluations -- National	0.014 (0.034)	-0.022 (0.036)	0.187 (0.045)	0.001 (0.042)	-0.130 (0.043)	-0.210 (0.042)
Transitional National * Post Comm Generation	-0.101 (0.084)	0.056 (0.086)	0.075 (0.109)	0.206 (0.102)	0.148 (0.103)	0.057 (0.101)
Short-Term Economic Evaluations -- National	0.122 (0.044)	0.066 (0.045)	0.050 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.053)	-0.132 (0.054)	0.070 (0.053)
Short-Term National * Post Comm Generation	-0.021 (0.104)	-0.023 (0.105)	0.138 (0.132)	0.014 (0.124)	0.115 (0.125)	-0.153 (0.123)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.197 (0.061)	0.121 (0.063)	0.011 (0.079)	0.396 (0.074)	0.480 (0.075)	0.072 (0.073)
Member of Communist (or Satellite) Party	0.044 (0.026)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.033)	0.007 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.031)
Age	-0.068 (0.073)	0.089 (0.074)	-0.236 (0.094)	0.039 (0.088)	0.222 (0.090)	0.084 (0.087)
Income	0.099 (0.094)	-0.084 (0.096)	0.217 (0.121)	-0.236 (0.114)	-0.281 (0.119)	-0.250 (0.113)
Education	-0.017 (0.027)	-0.050 (0.027)	-0.031 (0.035)	-0.054 (0.032)	-0.129 (0.033)	-0.218 (0.032)
Reside in Village	-0.006 (0.019)	0.071 (0.019)	-0.060 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.022)	0.016 (0.023)	0.085 (0.022)
Farmer	0.006 (0.030)	0.089 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.038)	0.005 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.037)	0.106 (0.036)
Lustration Position	0.201 (0.022)	0.042 (0.023)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.164 (0.027)	-0.046 (0.028)	0.009 (0.027)
Constant	0.134 (0.043)	0.272 (0.044)	0.506 (0.056)	0.602 (0.052)	0.353 (0.053)	0.510 (0.052)
R-Squared	0.142	0.068	0.095	0.090	0.134	0.234
N	910	893	917	918	908	923

Appendix 5: Party Vote and Seat Share in the 1997, 2001, 2005 Polish Parliamentary Elections

Table A5-1: 1997 Polish Parliamentary Election Results

Party	Votes	Vote Share	Seats
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)	4,427,373	33.83%	201
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	3,551,224	27.13%	164
Freedom Union (UW)	1,749,518	13.37%	60
Polish Peasant's Party (PSL)	956,184	7.31%	27
Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)	727,072	5.56%	6
Labour Union	620,611	4.74%	-
Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów	284,826	2.18%	-
Unia Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej	266,317	2.03%	-
KPERR	212 826	1.63%	-
Blok dla Polski	178,395	1.36%	-
Turnout		47.93%	

Table A5-2: 2001 Polish Parliamentary Election Results

Party	Votes	Vote Share	Seats
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	5,342,519	41.04	216
Civic Platform (PO)	1,651,099	12.68	65
Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP)	1,327,624	10.2	53
Law and Justice (PiS)	1,236,787	9.5	44
Polish Peasant's Party (PSL)	1,168,659	8.98	42
League of Polish Families (LPR)	1,025,148	7.87	38
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)	729,207	5.6	0
Freedom Union (UW)	404,074	3.1	0
Alternatywa Ruch Społeczny	54,266	0.42	0
Turnout		46.29%	

Table A5-3: 2005 Polish Parliamentary Election Results

Parties	Votes	Vote Share	Seats
Law and Justice (PiS)	3,185,714	27	155
Civic Platform (PO)	2,849,259	24.1	133
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP)	1,347,355	11.4	56
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	1,335,257	11.3	55
League of Polish Families (LPR)	940,726	8	34
Polish People's Party (PSL)	821,656	7	25
Social Democracy of Poland	459,380	3.9	-
Democratic Party	289,276	2.5	-
Janusz Korwin-Mikke Platform	185,885	1.6	-
Patriotic Movement	124,038	1.1	-
Polish Labor Party	91,266	0.8	-
German Minority Electoral Committee	34,469	0.3	2
Polish National Party	34,127	0.3	-
Native House	32,863	0.3	-
Centre	21,893	0.2	-
All-Poland Civic Coalition	16,251	0.1	-
Party Initiative of the Republic of Poland	11,914	0.1	-
Polish Confederation - Dignity and Work	8,353	0.1	-
National Rebirth of Poland	7,376	0.1	-
German Minority of Silesia	5,581	0.1	-
Labour Party	1,019	0.01	-
Social Rescuers	982	0.01	-
Turnout		40.6	

Appendix 6: Economic Variables Question Wording.

Short-term economic evaluations

National

1997: “Would you say that over the last twelve months, the state of the economy in Poland has gotten better [much better/somewhat better], stayed about the same, or gotten worse [much worse/somewhat worse]?”

2001/2005: During the last 12 months has the economic situation in Poland: definitely improved, rather improved, did not change, rather deteriorated, or definitely deteriorated ?”

Household:

1997: “And if you compare the current financial situation of your household with the situation a year before, would you say that: current situation is much better, slightly better, the same, slightly worse, current situation is much worse, Don’t know?”

2001/2005: “During last 12 month has the material situation of your household: definitely improved, rather improved, did not change, rather deteriorated, definitely deteriorated, don't know, hard to say?”

Transitional economic evaluations

National

1997: “Looking back, how do you - retrospectively - evaluate the effects of the so-called ‘Balcerowicz Plan’³⁴ .”

2001/2005: “Does Poland’s economy now operate better or worse than in the times of the old regime, that is before 1989”.

Household

1997: “Please think again about the four dimensions evaluated in the previous question and tell me whether you may say that in the last 8 years (since 1989) substantial changes occurred in your life in these domains, and were they for better or worse?” [Dimension 1: Your Wealth]

2001/2005: “And looking at the standards of living of you and your family, are you better off or worse off than in the times before 1989?”

³⁴ This question directly taps evaluations of the economic reforms put in place following the end of communism (The Balcerowicz Plan) and thus provides a reasonable, albeit less explicit, measure of the underlying concept with which we are concerned. See as well our expanded discussion of this point in footnote 22.