Minds and Machines

V83.0015

 

 

Session:          Summer Session 2 (June 30-August 7 2008)

Time:              6:00-7:35 p.m.

Room:             Silver Center Room 707

 

Instructor:      Jonny Cottrell

E-mail:            jdc372@nyu.edu

Office:             5 Washington Place 613

Office hours:  Tues and Thurs, 4:30-5:30 p.m., or by appointment.

 

 

Course description

Required text

Recommended texts

Assignments

Background

Course Policies

Schedule

Philosophy Resources

           

 

Course Description

 

Could man-made machines—in particular, computers—have mental lives at all like ours?  Are our own minds (or brains) themselves computers?  This course will approach central topics in philosophy of mind and psychology by way of these questions.  Along the way, we will consider:  Could computers ever be intelligent?  How do we represent the world in language and thought, and could computers be capable of either?  What is the relation between those aspects of our minds we are aware of, such as our beliefs, desires and experiences, and the subconscious neural processing that takes place in our brains?  Is it anything like the relation between software and hardware?  What is the nature of consciousness experience?  And what are we, ourselves—are we computers, or computer programs?  Or are we animals of a certain biological species?  Readings will be drawn from classic books and papers in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and artificial intelligence.

 

Topics will include:

 

  • Dualism and materialism
  • Behaviorism
  • Functionalism
  • Computational views of the mind
  • The Chinese Room argument
  • The Language of Thought Hypothesis
  • Connectionism
  • Eliminativism
  • Consciousness
  • The Self

 

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Required text

 

Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F.  Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction, 2nd edition.  (Hereinafter BMJ.)

 

This is available from the NYU Bookstore.  You might also look online for cheaper second hand copies—but make sure you get the second edition.)

 

Other assigned readings will be available online, or will be provided in hardcopy.

 

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Recommended texts

 

I don’t require that you buy any of the following, but you might find it useful to browse through them.

 

  • Copeland, J.  1993.  Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction.
  • Guttenplan, S. (ed.)  1996.  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.
  • Chalmers, D.  2002.  Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.
  • Lycan, W. and Prinz, J. (eds.)  2008.  Mind and Cognition: An Anthology.  (Older editions of this anthology, edited by Lycan alone, are good, too.)

 

Most of these will be available on reserve at Bobst Library.

 

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Assignments

 

The course grade will be based on the following assignments:

 

  • Four problem sets, each counting for 20% final grade.  These will ask you to evaluate positions or arguments that we have encountered in class.  I’ll evaluate them with an emphasis on clarity of thought and writing.  Please submit these assignments to the Digital Dropbox of the course Blackboard site.
  • Final exam, counting for 15% final grade.  This will be a comprehensive review of the material covered in the course.
  • Participation grade, counting for 5% final grade.  Though the course will presuppose no background in philosophy (see below), I do expect students to engage seriously with the assigned readings, and to come to class prepared to participate actively in our discussions.

 

First Problem Set

 

 

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Background

 

This course will presuppose no background in philosophy.  But some of the readings (especially those later in the course) will be difficult.  I advise that students who would like to acquire some background should read over the first three chapters in BMJ, follow up any references that sound interesting to them, and/or peruse any of the recommended texts, again following up references to the topics on the schedule.

 

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Course Policies

 

The following policies will be enforced during the course:

 

  • Except under extenuating circumstances, late assignments will not be accepted.
  • Any student found to have plagiarized material in any submission for the course, or to have perpetrated any other form of academic fraud, will automatically be issued an ‘F’ grade in the course, and will be referred to the Dean of their school for further disciplinary action.

 

For a definition of ‘plagiarism,’ students should consult: http://www.nyu.edu/cas/ewp/html/policies___procedures.html (section on Academic Integrity).  For further guidance, please consult the College of Arts and Sciences webpage on Academic Standards: http://cas.nyu.edu/object/bulletin0608.ug.academicpolicies.html (section on Academic Standards and Discipline).

 

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Schedule (this schedule is tentative, and readings are subject to change)

 

For most topics, a background reading is assigned from BMJ (normally a chapter).  In class, we’ll focus on the daily readings, which will by and large be excerpts from BMJ, and from classic papers in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and artificial intelligence.  Readings marked (B) are available in the ‘Course Documents’ section of the Blackboard site.

 

 

Part One:  Introduction

 

6/30:  Introduction

 

7/1:  Dualism and alternatives

BMJ pp.3-9, 10-23, 32-35.

Optional: Smullyan, ‘An Unfortunate Dualist’ (B).

 

 

Part Two:  Behaviorist Approaches

Background reading: BMJ Ch. 2

 

7/2:  The Turing Test

A.M. Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence,’ sections 1-3 (pp.433-436 in JStor version), and s.6.5 (‘Arguments from Various Disabilities,’ pp.447-450); BMJ pp.114-122 (‘Blockhead’).

 

Turing’s paper is also available here, for those without JStor access.

 

7/3:  Logical Behaviorism

H. Putnam, ‘Brains and Behavior’ (B)

 

 

Part Three:  The Identity Theory and Functionalist Approaches

Background reading: BMJ Chs. 3 and 5

 

7/7:  The Identity Theory

J.J.C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ (B); BMJ pp.49-52.

 

FIRST PROBLEM SET DUE 7/7.

 

7/8:  Introduction to Functionalism

BMJ Ch. 3, esp. pp.48-58 (have a look at—but don’t worry if you don’t understand—the starred (*) sections at pp.58-59).

 

7/9:  Troubles with Functionalism

BMJ pp.107-110 (‘The China Brain’); BMJ Ch. 5.

Optional: Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism,’ selections.

 

7/10:  Functionalism and the Identity Theory

Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’ (B)

Optional: BMJ Ch. 6

 

 

Part Four: The Computational Theory

Background reading: BMJ Chs. 5 and 10; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry on The Computational Theory of Mind

 

7/14:  The Computational View of the Mind I

Sterelny, ‘Representation, Computation and Implementation,’ pp.42-49 (B)

 

SECOND PROBLEM SET DUE 7/14.

 

7/15:  The Computational View of the Mind II

Block, ‘The Mind as the Software of the Brain,’ section 1.

Optional: Sterelny, ‘Representation, Computation and Implementation,’ pp.49-60 (B)

 

7/16:  The Language of Thought Hypothesis

BMJ Ch. 10; Fodor, ‘Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought’ (B)

 

7/17:  Modularity

Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, selections: pp.38-46, 64-73, 101-108 (B)

(If you would like to chase up references to other parts of Fodor’s book, you can do so online from an NYU terminal.)

 

 

Part Five: Problems for the Computational View

Background reading: BMJ Chs. 12 and 14, selections

 

7/21:  The Chinese Room Argument

Searle, ‘Can Computers Think?’ (B); BMJ pp.110-114 (‘The Chinese Room’)

 

THIRD PROBLEM SET DUE 7/21.

 

7/22:  The Frame Problem

Dennett, ‘The Frame Problem for AI’ (B)

 

7/23:  Eliminative Materialism

Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’ (B); BMJ Ch. 14

 

7/24:  Connectionism

Sterelny, ‘Connectionism’ (B)

 

 

Part Seven:  Consciousness

Background reading: BMJ Ch. 8

 

7/28:  Nagel’s objection to reductive approaches

T. Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (B)

 

FOURTH PROBLEM SET DUE 7/28.

 

7/29:  Is there more than one kind of consciousness?

N. Block, ‘Some Concepts of Consciousness,’ (B)

 

7/30:  The ‘Knowledge Argument’

F. Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ and selections from ‘What Mary Didn’t Know,’ (B)

 

7/31:  Functionalist and Physicalist responses to the objections from consciousness

D. Dennett, ‘Quining Qualia’ (B)

 

 

Part Eight:  Functionalism and The Self

Background reading: John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality

 

EXAM STUDY GUIDE NOW AVAILABLE

 

8/4:  The Functionalist view of personal identity

S. Shoemaker, ‘A Materialist’s Account’ sections 1, 3, 5, 6, 10.

Optional: ‘A Materialist’s Account’ section 4.

 

8/5:  The Animalist view

E. Olson, ‘Was I Ever A Fetus?’; Shoemaker, ‘A Materialist’s Account’ section 11.

 

8/6:  ‘Split-brain’ patients and the unity of consciousness

T. Nagel, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’.

 

8/7:  Dennett on Self-Location

Dennett, ‘Where Am I?’ (B)

 

TAKE HOME EXAM DUE 8/8 AT HIGH NOON.

 

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Philosophy Resources

 

Professor Jim Pryor’s website gives very helpful guidance in reading and writing philosophy:

 

Jim Pryor’s Philosophical Terms and Methods

Guidelines on Reading Philosophy

Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper

 

Although no term paper will be required for this course, the writing guidelines will help you excel in the Problem Sets; I too will be looking for clarity and straightforwardness in your writing.

 

You might also find the following links useful:

 

Philosophy Research Resources

Philosophy at NYU

 

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