

It's Nothing Personal?

The Appeal of Party Leaders and the Development of Partisanship in Russia

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ABSTRACT

One of the most common assumptions about Russia's nascent party system is that it is overly "personalistic," yet there have been surprisingly few attempts to provide empirical support for this claim at the mass level. In order to address the question directly, we test three hypotheses concerning the relationships between citizens' evaluations of leaders and their development of partisan attachment. First, evaluations of leaders could have no relationship to the development of partisan attachments (the *null hypothesis*). Second, evaluations of leaders could be one factor of many that affect the development of partisanship (the *reasoned voter hypothesis*). Finally, evaluations of leaders could be the determining factor in affecting the development of partisanship, overwhelming all other considerations (the *personalism hypothesis*).

Relying on data from a three wave panel survey of citizens during the 1995-1996 Russian electoral cycle, we find compelling evidence that the personal appeal of political leaders contributes to developing partisanship in Russia. The results hold across multiple measures of the explanatory variable that operationalize leader appeal as either extreme opinionation about leaders generally or an intense attraction to individual leaders. On the basis of these findings, we confidently reject the null hypothesis that attitudes toward political leaders are irrelevant to the development of partisanship. We also confidently reject the personalism hypothesis: Russians' feelings about their leaders are influential in the formation of partisanship *along side* numerous other factors, such as political awareness and involvement, social position, former membership in the CPSU, and trust in government.

In the final section of the paper, we present additional evidence that suggests that Russians' use of political personalities as a guide rests significantly on substantive evaluations of leadership potential. More specifically, affect toward political figures is explicable in good portion by two such criteria: (1) evaluations of traits that voters may find desirable in their leaders; and (2) relative assessments of how well politicians can handle policy in major issue areas. Overall, the factors, including affect toward party leaders, that distinguish those Russians who appear more adept at finding their place in the evolving political universe (i.e., developing partisans) strengthen the impression that this is a rational – or at least, reasonable – process.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most common assumptions about Russia's nascent party system is that it is overly "personalistic."¹ Inevitably, this has a negative connotation, as if it were one more piece of evidence casting doubt on the democratic future of Russia. Scholars have countered these claims with considerable evidence that policy preferences, economic evaluations, and other substantive factors play a sizeable role in party support (Brader and Tucker 2001; Miller et al. 2001; Miller and Klobucar 2000; Whitefield and Evans 1998, 1999). Surprisingly, however, there have been few attempts to test directly the extent to which personalistic considerations drive the political behavior of Russians, either in the relationship between opinions of politicians and voting behavior (although see Colton 2000, 2002) or the link between feelings about party leaders and attachment to particular parties (although see Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1998).

In this paper, we investigate directly the extent to which the development of partisanship rests on the appeal of political personalities. There are numerous possibilities for the magnitude, direction, and nature of the link between leader popularity and the acquisition of partisan attachment. Given widespread assumptions about Russian mass politics, our primary focus is on the *personalism hypothesis*, which proposes that partisanship is based mostly or entirely on the personal appeal of politicians. From this view, therefore, we expect the causal relationship to flow from leader popularity to party attachment and the magnitude of that effect to overwhelm other potential explanatory factors. Moreover, the "appeal of politicians" envisioned by this hypothesis is of a charismatic nature, reflected in citizens' attraction to (or revulsion from) political figures as individuals (rather than, say, as representatives of a specific platform). The

¹ For summaries of many works that make these sorts of claims, see Miller et al. (2000), Miller and Klobucar (2000), and Brader and Tucker (2001).

strong, contrary point of view is that attitudes toward leaders have no relationship to the development of partisan attachments. From this perspective, essentially the *null hypothesis*, questions as to the nature and direction of the tie are moot. We expect partisanship to be based on other factors and not at all on the appeal of politicians, leaving the critics of Russia's transitional period completely mistaken, at least in this regard.

There are of course other possibilities, and at least one of these is suggested by previous research on leader popularity. In the United States and other established democracies, studies demonstrate that assessments of the leaders' personal characteristics play a modest but at times decisive role in the voting choices of citizens (Bartels 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996; Pierce 2002). Under this view, which we might call the *reasoning voter hypothesis* (cf. Popkin 1994), the "appeal of politicians" is more substantively based on evaluations of personality traits that could be seen as desirable in political leaders (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Empirical work in these settings also shows that such evaluations of leaders are often partially, though not entirely, derivative of more fundamental predispositions, especially party identification (Bartels 2002). In the new democracy context, however, the causal status of opinions about major political figures seems to be on surer footing. Such attitudes are unlikely to derive fully from partisanship, which is merely developing and has not yet reached full party identification in the American sense (Brader and Tucker 2001).² Nonetheless, *reciprocal* influence is more likely in this context than in established democracies (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1998). Although we lack the experimental data to test fully for reciprocity, we can test

² In the tradition of the so-called Michigan model of party identification, Colton (2000) makes the stronger assumption that leader evaluations come much further down the "funnel of causality" than partisanship.

competing hypotheses about the magnitude and nature of the relationship using a three-wave panel survey of Russian citizens collected during the 1995-1996 electoral cycle.³

Our investigation of these claims is situated within a larger project aimed at advancing our understanding of the development of partisanship more generally. While party identification has long attracted the attention of scholars, most research has focused on established democracies, in particular the United States (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Such studies, however, are limited in their ability to test empirical predictions regarding the *development* of partisan attachment. Indeed, to explore these questions fully, we need data from new democracies, where we can actually observe citizens as they become attached to political parties.

In previous papers, we have explored how best to identify “developing partisans” in new democracies (Brader and Tucker 2001) and tested alternative views on the origins of partisanship in a single model (Brader and Tucker 2002).⁴ In this paper, we build on the earlier work by incorporating attitudes toward leaders into the model as a competing factor explaining nascent partisan attachments. Our approach is somewhat different from the few previous attempts to study this phenomenon in Russia in that our measure of developing partisanship is not tied to *specific* parties; instead, we look at both the acquisition of partisanship and opinionation about leaders at a more general level.

The rest of the paper develops as follows. First, we briefly review how previous studies have examined the effects of leader evaluations in Russia. We then present our approach for testing the three hypotheses specified above and discuss how we constructed our key variables of

³ The survey was carried out under the supervision of Timothy Colton and William Zimmerman. It had a response rate of 79.8% and yielded 2841 respondents for the first wave. While over 97% of the first wave respondents participated in the second wave, there were slightly more than 400 respondents lost by the third wave. See Colton 2000 (237-8) for more details on the survey.

⁴ Colton (forthcoming) uses the term “protopartisans” instead of developing partisans, but both terms tap into the same concept.

interest: developing partisanship (the dependent variable) and the appeal of political leaders (the principal explanatory variable). Our results appear in three sections. Evidence presented in the first allows us to reject confidently the null hypothesis and leads us to conclude that the appeal of leaders matters, but does not overwhelm other factors. In the second, we turn to citizens' opinions about politicians in an effort to understand the basis for those evaluations. The evidence provides strong support for the reasoning voter hypothesis over the personalism hypothesis. To the extent that Russians' partisan orientations are influenced by their attraction to political persons, that attraction appears to stem in large part from substantive political criteria. However, substantive criteria do not fully explain affect toward politicians and, in the final empirical section of the paper, we make greater use of the panel data to explore whether charismatic appeal plays some role and under what conditions.

Before continuing, it is important to say a word about what we are *not* attempting to do in this paper. We make no claims about the organization of Russian political parties themselves, their reliance on individual leaders, or their success in institutionalizing themselves as a permanent part of the Russian political landscape. Although there are plenty of reasons to be concerned about elite behavior *vis a vis* parties in new democracies and in Russia in particular (Golosov 1999; Hale 2001; Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998; McFaul 2000, 2001; Moser 1999), this paper is exclusively focused on the level of mass politics. Moreover, suggestions that Russia's transitional party system is overly personalistic are aimed in no small part at the electoral judgment of citizens. Therefore, we wish to understand how ordinary Russians have responded to political parties in the early days of the transition from Soviet rule and the role their perceptions of party leaders have played in that process. We intend our conclusions to speak principally to that end.

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF LEADER APPEAL: PREVIOUS APPROACHES

The belief that Russia's nascent party system is based on the attraction of citizens to political personalities is fairly widespread. However, the belief itself appears to be based largely on impressionistic evidence. In a review of the literature, we have found only a couple of attempts to put our understanding of the relationship on firmer footing. These studies have come to conclusions somewhat different than the conventional wisdom of critics.

Colton (2000) has incorporated the appeal of party leaders into his general model of transitional Russian political behavior. In this work, Colton includes leader evaluations as one set of factors among many that lead citizens to vote for particular parties. Although he treats partisanship as another factor affecting the vote choice, he does not examine the specific relationship between leader evaluations and the development of partisan attachments. Indeed, Colton's model assumes that Russians' self-reported party attachments in 1995 can cause, but not be caused by, such assessments of party leaders; this is a stronger assumption than we are willing to make.⁵ Nevertheless, the focus of the research is not on the relationship between these factors, but rather on their contribution to explaining the vote. Not surprisingly, Colton finds that voters' likelihood of selecting a particular political party in the 1995 parliamentary elections is in part a function of their feelings about the leader of that particular party (e.g., does a higher ranking for Gennadii Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of Russia, make one more likely to vote for the Communists?). He concludes that evaluations of party leaders clearly

⁵ Colton is constrained into this assumption by the recursive design of the "funnel of causality" model and the desire to maintain simplicity of the ordering of factors. He acknowledges that some political figures, such as Boris Yeltsin, are so salient that they could arguably be placed earlier in the causal chain, whereas others, such as Gennadii Zyuganov, can be less questionably labeled derivative of their party. However, it would complicate the explanatory effort a great deal to allow particular evaluations of the same type to enter the model at different stages.

matter, but “the influence of the leadership factor is by no means off the charts when compared to some of the other explanatory variables examined” (194).⁶

A more direct test of the effect of leadership on the development of partisan attachments in Russia has been carried out by a team of researchers from the University of Iowa (Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1998). The authors construct a uni-dimensional measure of partisanship that places respondents who identify themselves with communist and nationalist parties on one end of the spectrum, centrist and reformist parties on the other end, and those who do not identify with any party in the middle (128).⁷ To capture the appeal of party leaders, they use the difference between the ratings given by the respondent for Gennadii Zyuganov (the Communist leader) and Boris Yelstin (the incumbent president at the time of the survey, and much more clearly associated with reformist and, in particular, centrist parties as the authors define them).⁸ Not surprisingly, Miller and colleagues find that the more highly one rates Zyuganov relative to Yeltsin, the more likely one is to be found at the communist/nationalist identifier end of the scale, and vice versa.

Although this approach includes partisan identifiers as part of the dependent variable (as opposed to party voters), it is similar to the Colton approach by looking at whether evaluations of *particular* leaders push people towards support of *particular* parties. Miller and colleagues reach a similar conclusion as well: Evaluations of party leaders play a noticeable but not an overwhelming role in citizens’ behavior, and this role can be reasonably deemed substantive

⁶ As one may expect, Colton (2002) finds that evaluations of leaders, in terms of various personality traits, play an even larger role in the presidential voting, though again they operate along side other factors.

⁷ Respondents who identify with a party are those who have answered the question “Is there one particular party that expresses your views better than any of the others?” The decision to place Russian parties on a uni-dimensional scale imposes a strong ordering that may make more sense to researchers than voters. This stands in contrast to approaches that seek to explain partisan choices using non-ordered models such as multi-nomial logit (Colton 2000; Brader and Tucker 2001).

⁸ They actually look at ratings across a variety of leadership traits, as opposed to a single evaluation of one’s preference for a leader. Those traits are strong leader, caring, man of action, trustworthiness, and tough on crime (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1998, 118).

rather than superficial. Because “non-identifiers” are buried in the middle of the scale, they can not and do not speak to whether attraction to political personalities makes one more likely to develop partisan attachment *in general*. Moreover, adherents to the personalism hypothesis might object that by focusing exclusively on evaluations of only two leaders, the authors can not speak to the power of the personal appeal of leaders *generally*.⁹

In earlier investigations, scholars have made valuable contributions to our understanding of the role that evaluations of leaders can play in pushing voters to support the party of that leader (or like-minded parties). Both studies find evidence that the role is modest and the overall process more substantive than superficial. Interestingly, they reach similar conclusions despite some fundamental differences in their theoretical foundations – for example, where Colton conceives party attachment as prior to leader evaluations in explaining party vote, Miller and colleagues conceive leader evaluations as prior to party attachment. Neither study tests directly whether the appeal of party leaders drives the development of partisanship in general, and neither has offered critics of Russia’s early party system a full test of their personalism hypothesis.

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP APPEAL: OUR APPROACH

Our approach is distinguished from previous studies in a number of ways, but most importantly the dependent variable we are seeking to explain is the degree to which one is or is not a “developing partisan,” irrespective of the particular party to which one becomes attached. Therefore, we require a corresponding approach to measuring the appeal of party leaders. If the

⁹ These critics may especially object that analysis focuses on Yeltsin and Zyuganov who might be most easily tied to platforms and/or government policies and mostly ignores figures like Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir Zhirinovskii who might more readily attract a charismatic following.

outcome variable captures whether an individual is showing any signs of attachment to a party in general, then the explanatory variable for our tests must capture whether that individual shows any signs of attraction to a leader in general. In this way, we can ask (and hopefully answer) whether a person who possesses strong feelings toward a political leader is more likely to develop a partisan orientation – in short, whether politicians are playing the role of the Pied Piper in leading citizens into partisanship.

We begin with a base model of factors that we expect to affect the development of partisan attachments in new democracies. These factors are mostly drawn from theories of party identification and political behavior in established democracies and include measures of political sophistication and involvement (e.g., exposure, engagement, awareness, the efficacy of voting), social position and the presence of cross-pressuring cleavages, and a few particularly salient orientations to transitional Russian politics (e.g., former membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), attitudes toward Yeltsin, and trust in the government). We explore the theoretical foundations of the base model and empirical results elsewhere (Brader and Tucker 2002). For the present analysis, the most important finding is that numerous factors are found to have a significant effect, substantively and statistically, on the development of partisanship.

The question then remains how taking the appeal of party leaders into consideration changes this picture. Our plan is simply to add the key variable of interest – attraction to party leaders – to the base model and perform the analysis again. There are three types of results we could find, each of which corresponds to one of the hypotheses. In support of the null hypothesis, we could find that the measure of leader evaluation does not have a significant effect. Conversely, we could find that the measure of leader evaluation has such a strong effect that it washes out, or at least overwhelms, all other factors, as predicted by the personalism hypothesis.

Finally, we could find that leader evaluations have a positive impact but leave the contribution of other variables in the model largely unaltered. This final scenario offers some support for the reasoning voter hypothesis, but further analysis is required (and undertaken) to assess whether the leader evaluations themselves are based on superficial or substantive factors. Before turning to the results, we first describe the construction of our two principal variables.

The Dependent Variable: Developing Partisanship

Unlike conventional approaches in established democracies, we do not use self-reported party identification as our measure of partisanship. We have devoted considerable attention elsewhere to our theoretical and empirical concerns with using such measures to capture developing partisanship in a new democracy (Brader and Tucker 2001). To summarize, theories do not predict full partisan identification – especially identification conceived as a Michigan-style psychological attachment – to exist so early in a new democracy. Empirically, we demonstrate that self-report survey instruments indeed exhibit the sort of instability and inconsistency with other attitudes that we associate with full party identification.

Instead, we conceptualize partisanship in a new democracy as developing along a continuum. At one end of this continuum lies a fully developed partisan identifier; at the other, citizens for whom political parties are almost completely unknown and basically irrelevant to structuring their political outlook (i.e., parties are at best one more object of political choice and making that choice leaves no lasting impression). Although the dearth of research into the origins of party attachment leave us without a good sense of how long it takes for full party identification to emerge, we expect that it will take some time – a matter of many years and certainly not months. We do, however, hope to be able to differentiate between non-partisans

and those who are developing partisanship through the use of behavioral and attitudinal indicators. We focus on two sorts of indicators – stability of party preferences and consistency of partisan attitudes – derived from the basic understanding of partisanship as something that initially accumulates according to the record of political experience and eventually extends to bring other political evaluations in order.

In an effort to be cautious about what we are seeing under these circumstances, we use three measures of developing partisanship in our present analysis. The first is a dichotomous measure indicating stability in party preference between an individual's intended vote choice in the pre-parliamentary election survey and her reported vote in the post-parliamentary election survey.¹⁰ An admittedly low threshold of partisan loyalty by American standards, it is one that only 53.6% of the voters manage to clear in 1995. However, this simple measure does a remarkably good job of predicting other partisan-consistent attitudes and behavior (Brader and Tucker 2001).¹¹ In keeping with our earlier work, from time to time we refer to those developing partisans captured by this measure as “core voters.”¹²

One drawback of the first measure is that it incorporates actual voting behavior into our observation of developing partisans, which has two critical consequences. First, it restricts any analysis utilizing the measure to the subset of respondents that chose to vote in the election,

¹⁰ Membership in the lower house of parliament, the Duma, is chosen by two sets of electoral rules. Half of the deputies are elected from 225 single member districts, while the other half are elected by national list proportional representation (PR) with a five percent threshold. In this paper, all vote intentions refer to the PR component of the election. For more on Russia's electoral laws, see Moser (1995); Barnes (1996); Clark (1999); and Moser (2001).

¹¹ While we use this measure as a proxy for developing partisanship, it also speaks to the general theme of stability of preferences of voters in new democracies. Those who are uncomfortable with how we have chosen to capture developing partisanship can still evaluate the effects on stability. In the most direct sense, that is what the variable measures – the stability of political preferences. However, we may more precisely say it measures the stability of *party* preferences and, as we have argued elsewhere, these *are* the necessary building blocks of partisanship, so there is quite conceivably no better place to look for developing partisanship.

¹² We chose the phrase because one could think of three types of supporters of a party: those who originally planned to support the party but changed their mind; those who originally planned to support another party but eventually came to support the party in question; and the “core” of supporters who remained consistent in their support of the party.

which is 67% of the sample.¹³ Analytically, it prohibits us from ever testing the effect of voting behavior on the development of partisanship. We therefore employ two measures of partisan consistency, both of which incorporate party preferences but do *not* include actual vote choice.

Both measures are constructed in the same fashion. First, we identify a respondent's preferred party. Next, we see if the respondent ranks her party the highest across a number of criteria: party trusted the most, party closest to the people, party best prepared to govern, party most likely to ensure peace, and a general measure of how much the party is liked or disliked. The final measure is an additive scale: each time a respondent ranks her party as highest (or at least as high as any other party), she receives one point on the partisan consistency scale.

We obtain two measures because we have two options in ascertaining which is the respondent's preferred party. The first version uses the respondent's party vote preference (intention) as the baseline. The second version uses the respondent's self-reported party attachment as a baseline.¹⁴ For both measures, we coded respondents who could not name a party as a 0.¹⁵ In addition, we included consistency between these two measures as a final additive criterion in both of the scales (e.g., was the party that represents your interest the same as one for which you intended to vote in the first version, and vice versa for the second version). As Table 1 indicates, these measures are closely correlated, suggesting the measures tap into a similar underlying phenomenon.

¹³ The alternative would have been to just classify non-voters as non-partisans. Although there are good reasons to assume that failing to vote in early elections ensures the individual will not develop party identification, there are other factors that affecting an individual's decision on whether or not to cast a ballot. Given the non-trivial number of non-voters, we would essentially explain the decision to vote just about as well as partisanship.

¹⁴ The party attachment question asked "Is there a party that best represents my interests?" or "Is there a party you could say is 'my party'?" We have called self-reports of this nature into question as solo measures of party identification (what they claim to measure), but they may serve as one more indicator of partisanship. At some point, individuals who are developing a partisan attachment should answer this question appropriately.

¹⁵ We realize that this sounds similar to coding non-voters as non-partisans, which we mentioned as something we wish to avoid. However, though there are many reasons why one might not have voted that are unrelated to partisanship (e.g., the weather was bad, the baby got sick, etc.), many such factors should not affect one's party preference in the pre-election survey.

– INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE –

The Explanatory Variable: Attraction to Party Leaders

Our goal is to construct a measure that captures the extent to which an individual is drawn by the appeal of a party leader or party leaders in general. We focused on two ways of creating such a measure. First, we tried to single out respondents who were generally opinionated (i.e., have strong feelings) about leaders, whether positive or negative. Personalism might be exemplified by people who respond to political leaders in a love-hate fashion. If attitudes toward leaders lead individuals into partisanship, then individuals who feel most strongly about leaders in general should be most likely to develop partisanship. Second, we measured the degree to which respondents are attracted to a particular leader over others. Personalism here suggests a sort of fan-mentality in which individuals are under the charismatic sway of a single leader. Under this view, citizens who like one leader far more than the rest should be more likely to develop partisanship.

We used a common set of survey items to construct both types of measures: thermometer ratings of party leaders (i.e., respondents rate leaders on a scale from 0 to 100).¹⁶ For ease of interpretation, we rescaled all explanatory variables to a range from 0 to 1. Respondents assessed a number of political figures across the different waves of the survey; in the first section of the paper, we rely upon thermometer scores from the first wave of the survey only. For most

¹⁶ Specifically, respondents were instructed to give a 0 if they very much disliked the leader, 50 if they liked and disliked in equal measure, and 100 if they liked the leader a great deal; measures in between were to be interpreted as correspondingly closer or farther from these feelings.

of versions of these variables, we incorporate only the evaluations of the five prominent leaders who were also the top five contenders in the 1996 presidential election (and captured approximately 95% of the vote): Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Grigorii Yavlinsky, Alexander Lebed, and Vladimir Zhirinovskii.¹⁷

In constructing the first type of measure – general opinionation about party leaders – we consider the extent to which a respondent's affect toward leaders deviated from the midpoint of the scale, regardless of whether it varied in a positive manner or a negative direction. In other words, we calculate the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's thermometer score and the mid-point (50 on the original, 0.5 on the rescaled version) for each leader and then average these values across all of the respondent's ratings. Therefore, the most opinionated respondents (who ranked all candidates as either a 1 or 0 on the rescaled thermometer) would receive a value of 0.5, while the least opinionated (those who rated everyone at the midpoint) scored 0. We construct two versions that differ only in the number of feeling thermometers incorporated. The first is based on affect toward the five leaders previously mentioned, and the second includes affect toward all twelve of the leaders listed in the survey.¹⁸

We construct the second type of measure – attraction to a particular leader – by trying to distinguish individuals who rated one leader higher than most or all others. In each of three versions, we only use evaluations of the five more prominent leaders and required respondents to

¹⁷ Zyuganov was the leader of the Communist Party of Russia, Yavlinsky of Yabloko, and Zhirinovskii of the ironically named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. While Yeltsin and Lebed technically ran in the presidential election as independents, they were closely connected with Our Home is Russia and the Congress of Russian Communities, respectively, both of which participated in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Moreover, at the time of the survey, Lebed was running on the party list of the Congress of Russian Communities. For details, see Belin and Orttung (1997), McFaul (1997), and Marsh (2002).

¹⁸ The additional seven leaders and their party affiliations are Viktor Chernomyrdin (Our Home is Russia) Yuri Skokov (Congress of Russian Communities) Mikhail Lapshin (Agrarian Party) Alexander Rutskoi (Derzhava) Boris Fedorov (Forward Russia) Yekaterina Lakhova (Women of Russia) and Yegor Gaidar (Russia's Democratic Choice). For more on these parties, their leaders, and their platforms, see Belin and Orttung (1997), White, Rose and McAllister (1997), White, Wyman and Oates (1997), and Marsh (2002). Respondents were coded as missing values and excluded from analysis unless they rated at least three leaders for the first measure and at least six for the second.

rank at least three of them. For the first version, we simply subtract a respondent's average rating from his highest rating. The highest possible value is 0.8 and comes from rating one leader at the maximum (1) and the remaining four at the minimum (0). One weakness of this measure is that an individual possessing strong feelings about two leaders and bad feelings about the other three would also score fairly high (e.g., 0.6), thus we might not tap into preference for just one leader. For this reason, we also constructed two dummy variables indicating that the respondent rated one leader (and one only) at least a certain margin higher than the other four leaders. The first dummy variable stipulates a margin of at least 30 thermometer points for the highest leader and the second variable stipulates at least 50 points. Summary statistics for all five versions of the measures are in Table 2.

– INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE –

As indicated in Table 3, all measures are positively correlated to a significant degree. As expected, the differing versions of the same type of measure are quite closely related. The measures are also substantially related across the two types, but not nearly as much. This suggests they are capturing attraction to party leaders in partially distinct ways, which is consistent with the fact that the two types of measures are tied to distinct conceptualizations.

– INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE –

THE APPEAL OF LEADERS AND DEVELOPING PARTISANSHIP: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The goal of this section is to assess the extent to which the appeal of party leaders influences the development of partisan attachments, if at all. To do this, we separately add each measure of the explanatory variable to a base model of developing partisanship elaborated elsewhere. We consider each of the alternative measures of the dependent variable in turn. In Table 4, we present the coefficients and standard errors from our analyses using the first version of the dependent variable, the core voter measure; as this measure is dichotomous, we employ a logit model.¹⁹ No matter which measure of leader appeal we use, the coefficient is always positive and always significant ($p < .01$ in four of the five cases, $p < .05$ in the remaining case). Moreover, the magnitude of the impact is substantial as well; a shift from the lowest to highest value of leadership evaluation increases the probability of being a developing partisan by approximately 10% to 35%, depending on the version of the leader appeal measure included in the analysis.²⁰

– INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE –

Moving to the second area of examination – the effect that including the appeal of leaders has on other variables in the base model – we find similar results across versions of the explanatory variable. Simply put, there is very little change in the estimated effects of other variables when we control for the role of party leaders. Most of the variables that were

¹⁹ All independent variables have been rescaled on a 0-1 scale with the exception of the versions of the leadership evaluation variables described above.

²⁰ Substantive effects are estimates from rerunning analysis using standard regression; more precise predicted probabilities from the logit analysis will be included in the next version of the paper.

previously significant retain their direction and significance, and indeed have very similar coefficients and standard errors.²¹ For a couple of variables, political awareness and attitude towards Yeltsin, statistical significance decreases in some cases below conventional thresholds. Even so, the coefficients are always in the same direction, and neither the coefficients nor the standard errors change much in size. Attitudes toward Yeltsin are measured directly from the feeling thermometer, thus it is not surprising that the effect is attenuated somewhat when the thermometer-based measures are included. Although we do not have the space to pursue these results fully, the fact that political awareness (essentially a scale of political knowledge borrowed directly from Colton (2000)) is also slightly attenuated suggests that political sophistication may play a role in sorting out the connection between strong feelings toward leaders and partisan orientations.²² If so, then it constitutes further evidence that this relationship is neither superficial nor irrational. Overall, the findings for partisans stability are remarkably clear and consistent: attraction to leaders has a substantial effect on party fidelity, but does not dominate other factors.

– INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE –

In Table 5, we present results from analyses using the first attitudinal measure of partisan consistency (intent base). Again, it is clear that no matter which version of leader evaluations is used, the coefficient is positive and the results are statistically significant; the substantive effect

²¹ Missing values are listwise deleted, which is why the N is below 1896, the total number of respondents coded as either core voter or not core voters, in all cases. For variables with large numbers of missing values – positive or negative attitude towards parties, trust in government, and attitude towards Yeltsin – mean replacement is used.

²² The political awareness measure assesses the respondent's overall political awareness based on his or her ability to answer a number of questions about Russian and international politics (Colton 2000, 244).

is comparable to the previous analysis as well.²³ We find an almost identical pattern regarding the effect of adding the appeal of party leaders on other variables in the base model. In most cases, any changes in the size of either the coefficients or standard error are small; we see the same attenuation but not real dissipation of the effects of attitudes toward Yelstin and high levels of education. Only political awareness seems to be affected much, as its coefficient is cut roughly in half. In sum, our findings for partisan consistency here provide us with plenty of evidence on which to reject the null hypothesis and the extreme version of the personalism hypothesis. The results are most consistent so far with the reasoning voter hypothesis.

The final version of the dependent variable – attitudinal consistency with a self-reported identification base – produces almost the exact same pattern, as displayed in Table 6. It is distinguished from the previous two analyses by the fact that one measure for leader appeal is not statistically significant at the $p < .10$ level (general opinionation using all 12 leaders), but it is still in the correct direction and in fact falls just shy of the threshold ($p < .11$). The other four versions are significant, statistically and substantively, at the same level as for effects on the previous attitudinal measure. The effects on other explanatory factors are again small; we are no longer confident in the effect of Yeltsin attitudes, and the substantive magnitude of the awareness is diminished, though not below conventional levels of significance.

– INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE –

²³ Interpreting the substantive effect is slightly more complicated here. Recall that the dependent variable range from 0 – 1 with a 0 representing no signs of developing partisanship and a 1 indicating positive evaluations across all of the criteria. The substantive effect of shifting from the lowest level of leadership evaluation to the highest level would move a respondent anywhere from .06 to .30 along that scale depending on the measure employed. The largest effect is found for the version measuring the difference between the respondents highest evaluation and the average of all other evaluations, the smallest for the dummy variable noting whether there is at least one candidate ranked more than 30 thermometer points higher than any other.

The assessment of the level of empirical support for our three hypotheses is remarkably consistent across the many different measures of the dependent and explanatory variables. Stronger feelings about party leaders spurs the development of partisanship, captured here by stability of party preferences and consistency of partisan attitudes. These feelings do not, however, overwhelm most other factors. To the contrary, there are plenty of substantive political reasons underlying the development of partisanship beyond the personal appeal of party leaders. Therefore of the three hypotheses presented in the introductory section of the paper, the empirical evidence most clearly supports the reasoning voter hypothesis at the expense of both the personalism and null hypotheses.

WHAT'S SO APPEALING?: THE SUBSTANCE OF LEADER EVALUATIONS

Having established that attraction to party leaders can promote the development of partisanship among Russians, we wish to learn more about what lies behind their personal appeal for citizens. In saying that an individual likes a leader, we only beg the question, why? Moreover, the empirical tests in the preceding section shed light on predictions from competing hypotheses regarding the magnitude of the effect but do not allow us to distinguish between predictions regarding the nature of the effect. The personalism hypothesis suggests that the appeal of party leaders rests on fleeting and idiosyncratic factors devoid of meaningful political content (e.g., physical attractiveness, popular image, personal charm, etc.). We do not possess measures of these superficial factors in order to assess their importance directly. However, we do have measures of more substantive factors, such as evaluations of leadership-relevant traits

and assessments of competency in handling major policy issues, and we can examine how well they explain the affect toward leaders (i.e., feeling thermometers).

To assess what attracts citizens to leaders, we regress the thermometer rankings of each of the five prominent politicians featured earlier on a battery of trait and issue evaluations about the leader.²⁴ Respondents evaluated on a four-point scale (rescaled 0-1) the extent to which each leader embodies each of the following traits: intelligent and knowledgeable, honest and trustworthy, has vision, cares about people, and is a strong leader. These are all qualities that one could desire in a leader for political reasons. Respondents also evaluated which politician among the five leading presidential contenders is best suited to handle each of several policy issues. For each candidate, we created seven dummy variables to indicate whether the respondent selected that person as the best candidate on each of seven issues, which included the economy, unemployment, crime and corruption, Chechnya, foreign policy, development of democracy, and stability.

In assessing the results, we are interested in two features of the data. First, we want to examine the estimated effects of traits and issue competencies. We expect the effects to be positive. Significant negative effects would be evidence of extremely unusual behavior indeed, suggesting that the lower the evaluations Russians give a particular leader, the more they like him or her. Weak or non-existent effects would suggest that feelings toward leaders are not based on evaluations of this nature. In that case, although we could not conclude that there is *no* substantive basis to the feelings (i.e., we may simply not have the right factors), we would not be a position to reject the personalism hypothesis inasmuch as it predicts a lack of substance. A second feature that might allow us to tap into the relative contribution of substantive factors is the amount of variance explained (R-squared, or R^2) by traits and issue competencies. High R^2

²⁴ Thermometer scores and candidate evaluations in these analyses are from the third wave of the survey.

values would imply that the appeal of party leaders derives substantially from political evaluations of leaders, while lower R^2 values would suggest caution in rejecting the personalism hypothesis. As with the estimated effects, we must not jump to conclusions because we cannot be certain we are including all relevant substantive factors. However, if these factors do not explain much variance at all, our confidence in the personalism hypothesis will rise.

– INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE –

In Table 7, we see no evidence of effects in the wrong direction. Only five out of 60 coefficients are negative, and all of these have standard errors larger than their coefficients. In contrast, strong positive relationships are plentiful; on average, we have reason to be confident in at least eight of the 12 variables in each regression.²⁵ Moreover, these factors explain a substantial portion of the variance in feelings toward the candidates. On average, the explanatory variables capture close to half of the variation in the dependent variable. We can see however that these substantive factors take us a lot further with some leaders than others. The R^2 values range from .32, in the case of Lebed, to .68, for Zyuganov. These results offer ample evidence on which to doubt the personalism hypothesis; they do not prove idiosyncratic factors are non-existent, as a significant portion of the variance remains unexplained, but they do provide considerable support for the reasoning voter hypothesis.²⁶

²⁵ Although the purpose of this analysis is not to assess the relative importance of the different categories, it is interesting to note the following: First, there appears to be more consistency across the trait variables than the best candidate variables. Second, of all the traits, honesty seems to be most important. Of the best candidate variables, the economy is the only one that is significant in all cases, and it also clearly has the largest coefficients.

²⁶ The reader will notice from observing the N that a significant number of observations were dropped due to missing values. As a robustness test, we reran the analysis again using mean replacement for the trait variables –

Of course there are other political factors, not tied directly to politicians, that nonetheless may explain feelings toward leaders. We undertook the preceding analysis first to get a sense for how the politician-specific factors relate to one another. However, one can imagine that factors such as agreement or disagreement with a politician on important political issues could influence attitudes toward that politician, above and beyond any effect assessment of personal characteristics or competence. In order to test for additional factors at our disposal, we reran the analyses with measures of respondent opinions on five important issues – privatization, how closely Russia should follow the example of the West, the importance of law and order at all costs, whether the government should guarantee a job, and whether the government should limit the income of the rich – plus “left-right” ideology, as measured by self-placement on a seven-point scale. We also included retrospective evaluations of both the national economy and personal finances to control for economic attributions that might affect attitudes toward particular leaders.

– INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE –

In Table 8, we present the original regression (from Table 7) and the new regression so that we may compare the effect of adding these new variables. Naturally, issue opinions and economic evaluations may also affect (attenuate) the estimates for the candidate evaluations in some cases, especially competence in handling particular policy domains, because the former can play a role in shaping the latter impressions. We present the results for only two candidates to

which added anywhere from 700-900 additional observations – and found largely the same results; these are available from the authors upon request.

save space, but the results are similar for the other three candidates. Inclusion of issue opinions does not greatly alter the effects of the candidate-specific evaluations; in fact, most of the trait and competence evaluations are essentially unchanged. However, some of the additional factors do affect feelings toward the candidates directly, although it is clear from the small increase in R^2 that the contribution of these factors overlaps somewhat with candidate-specific evaluations. The evidence from Zyuganov is illustrative. We can see, not surprisingly, that voters who are more disgruntled with the economy, oppose following the path of the west, and want the government to guarantee jobs and limit the income of the rich are more likely to have favorable impressions of Zyuganov. But, even controlling for those opinions, Russians who think he is the most qualified candidate to handle the economy, unemployment, and corruption are likely to have even higher evaluations of him. The addition of these several major considerations did not help us account for attitudes toward Lebed, whose attraction had been already least explicable. Under these circumstances, we might more safely conclude that a larger share of the appeal of Lebed rested on non-political, personal factors, even though there clearly was some substantive basis. It is plausible that we are witnessing a sort of “cult of personality” effect, in which Lebed is popular with many Russians simply because it was popular to like him at the time (Colton 2002).

PERSONAL APPEAL AND PARTISANSHIP REVISITED

[Note: This portion of the analysis has not been completed in time for this draft of the paper.]

CONCLUSIONS

We find compelling evidence that the personal appeal of political leaders contributes to developing partisanship in Russia. Using survey data from the 1995 parliamentary elections, we observe a strong positive correlation between citizens who feel strongly about party leaders and citizens who show signs of acquiring partisanship. The results hold across multiple measures of the explanatory variable that operationalize leader appeal as either extreme opinionation about leaders generally or an intense attraction to particular leaders. On the basis of these findings, we can confidently reject the null hypothesis that attitudes toward political leaders are irrelevant to the development of partisanship. Critics of the transitional party system in Russia claim that these “personalistic” considerations overwhelm all others. Our analysis shows otherwise: Russians’ feelings about their leaders are influential in the formation of partisanship *along side* numerous other factors, such as political awareness and involvement, social position, former membership in the CPSU, and trust in government. Therefore, we can reject the predictions of the personalism hypothesis; results showing the appeal of party leaders as just one factor among many in the explanation of partisan development are far more consistent with the reasoning voter hypothesis.

Even so, proponents of the personalism hypothesis claim the appeal of party leaders not only drowns out other considerations in Russian political behavior, but also rests on fleeting and superficial judgments. Contrary to such widespread characterizations of party support as personalistic in the worst sense, however, we argue that Russians’ use of political personalities as a guide rests significantly on substantive evaluations of leadership potential. More specifically, affect toward political figures is explicable in good portion by two such criteria: (1) evaluations

of traits that voters may find desirable in their leaders; and (2) relative assessments of how well politicians can handle policy in major issue areas. Overall, the factors, including affect toward party leaders, that distinguish those Russians who appear more adept at finding their place in the evolving political universe (i.e., developing partisans) strengthen the impression that this is a rational – or at least, reasonable – process.

Although the thrust of these results is quite clear, conclusions must be tempered by the obstacles to observing this relationship even in high quality data such as those in our possession. Partisanship is a latent psychological construct; we can therefore never observe it directly. In a new democracy, we face the further dilemma of trying to measure partisanship at a developmental stage. In an effort to err on the side of caution, therefore, we rely on multiple measures that tap into two components of partisan behavior – stability in preferences and consistency in attitudes – that theories of party identification imply as logical precursors to its initial development. The conclusions in this paper hold whether developing partisanship is measured as stable party preferences or consistent partisan attitudes.

Our findings leave little doubt that the appeal of party leaders plays a role in Russian mass politics. Faced with the demanding electoral choices of a multiparty system and some impetus to figure out where they “belong” in it, citizens rely in part on their impressions of prominent persons associated with the parties. The nature of these impressions, however, dispels the myth that ordinary Russians are personalistic and superficial in their political judgments. Charismatic attraction may play a small role, but feelings about politicians also are formed on the reasonable basis of leadership traits and issue competencies. Future research, especially panel data or experiments, can help track the sort of reciprocal ties between developing partisanship and leader evaluations that are likely to develop as partisanship strengthens and comes closer to what has

been observed in established democracies. In the mean time, we must move beyond the old assumptions: Even though political personalities cast a long shadow over Russian politics in general, the appeal of party leaders to Russian voters is more political than personal.

Table 1: Correlation among Measures of Developing Partisanship

Variable	CV	At: Int	At: ID
Core Voters	1		
Attitudinal Consistency: Intent Base	0.59	1	
Attitudinal Consistency: ID Base	0.41	0.67	1

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Measures of the Appeal of Party Leaders

Variable	Range	Mean	St. Dev	N
Generally Opinionated: 5 leaders	0 – 0.5	0.31	0.11	2303*
Generally Opinionated: 12 leaders	0 – 0.5	0.29	0.11	2221**
Difference Highest and Average: 5 leaders	0 – 0.8	0.35	0.19	2303*
Prefer One by > 30 points: 5 leaders	0 or 1	0.36	0.48	2303*
Prefer One by > 50 points: 5 leaders	0 or 1	0.23	0.42	2303*

*Respondents that did not rank at least 3 leaders are coded as missing values

**Respondents that did not rank at least 6 leaders are coded as missing values

Table 3: Correlation among Measures of the Appeal of Party Leaders

Variable	Op:5	Op:12	Dif	>30	>50
Generally Opinionated: 5 major	1				
Generally Opinionated: 12 major	.88	1			
Difference Highest and Average: 5 major	.47	.39	1		
Prefer One by > 30 points: 5 major	.32	.28	.68	1	
Prefer One by > 50 points: 5 major	.38	.34	.65	.72	1

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Core Voters with Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	Base	Opin: 5	Opin: 12	Difference	Dummy: 30	Dummy: 50
Voting Efficacy	.418** (.177)	.471** (.189)	.535*** (.191)	.413** (.191)	.473** (.189)	.469** (.189)
Political Awareness	.652** (.277)	.426 (.306)	.354 (.313)	.300 (.311)	.479 (.307)	.444 (.306)
Exposure	-.444 (.271)	-.311 (.289)	-.317 (.294)	-.400 (.293)	-.320 (.290)	-.313 (.289)
Engagement	1.005*** (.298)	.836** (.324)	.969*** (.330)	.786** (.328)	.812** (.325)	.840** (.324)
Cross-pressures	-.118 (.411)	-.242 (.455)	-.155 (.470)	-.323 (.463)	-.238 (.457)	-.250 (.455)
Low Education	-.067 (.138)	.033 (.149)	.012 (.151)	.041 (.151)	.011 (.149)	.039 (.149)
High Education	-.384 (.270)	-.328 (.278)	-.304 (.281)	-.334 (.281)	-.309 (.279)	-.312 (.278)
Cross Pressure X Hi Ed	1.362* (.784)	1.350* (.811)	1.171 (.820)	1.416* (.821)	1.350* (.813)	1.360* (.811)
Age	.027 (.298)	-.028 (.322)	-.107 (.327)	-.114 (.325)	.027 (.321)	.017 (.320)
Male	.212* (.110)	.268** (.117)	.250** (.118)	.274** (.118)	.269** (.117)	.269** (.117)
Communist Party	-.095 (.149)	-.113 (.156)	-.094 (.157)	-.130 (.157)	-.120 (.156)	-.125 (.156)
Demographic Stability	-.373** (.168)	-.333* (.180)	-.305* (.182)	-.341* (.182)	-.372** (.180)	-.365** (.180)
Party Competition	.000 (.198)	.002 (.208)	-.112 (.210)	.070 (.211)	.052 (.208)	.070 (.208)
Prior Voting	.142 (.154)	.202 (.167)	.150 (.171)	.148 (.169)	.165 (.167)	.183 (.167)
Pos/Neg Support	.123 (.109)	.106 (.117)	.098 (.118)	.098 (.119)	.103 (.118)	.100 (.117)
Yeltsin Attitude	-.482** (.199)	-.300 (.228)	-.216 (.227)	-.291 (.217)	-.368* (.215)	-.390* (.216)
Trust Government	-.424* (.241)	-.475* (.258)	-.548** (.262)	-.413 (.262)	-.507* (.260)	-.499* (.259)
LEADER APPEAL		1.406*** (.528)	1.410** (.565)	1.930*** (.293)	.479*** (.114)	.405*** (.132)
Constant	-.525 (.320)	-.843** (.388)	-.759* (.400)	-.890** (.364)	-.560 (.355)	-.503 (.354)
N	1721	1512	1475	1512	1512	1512

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Table 5: Regression Analysis of Attitude Measure (Intent Base) with Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	Base	Opin: 5	Opin: 12	Difference	Dummy: 30	Dummy: 50
Voting Efficacy	.183*** (.028)	.172*** (.030)	.181*** (.031)	.161*** (.030)	.170*** (.030)	.171*** (.030)
Political Awareness	.182*** (.043)	.089* (.049)	.092* (.050)	.065 (.049)	.100** (.049)	.097* (.049)
Exposure	.066 (.043)	.039 (.047)	.027 (.047)	.026 (.046)	.038 (.047)	.039 (.047)
Engagement	.444*** (.044)	.395*** (.049)	.420*** (.050)	.365*** (.048)	.387*** (.049)	.388*** (.049)
Cross-pressures	.060 (.068)	.055 (.076)	.042 (.079)	.034 (.075)	.053 (.076)	.053 (.076)
Low Education	-.028 (.022)	-.006 (.025)	-.010 (.025)	-.003 (.024)	-.006 (.025)	-.003 (.025)
High Education	-.079* (.043)	-.064 (.046)	-.073 (.046)	-.065 (.045)	-.062 (.046)	-.062 (.046)
Cross Pressure X Hi Ed	.035 (.125)	.032 (.132)	.034 (.134)	.054 (.130)	.036 (.132)	.037 (.132)
Age	.089** (.045)	.103** (.052)	.114** (.053)	.083 (.051)	.110** (.051)	.109** (.051)
Male	-.028 (.017)	-.033* (.019)	-.031 (.019)	-.032 (.018)	-.033* (.019)	-.033* (.019)
Communist Party	-.030 (.025)	-.037 (.026)	-.036 (.026)	-.039 (.026)	-.039 (.026)	-.040 (.026)
Demographic Stability	-.038 (.026)	-.042 (.028)	-.045 (.029)	-.046* (.028)	-.045 (.028)	-.047* (.028)
Party Competition	.032 (.032)	.035 (.034)	.027 (.034)	.049 (.033)	.045 (.034)	.048 (.034)
Prior Voting	.186*** (.022)	.196*** (.024)	.180*** (.025)	.183*** (.024)	.191*** (.024)	.192*** (.024)
Pos/Neg Support	.007 (.017)	-.001 (.019)	-.001 (.019)	-.004 (.019)	-.003 (.019)	-.003 (.019)
Yeltsin Attitude	-.086*** (.032)	-.040 (.037)	-.060 (.037)	-.043 (.034)	-.065* (.035)	-.059* (.035)
Trust Government	.010 (.038)	.025 (.041)	.032 (.042)	.039 (.041)	.021 (.041)	.020 (.041)
LEADER APPEAL		.268*** (.085)	.192** (.090)	.374*** (.045)	.064*** (.018)	.078*** (.021)
Constant	-.102** (.047)	-.084 (.060)	-.051 (.061)	-.077 (.054)	-.018 (.054)	-.015 (.054)
N	2445	2040	1974	2040	2040	2040

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Table 6: Regression Analysis of Attitude Measure (ID Base) with Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	Base	Opin: 5	Opin: 12	Difference	Dummy: 30	Dummy: 50
Voting Efficacy	.235*** (.030)	.220*** (.033)	.235*** (.033)	.210*** (.032)	.218*** (.033)	.218*** (.033)
Political Awareness	.181*** (.046)	.113** (.053)	.106** (.055)	.090* (.053)	.123** (.053)	.120** (.053)
Exposure	.161*** (.045)	.145*** (.050)	.152*** (.051)	.133*** (.050)	.145*** (.050)	.145*** (.050)
Engagement	.367*** (.046)	.343*** (.053)	.359*** (.054)	.315*** (.052)	.335*** (.053)	.337*** (.053)
Cross-pressures	.076 (.072)	.089 (.082)	.099 (.085)	.070 (.081)	.088 (.082)	.089 (.082)
Low Education	-.031 (.023)	-.010 (.027)	-.025 (.027)	-.008 (.026)	-.011 (.027)	-.008 (.027)
High Education	-.124*** (.046)	-.120** (.049)	-.122** (.050)	-.122** (.049)	-.119** (.049)	-.119** (.049)
Cross Pressure X Hi Ed	.139 (.132)	.140 (.143)	.122 (.145)	.160 (.141)	.144 (.143)	.145 (.143)
Age	.191*** (.048)	.217*** (.056)	.238*** (.057)	.200*** (.055)	.225*** (.055)	.225*** (.055)
Male	-.024 (.018)	-.028 (.020)	-.024 (.020)	-.028 (.020)	-.029 (.020)	-.029 (.020)
Communist Party	.029 (.026)	.019 (.028)	.016 (.028)	.017 (.028)	.017 (.028)	.016 (.028)
Demographic Stability	-.020 (.027)	-.032 (.031)	-.031 (.031)	-.036 (.030)	-.035 (.031)	-.037 (.031)
Party Competition	-.023 (.034)	-.022 (.036)	-.018 (.037)	-.008 (.036)	-.012 (.036)	-.009 (.036)
Prior Voting	.083*** (.023)	.082*** (.026)	.060** (.027)	.069*** (.026)	.077*** (.026)	.078*** (.026)
Pos/Neg Support	-.001 (.018)	-.004 (.020)	-.005 (.021)	-.007 (.020)	-.006 (.020)	-.006 (.020)
Yeltsin Attitude	-.060* (.034)	-.007 (.040)	-.041 (.040)	-.015 (.037)	-.035 (.038)	-.031 (.038)
Trust Government	-.002 (.040)	.018 (.045)	.019 (.046)	.030 (.044)	.013 (.045)	.013 (.045)
LEADER APPEAL		.283*** (.092)	.159 (.098)	.350*** (.049)	.063*** (.020)	.070*** (.023)
Constant	-.142*** (.050)	-.164** (.065)	-.125* (.066)	-.147** (.058)	-.093 (.058)	-.089 (.058)
N	2445	2040	1974	2040	2040	2040

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Table 7: Regression Analysis of Leader Thermometer Scores with Coefficients and (Standard Errors)

	Yeltsin	Yavlinsky	Zhirinov.	Lebed	Zyuganov
Intelligent	.145*** (.023)	.101*** (.034)	.086*** (.018)	.166*** (.035)	.065** (.027)
Strong Leader	.038* (.022)	.095*** (.027)	.027 (.019)	-.016 (.034)	.055** (.027)
Honest	.246*** (.025)	.168*** (.035)	.172*** (.029)	.189*** (.032)	.210*** (.032)
Vision	.115*** (.020)	.063* (.032)	.029 (.017)	.070** (.029)	.025 (.025)
Cares	.130*** (.024)	.147*** (.031)	.108*** (.028)	.143*** (.028)	.276*** (.030)
BC: Economy	.079*** (.017)	.088*** (.017)	.146*** (.039)	.059** (.023)	.106*** (.018)
BC: Unemployment	-.017 (.021)	.054*** (.024)	.096*** (.025)	.010 (.022)	.044*** (.016)
BC: Crime&Corruption	-.018 (.030)	.015 (.068)	.063*** (.023)	.013 (.016)	.051** (.021)
BC: Chechnya	.025 (.027)	-.019 (.043)	.067*** (.022)	.039*** (.015)	-.007 (.022)
BC: Foreign Policy	.062*** (.015)	.000 (.027)	.113*** (.039)	.015 (.025)	.055*** (.020)
BC: Democracy	.037*** (.013)	.035 (.022)	.043 (.053)	.076*** (.029)	-.011 (.021)
BC: Stability	.034* (.018)	.085*** (.031)	.012 (.041)	.035** (.015)	.092*** (.019)
Constant	.083*** (.011)	.036 (.022)	.042*** (.008)	.103*** (.024)	.029** (.014)

N	1669	1061	1419	1484	1385
R-Squared	.568	.420	.436	.319	.684

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, BC = Best Candidate Dummy

Table 8: Regression Analysis of Lebed and Zyuganov Thermometer Scores with Coefficients and (Standard Errors) with and without Control Variables

	Lebed	Lebed	Zyuganov	Zyuganov
Intelligent	.166*** (.035)	.164*** (.038)	.065** (.027)	.061** (.029)
Strong Leader	-.016 (.034)	-.009 (.037)	.055** (.027)	.064** (.028)
Honest	.189*** (.032)	.193*** (.036)	.210*** (.032)	.176*** (.035)
Vision	.070** (.029)	.070** (.032)	.025 (.025)	.044 (.027)
Cares	.143*** (.028)	.122*** (.031)	.276*** (.030)	.236*** (.033)
BC: Economy	.059** (.023)	.061** (.025)	.106*** (.018)	.075*** (.020)
BC: Unemployment	.010 (.022)	.003 (.024)	.044*** (.016)	.049*** (.017)
BC: Crime&Corruption	.013 (.016)	.025 (.018)	.051** (.021)	.045** (.022)
BC: Chechnya	.039*** (.015)	.031* (.016)	-.007 (.022)	-.019 (.023)
BC: Foreign Policy	.015 (.025)	.006 (.027)	.055*** (.020)	.041 (.021)
BC: Democracy	.076*** (.029)	.099*** (.031)	-.011 (.021)	-.003 (.022)
BC: Stability	.035** (.015)	.035* (.016)	.092*** (.019)	.092*** (.020)
Ideology		-.034 (.035)		-.040 (.030)
West		-.029 (.026)		-.078*** (.025)
Privatization		.018 (.033)		-.018 (.030)
Retrospective Sociotropic		.042 (.029)		-.075*** (.027)
Retrospective Pocketbook		-.018 (.028)		-.056** (.026)
Law and Order		.020 (.020)		-.007 (.017)
Guaranteed Job		.063* (.037)		.071** (.034)
Limit Rich		.000 (.026)		.078*** (.025)
Constant	.103*** (.024)	.057 (.050)	.029** (.014)	.045 (.043)
N	1484	1253	1385	1150
R-Squared	.319	.327	.684	.700

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, BC = Best Candidate Dummy

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