Spring 2007:
Game Theory II
Fridays, 11:30-1:30, Room 517
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Date |
Topic |
Homework |
References |
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1 |
19-Jan |
General introduction + introduction to dominant strategy implementation (Notes) |
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13, 17, 18, 23, 28 |
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2 |
26-Jan |
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (see Reny's paper, [25]) |
25, 28, 29 |
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3 |
2-Feb |
Matching + VCG mechanism (Notes) |
1, 15, 26 |
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4 |
9-Feb |
Nash implementation (see Benoit & Ok's paper, [4]) Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms (Notes) |
4, 26, 23, 30 |
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5 |
16-Feb |
Virtual + subgame-perfect implementation (Notes) |
3, 23 |
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6 |
23-Feb |
Mechanism-design: Optimal mechanisms (Notes) |
14, 20 |
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7 |
2-Mar |
Mechanism-design: Efficient mechanisms (Notes) |
5-7, 14, 21, 22 |
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8 |
9-Mar |
midterm |
Midterm | |
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9 |
16-Mar |
spring recess |
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10 |
23-Mar |
Midterm solution (full extraction of the surplus, bayesian implementation and sequential screening) |
Midterm solution |
6, 11, 22, 31, 32 |
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11 |
30-Mar |
Common knowledge, common priors and speculative trade (Notes) |
2, 19, 23, 27, 33 |
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12 |
6-Apr |
Common knowledge, common priors and speculative trade - cont. Mechanism-design approach to speculative trade |
2, 19, 23, 27, 33 10 |
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13 |
13-Apr |
Mechanism-design approach to speculative trade - cont. Contract design with non-common priors |
10 11 |
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14 |
20-Apr |
Contract design with non-common priors - cont. |
11 |
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15 |
27-Apr |
Contract design with non-common priors - cont. Contract design with dynamically inconsistent agents |
11 8, 9, 24 |
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| 15 | 4-May | Final |
References
[1] Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez (2003), “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach”, American Economic Review 93(3), pp. 729-747
[2] Robert Aumann (1976), "Agreeing to Disagree", Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
[3] Dilip Abreu and Hitoshi Matsushima (1992), "Virtual Implementation in Iterated Undominated Strategies: Complete Information", Econometrica 60 , 993-1008.
[4] Jean Pierre Benoit and Efe Ok (2006), "Maskin's Theorem, with Limited Veto Power", Games and Economic Behavior 55, 331-339.
[5] Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987), "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently", Econometrica 55(3), 615-632.
[6] Jacques Cremer and Richard McLean (1985), "Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent", Econometrica 53(2), 345-361.
[7] Jacques Cremer and Richard McLean (1988), "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions", Econometrica 56(6), 1247-1257.
[8] Stephano Della Vigna and Ulrike Malmendier (2004), "Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence", Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 353-402.
[9] Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (2006), "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents", Review of Economic Studies 73(3), 689-714.
[10] Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (2006), "A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade", forthcoming in Econometrica.
[11] Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (2006), "Speculative Contracts", Mimeo, NYU.
[12] A. Gibbard (1973), "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result", Econometrica 41, 587-601.
[13] Matthew Jackson (2001), “A Crash Course in Implementation Theory”, Social Choice and Welfare 18(4), 655-708.
[14] Vijay Krishna (2002), Auction Theory, Academic Press.
[15] Herman B. Leonard (1983), "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions", Journal of Political Economy 91(3), 461-479.
[16] Eric Maskin (1999), "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality", Review of Economic Studies 66, 23-38.
[17] Eric Maskin and Tomas Sjöström (2001), “Implementation Theory”, forthcoming in the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1-12. Available at http://www.sss.ias.edu/papers/econpapersix.pdf
[18] John Moore (1992), “Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information”, in Advances in Economic Theory, Volume 1, edited by J. J. Laffont, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[19] Stephen Morris (1994), "Trade with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Asymmetric Information", Econometrica 62(6), 1327-1347.
[20] Roger Myerson (1981), "Optimal Auction Design", Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58-73.
[21] Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite (1983), "Efficient Mehanisms for Bilateral Trading", JET 28, 265-281.
[22] Zvika Neeman (2004), "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design", JET 117, 55-77.
[23] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 177-180.
[24] Matthew Rabin and Ted O'Donoghue (1999), "Incentives for Procrastinators", Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 769-816.
[25] Phil Reny (2001), "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach", Economic Letters 70, 99-105.
[26] Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. E. Sotomayor (1990), Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-215
[26] Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky (1990), "On the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results", Journal of Economic Theory 51(1), 184-193.
[28] Roberto Serrano (2004), "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules", SIAM Review 46(3), 377-414.
[29] Mark Satterthwaite (1975), "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions", JET 10, 187-217.
[30] Matthew Jackson (1992), “Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms”, Review of Economic Studies 89, 757-775.
[31] Courty, P. and H. Li (2000): "Sequential Screening", Review of Economic Studies 67(4), 697-718.
[32] Tom Palfrey (1992): "Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design", in Advances in Economic Theory, Volume 1, edited by J. J. Laffont, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 291-292.
[33] Dov Samet (1998): "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets", Games and Economic Behavior 24, 172-174.